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 This thesis is an examination of the problem of tyranny from the perspective of 
radical libertarianism. History is to be seen as a race and conflict between liberty and 
power. After a brief introduction, the second section of this thesis is devoted to sketching 
out a natural law and natural rights theory. With this as the foundation, the third section 
analyzes the seminal work of Étienne de la Boétie’s The Discourse of Voluntary 
Servitude in which he elucidates the nature of tyranny and the psychology of subjection. 
All governments, even the worst tyranny, rest upon general popular acceptance. Religious 
and political ideologies serve as the justification and motivation for resisting tyranny. The 
role of ideology in revolutions, and the perennial conflict between liberty and power, are 
illustrated in the fourth and fifth sections in the context of the American Revolution and 
Founding, and Civil War. The sixth section sketches a radical libertarian critique of the 
State as inherently tyrannical and counterproductive to the goal of securing individual 













But O good Lord! What strange phenomenon is this? What name shall 
we give it? What is the nature of this misfortune? What vice is it, or, 
rather, what degradation? To see an endless multitude of people not 
merely obeying, but driven to servility? Not ruled, but tyrannized over? 
These wretches have no wealth, no kin, nor wife nor children, not even life 
itself that they can call their own. They suffer plundering, wantonness, 
cruelty, not from an army, not from a barbarian horde, on account of 
whom they must shed their blood and sacrifice their lives, but from a 
single man; not from a Hercules nor from a Samson, but from a single 
little man. 
– Étienne de la Boétie, The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude, c. 1552-
531 
 
WHEN in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for one 
People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with 
another, and to assume among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and 
equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle 
them, a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind requires that they 
should declare the causes which impel them to the Separation. 
 
WE hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness – 
That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, 
deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that 
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it 
is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new 
Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its 
Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their 
Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed will dictate that Governments 
long established should not be changed for light and transient Causes; and 
accordingly all Experience hath shewn, that Mankind are more disposed to 
suffer, while Evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing 
the Forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long Train of Abuses 
and Usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object, evinces a Design to 
reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their Right, it is their Duty, to 
throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future 
Security. 
– Thomas Jefferson, Declaration of Independence, 1776 
 
                                                 
1 Étienne de La Boétie, The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude, translated by 
Harry Kurz with an introduction by Murray Rothbard, (New York: Black Rose Books, 1997), pp. 47-48. 
Boétie is pronounced “Bwettie” with a hard t. 
 2 
Lord Acton once said, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely”; he continued, “Great men are almost always bad men.”2 This last might 
strike one as a curious statement, until one remembers that even Nero and Julius Caesar 
were deeply mourned by their people. Tyrants are not always recognized as such by their 
own people or even by subsequent generations. This can be explained by a failure to 
understand the nature of tyranny and the value of liberty, which brings us to the 
underlying theme of this essay: the problem of tyranny. To quote Murray Rothbard, “why 
in the world do people consent to their own enslavement?”3 For this is the fundamental 
insight of the sixteenth century Frenchman, Étienne de la Boétie, and the driving concern 
of his Discourse of Voluntary Servitude, that all governments are grounded on the 
consent of the governed, on general popular acceptance, even the worst tyranny.4  
Tyranny is a perennial danger for mankind, recurring again and again throughout 
history, and it has been a subject of discourse for many great thinkers from the ancient 
Greeks to the present. The traditional conception of tyranny is twofold; it is either 1) the 
usurpation of rightful power (typically the usurpation of a republic), or 2) government 
against the “laws” (defined variously as customary law, divine law, or natural law), or 
both. This traditional conception of tyranny focuses on the means by which the ruler 
                                                 
2 Lord Acton, letter, 3 April 1887, to Bishop Mandell Creighton (published in The Life and Letters of 
Mandell Creighton. Louise von Glehn Creighton, ed. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1913). 
3 Murray N. Rothbard, “The Political Though of Étienne de La Boétie,” in The Politics of Obedience: The 
Discourse of Voluntary Servitude, p. 13 (emphasis in original). I tend to agree with Rothbard that La Boétie 
cuts to the heart of not merely the central problem of tyranny, but “of what is, or rather should be, the 
central problem of political philosophy: the mystery of civil obedience” (Ibid.). 
4 David Hume independently discovered this principle two centuries later: “Nothing appears more 
surprising to those who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the 
many are governed by the few; and the implicit submission, with which men resign their own sentiments 
and passions to those of their rulers. When we enquire by what means this wonder is effected, we shall 
find, that, as Force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but 
opinion. It is therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most 
despotic and military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular.” (David Hume, “Of the 
First Principles of Government,” in Essays, Literary, Moral and Political (London: Oxford University 
Press [1966, c1963])). 
 3 
acquires power and the use made of that power. As we shall see, La Boétie goes beyond 
this traditional conception and implicitly gets to the heart of the nature of power itself: 
that the power of man over man is tyrannical. My own thoughts on liberty and tyranny, 
liberty and power, exactly follows that of Murray Rothbard’s as expressed in the preface 
to his four-volume work on American history from colonial times to the Revolution,  
Conceived in Liberty: 
My own basic perspective on the history of man, and a fortiori on the 
history of the United States, is to place central importance on the great 
conflict which is eternally waged between Liberty and Power, a conflict, 
by the way, which was seen with crystal clarity by the American 
revolutionaries of the eighteenth century. I see the liberty of the individual 
not only as a great moral good in itself (or, with Lord Acton, as the highest 
political good), but also as the necessary condition for the flowering of all 
the other goods that mankind cherishes: moral virtue, civilization, the arts 
and sciences, economic prosperity. Out of liberty, then, stem the glories of 
civilized life. But liberty has always been threatened by the encroachments 
of power, power which seeks to suppress, control, cripple, tax, and exploit 
the fruits of liberty and production. Power, then, the enemy of liberty, is 
consequently the enemy of all the other goods and fruits of civilization 
that mankind holds dear. And power is almost always centered in and 
focused on that central repository of power and violence: the state. With 
Albert Jay Nock, the twentieth-century American political philosopher, I 
see history as centrally a race and conflict between “social power” – the 
productive consequence of voluntary interactions among men – and state 
power. In those eras of history when liberty – social power – has managed 
to race ahead of state power and control, the country and even mankind 
have flourished. In those eras when state power has managed to catch up 
with or surpass social power, mankind suffers and declines.5 
 
In the following pages I attempt to sketch a radical libertarian natural law and natural 
rights social ethic as I understand it. In doing so I do not claim to speak for all 
libertarians; indeed, many libertarians would no doubt find something to disagree with in 
                                                 
5 Murray N. Rothbard, Conceived in Liberty Vol. I: The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century 
(New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House Publishers, 1975), pp. 9-10. 
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this essay.6 I then give an explication of La Boétie’s analysis of the nature of tyranny and 
voluntary servitude. In the two subsequent parts I attempt to illustrate the conflict 
between liberty and power with an examination of events surrounding the American 
Revolution and Founding, and Civil War. And finally, I sketch a radical libertarian 


















                                                 
6 The libertarian movement, not counting the anarchist socialists who also claim the label libertarian, is 
divided into two groups: the minarchists, who support a limited government as either good or a necessary 
evil, and the anarchists, who consider the State to be an unnecessary evil. 
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II. Natural Law and Natural Rights 
The program of liberalism, therefore, if condensed into a single word, 
would have to read: property, that is, private ownership of the means of 
production... All the other demands of liberalism result from this 
fundamental demand.  
– Ludwig von Mises, Liberalism7 
 
 What motivated early Americans to resist English tyranny? How is such 
resistance, whether violent or nonviolent, justified? I think these questions are related, not 
merely because human beings act for reasons and need to justify their actions. I could 
merely describe the motivations of the early Americans, and indeed I do so in part five of 
this essay; but my intention here is also to demonstrate the justification for resistance to 
tyranny in terms of a universally applicable ethical theory. This justification can be found 
in the political ideology of the early Americans, which is the political philosophy of 
(classical) liberalism. Libertarianism is a younger variant of liberalism that has taken its 
fundamental principles to their logical conclusion. 
Liberalism recognizes the principle that governments are founded upon the 
consent of the governed. Indeed, liberalism not only recognizes this principle but carries 
it further, arguing that the only just government is one that is formed voluntarily by the 
people in order to protect their natural rights. This political philosophy has been most 
popularly epitomized in the Declaration of Independence, quoted at the beginning of this 
essay.8 Those who take a natural law9 approach to liberalism, rather than a merely 
                                                 
7 Ludwig von Mises, Liberalism: A Socio-Economic Exposition (Mission, KA.: Sheed Andrews and 
McMeel, 1978 [1962]), p. 19. 
8 The original draft of the Declaration, while more philosophically precise, appears to have been changed 
for stylistic rather than substantive reasons. Regarding rights, it read as follows: “We hold these truths to be 
sacred and undeniable: that all men are created equal and independent; that from that equal creation they 
derive rights inherent and inalienable, among which are the preservation of life, and liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness.” (See Roderick T. Long, “Equality: The Unknown Ideal,” The Ludwig von Mises Institute: 
http://www.mises.org/fullstory.asp?control=804, 2001.) 
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utilitarian one, recognize that every individual has an absolute ethical duty to deal with 
others in a manner suitable for the life of a human being qua human being, that is, 
noncoercively.10 
Natural law holds that what is good and bad for Man is determined by his nature. 
Man is defined by his essential characteristic, which is his faculty of reason; in other 
words, Man is a rational being. He is neither omniscient nor omnipotent nor infallible and 
possesses no innate instinctual knowledge, and because of this he must use his mind to 
discover the ends he should pursue and the means by which to pursue them. 
Self-ownership is the basis of liberal/libertarian natural law and natural rights 
theory. In contradistinction to classical natural law theory, which “placed the locus of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 I take a supply-side virtue ethics approach to natural law here as opposed to traditional consequentialist 
and deontological (“duty-centered”) demand-side approaches.  The former, which has its roots in ancient 
Greek (particularly Aristotelian) thought, focuses on the agent of moral activity, whereas the latter focus on 
the patient of moral activity. For the former, the central question of ethics is not “What consequences 
should I promote?” or “What rules should I follow?” but rather “What kind of person should I be?” 
Certainly, demand-side approaches to natural law exist, but I would argue that they are not as 
philosophically defensible. For the distinction between supply-side and demand-side ethics, I am indebted 
to David Kelley and Roderick T. Long; see Long, “Slavery Contracts and Inalienable Rights: A 
Formulation,” Formulations 2, No. 2 (Winter 1994-95), http://www.libertariannation.org/a/f22l1.html. For 
the roots of liberal natural law and natural rights theory in Aristotle, see Fred D. Miller, Jr., Nature, Justice, 
and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); and for a necessary amendment 
to it, see Long, “Aristotle’s Conception of Freedom,” The Review of Metaphysics 49 (June 1996): 775-802. 
Finally, it is not the place of this essay to argue the ultimate source of natural law, whether it be God or the 
logical structure of reality. Suffice to say that there is some dispute among natural law theorists on this 
subject while they agree on the existence of natural law and its accessibility to reason. 
10 Man is defined as a rational being. Libertarians recognize certain conditions such as childhood, mental 
retardation, and insanity in which an individual’s faculty of reason is considered to be in an impaired, 
disabled, or not fully developed state. There is little, if any, debate among libertarians, or among sensible 
people for that matter, that it is a reasonable assumption that an adult is capable of making his or her own 
decisions (even if he or she actually makes foolish ones). There is considerable debate among libertarians, 
however, as to exactly when children develop an adult capacity for reason and cease being children. This 
issue is complicated by the fact that children don’t all mature at the same rate. The level of a child’s 
development is a matter of degree, leading to a diminished gap between the child’s expressed and true 
preferences as he/she matures. The issue is not central to my purpose, but I think Roderick Long’s 
suggested solution is the fairest one: “pick a single universal age of majority [say, 18], but allow exceptions 
through litigation; the age of majority simply determines the point at which the presumption of incapacity 
yields to a presumption of capacity, rather than serving as a rigid inescapable iron barrier. Once this 
flexibility is introduced, the precise age that is picked as the cut-off for majority becomes less important” 
(“Imagineering Freedom: A Constitution of Liberty, Part IV,” Formulations 2, No. 4 (Summer 1995), 
http://www.libertariannation.org/a/f24l2.html). Until a child reaches the age of majority, it is the duty of the 
parent(s) or guardian(s) to protect the child’s rights and supervise his/her choices. Such paternalism is not 
justified for adults, however. 
 7 
good and of virtuous action in the State, with individuals strictly subordinated to State 
action[,]” 
the Levellers and particularly John Locke in seventeenth-century 
England…transformed classical natural law into a theory grounded on 
methodological and hence political individualism. From the Lockean 
emphasis on the individual as the unit of action, as the entity who thinks, 
feels, chooses, and acts, stemmed his conception of natural law in politics 
as establishing the natural rights of each individual. It was the Lockean 
individualist tradition that profoundly influenced the later American 
revolutionaries and the dominant tradition of libertarian political thought 
in the revolutionary new nation.11 
 
Consider the following passage from Locke’s “Second Treatise on Government”: 
[E]very man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right 
to but himself. The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may 
say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that 
nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and 
joined to it something of his own, and thereby makes it his property. It 
being by him removed from the common state nature has placed it in, it 
hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common 
right of other men. For this labour being the unquestionable property of 
the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined 
to… 
 
He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples 
he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to 
himself. Nobody can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask when did they 
begin to be his?…And ‘tis plain, if the first gathering made them not his, 
nothing else could. That labour put a distinction between them and 
common. That added something to them more than nature, the common 
mother of all, had done: and so they become his private right. And will 
any one say he had no right to those acorns or apples he thus appropriated, 
because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his?…If such 
a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the 
plenty God had given him. We see in commons, which remain so by 
compact, that ‘tis the taking part of what is common, and removing it out 
of the state Nature leaves it in, which beings the property; without which 
the common is of no use.12 
                                                 
11 Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (New York: New York University Press, 2002 [1982]), p. 21. 
12 John Locke, “The Second Treatise of Government” in The Political Writings of John Locke, David 
Wootton, ed. (New York: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1993), V.27-28, pp. 274-275. The process, herein 




In The Ethics of Liberty, Murray Rothbard makes a similar point: 
 
The individual man, in introspecting the fact of his own consciousness, 
…discovers the primordial natural fact of his freedom: his freedom to 
choose, his freedom to use or not use his reason about any given subject. 
In short, the natural fact of his “free will.” He also discovers the natural 
fact of his mind’s command over his body and its actions: that is, of his 
natural ownership over his self.13 
 
This right to his person and property derives from Man’s reasoning mind. For individuals 
to live a life proper to Man (i.e., a virtuous life), central place must be given to the 
distinctively human faculty of reason. In dealing with others, one properly expresses this 
faculty through reason and persuasion, rather than through the initiation of force 
(including fraud, theft, and the threat of force).14 The virtue that defines the appropriately 
human attitude towards the initiation of force is justice. A just person will refrain from 
initiating coercion against others. From this obligation to behave justly (i.e., virtuously), 
we derive the concept of natural rights.  
A right is a moral concept; it is a principle of interpersonal ethics that acts as a 
bridge between the ethical and the political. Rights, then, are a subset of moral principles 
that govern the legitimate use of force in interpersonal relations. A right always pertains 
only to action (or more precisely, to freedom of action). To a moral agent, a right is a 
positive sanction for him to act on his own judgment; it is also a negative obligation on 
him to use reason in his dealings with others, that is, to refrain from violating their rights 
by initiating force. In other words, our obligation to live a maximally human life, which 
is a life of reason, translates into a right, on the part of others, not to be aggressed 
                                                 
13 Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, p. 31. 
14 Initiation of force here is used in contradistinction to retaliatory force, which itself is justified only 
against those who have initiated force in the first place. 
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against.15 In this sense, the right to liberty, properly understood, is the right not to be 
subject to the initiation of force. It is also important to point out that liberty, properly 
understood, is complete and total liberty.16 If liberty consists in freedom from the 
initiation of force; if it is unjust and therefore a violation of your liberty for me to initiate 
force against you, and vice versa; then it is nonsensical to speak of the protection of our 
rights as requiring the limitation of our rights, for by natural law none of us have the right 
to aggress against each other. In other words, the rights of individuals do not overlap or in 
any other way conflict with those of others; by definition, they cannot. 
 Just as we have a responsibility to conduct our affairs with others through reason 
and persuasion, so too do we have a responsibility to resist the initiation of force against 
us, for acquiescing to it prevents us from freely exercising our faculty of reason. 
Defensive force is morally permissible as a proper means of restoring justice, but it is 
hard to see how it can be mandated to the exclusion of nonviolent means of resistance. 
Indeed, nonviolent resistance would seem to be more appealing to a life pursuant with a 
dedication to reason. Aristotle argues, in his Politics, that man is a political animal; a man 
who is by nature without a polis must be either a beast or a god, either subhuman or 
superhuman, but being a god is impossible for man; either extreme is a vice. Similarly, in 
                                                 
15 As a point of clarification, this obligation is one that we owe ourselves as moral agents (and, for 
Christians, to God as well and above all; similarly for other religions). In an Aristotelian virtue-ethics, 
virtue is not merely instrumental to our happiness but constitutive of it. 
16 This is analogous to Herbert Spencer’s Law of Equal Freedom: “Every man has freedom to do all he 
wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man” (Spencer, Social Statics, New York: 
D. Appleton and Company, 1897, p. 121). Murray Rothbard is correct, however, in pointing out that 
Spencer’s Law is redundant; the first proviso implies the second. “For if every man has freedom to do all 
that he wills, it follows from this very premise that no man’s freedom has been infringed or invaded. […] 
The concept “equality” has no rightful place in the “Law of Equal Freedom,” being replaceable by the 
logical qualifier “every.” The “Law of Equal Freedom” could well be renamed “The Law of Total 
Freedom.” (Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State with Power and Market, Scholar’s Edition. Auburn: Mises 
Institute, 2004 [1962, 1970], p. 1312). 
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his Nicomachean Ethics, he holds that a virtue is a mean between two vices.17  If 
Aristotle is correct, and I think that he is, then neither an inhuman (or superhuman) 
passivism nor an animalistic (subhuman) propensity to violence is appropriate to man. In 
short, there is a point at which nonviolent resistance may no longer be moral and violent 
resistance becomes obligatory, and vice versa. Exactly what that point is will have to be 
judged contextually by the particular individual(s). 
 “The right of property implies the right to make contracts about that property: to 
give it away or to exchange titles of ownership for the property of another person.”18 The 
right of contract is not absolute, however, as it is derived from the right of property. 
[The] only enforceable contracts (i.e., those backed by the sanction of 
legal coercion) should be those where the failure of one party to abide by 
the contract implies the theft of property from the other party. In short, a 
contract should only be enforceable when the failure to fulfill it is an 
implicit theft of property. But this can only be true if we hold that validly 
enforceable contracts only exist where title to property has already been 
transferred, and therefore where the failure to abide by the contract means 
that the other party’s property is retained by the delinquent party, without 
the consent of the former (implicit theft).19 
 
This is the “title-transfer” theory of contracts. A contract is not made valid and therefore 
legally enforceable because of promises made or expectations created but because title to 
property has been transferred under certain agreed upon conditions. This is not to say that 
breaking promises or not living up to expectations we foster in others is moral, quite the 
contrary, but we are here concerned with justice and law. 
                                                 
17 Aristotle, Politics, 1253a1-5, 27-33; idem. Nicomachean Ethics; cf. Roderick T. Long, “The Irrelevance 
of Responsibility,” Social Philosophy and Policy 16, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 118-145. “The Aristotelian 
virtues, too, can be seen as a mean between the subhuman vice of overvaluing, and the superhuman vice of 
undervaluing, our vulnerable embodiedness. To err on the side of the beasts is to be excessively concerned 
with our animal nature, our physical desires and physical security[.] … To err on the side of the gods, by 
contrast, is to treat human beings as disembodied intellects for whom the animal nature is irrelevant[.]” 
(Long, p. 122.) 
18 Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, p. 133. 
19 Ibid. Emphasis in original. 
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 Not all titles of ownership in property are transferable. Certainly the physical 
property we own can be given away or sold by us as we please. Such property is 
alienable. Man’s right to his own person and will, however, is inalienable; that is, he 
cannot give or sell control of his person and will to another. Even if he did, in practice, 
voluntarily subordinate his will and person to another, it is still he who decides to follow 
every order given by that person. Moreover, no such voluntary slave contract can be 
legally enforceable. There is no transfer of title in the agreement. If, at any time, the 
individual changes his mind and refuses any longer to be a “slave,” he is legally entitled 
to do so. 
 It follows from the foregoing that the only just government is one that protects 
and respects the rights of its citizens. Some of the implications of this it would do to spell 
out, because such a government as would be just according to a consistent adherence to 
natural law and natural rights would hardly be recognizable as a government to most 
people. It has been said that one of the requirements of a just government is the consent 
of the governed. But what does this mean? Is it consent of the majority? Or of the 
strongest party? Can one man or group of men declare consent for another? 
 Legal theorist and abolitionist Lysander Spooner, writing just after the Civil War, 
answers these questions definitively in “No Treason No. 1 (1867).” Anyone who claim’s 
that “his consent is necessary to the establishment or maintenance of government” 
thereby admits that “every other man’s are equally necessary,” for one man’s rights are 
just as good as everyone else’s. The opposite is also true: anyone who claims that 
someone else’s consent is not necessary thereby admits that his own is not necessary 
either. There is “no alternative but to say, either that the separate, individual consent of 
 12 
every man, who is required to aid, in any way, in supporting the government, is 
necessary, or that the consent of no one is necessary.” 20 Since we possess the right to life, 
liberty, and property, it follows that the latter alternative must be rejected and that the 
individual consent of everyone is necessary 
Thus, applied to the United States Constitution, the phrase “We, the people” in the 
preamble must be taken to mean simply: “We, the people of the United States, acting 
freely and voluntarily as individuals, consent and agree that we will cooperate with each 
other in sustaining such a government as is provided for in this Constitution.”21 The 
whole authority of the Constitution rests upon the necessity for consent of “the people” 
and if they do not consent it is of no validity, and insofar as it has any validity it is only 
between those who actually consent to it.22 “No one’s consent could be presumed against 
him, without his actual consent being given, any more than in the case of any other 
contract to pay money, or render service. And to make it binding upon any one, his 
signature, or other positive evidence of consent, was as necessary as in the case of any 
other contract.”23 At most, the Constitution can be inferred only as offering membership. 
Spooner notes that even those few who actually voted to adopt the Constitution 
did not pledge their faith for any specific time, since no specific time was 
named, in the Constitution, during which the association should continue. 
It was, therefore, merely an association during pleasure; even as between 
the original parties to it. Still less, if possible, has it been any thing more 
than a voluntary association, during pleasure, between the succeeding 
generations, who have never gone through, as their fathers did, with so 
much even as any outward formality of adopting it, or of pledging their 
faith to support it. […] The consent, therefore, that has been given, 
                                                 
20 George H. Smith, ed., The Lysander Spooner Reader (San Francisco: Fox & Wilkes, 1992), p. 60 
(emphasis in original). 




whether by individuals, or by the States, has been, at most, only a consent 
for the time being; not an engagement for the future.24 
 
Thus, Spooner states in “No Treason No. VI” that the “Constitution [and any constitution, 
for that matter] has no inherent authority or obligation. It has no authority or obligation at 
all unless as a contract between man and man.”25 
 One also cannot infer from the Constitution that it is “an agreement between any 
body but ‘the people’ then existing; nor does it, either expressly or impliedly, assert any 
right, power, or disposition, on their part, to bind any body but themselves.”26 Indeed, no 
constitution that purported to do so could be considered valid. In the preamble, it merely 
expresses the hope that it will be useful to the original people’s posterity. Subsequent 
generations would have to individually and voluntarily consent to the Constitution to be 
bound by it. 
It is thought by some that individuals express their consent by voting and paying 
taxes, but even these actions cannot be taken to demonstrate consent. Certainly, even if 
the act of voting were a legitimate demonstration of consent, it “could bind nobody but 
the actual voters.”27 Furthermore, the act of voting cannot be said to be a demonstration 
of a person’s support for the Constitution unless the act of voting were a perfectly 
voluntary one. Yet the act of voting cannot properly be called a perfectly voluntary one 
for many people (or even for most, or all, today). Many vote out of necessity, seeing it as 
the only means they have of preventing the theft of their property or abuse of their rights 
                                                 
24 Ibid., pp. 66-67 (emphasis in original). 
25 Ibid., p. 77. The intervening numbers, III-V, were never written. 
26 Ibid. Emphasis in original. 
27 Ibid., p. 79. 
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by other voters. This is so, in part, because taxation is, at least in practice, compulsory.28 
And as “we can have no legal knowledge as to who votes from choice, and who from the 
necessity thus forced upon him, we can have no legal knowledge, as to any particular 
individual, that he voted from choice; or consequently, that by voting, he consented, or 
pledged himself, to support the government.”29 This is so because all voting is done 
secretly. “No man can reasonably or legally be said to do such a thing as to assent to, or 
support, the Constitution, unless he does it openly, and in a way to make himself 
personally responsible for the acts of his agents, so long as they act within the limits of 
the power he delegates to them.”30 
Spooner trenchantly concludes: 
The ostensible supporters of the Constitution, like the ostensible 
supporters of most other governments, are made up of three classes, viz.: 
1. Knaves, a numerous and active class, who see in the government an 
instrument which they can use for their own aggrandizement or wealth. 2. 
Dupes – a large class, no doubt – each of whom, because he is allowed 
one voice out of millions in deciding what he may do with his own person 
and his own property, and because he is permitted to have the same voice 
in robbing, enslaving, and murdering others, that others have in robbing, 
enslaving, and murdering himself, is stupid enough to imagine that he is a 
“free man,” a “sovereign”; that this is “a free government”;  “a 
government of equal rights,” “the best government on earth,” and such 
like absurdities. 3. A class who have some appreciation of the evils of 
government, but either do not see how to get rid of them, or do not choose 
to so far sacrifice their private interests as to give themselves seriously and 
earnestly to the work of making a change.31 
 
                                                 
28 The economist Joseph Schumpeter was correct when he wrote that “the theory which construes taxes on 
the analogy of club dues or of the purchase of services of, say, a doctor only proves how far removed this 
part of the social sciences is from scientific habits of mind” (Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1942), p. 198.). Anyone who doubts this is welcome to experiment with not 
paying his taxes and see what happens to him. 
29 Ibid., p. 81 (emphasis in original). 
30 Ibid., p. 83. 
31 Ibid., p. 84. In a footnote, Spooner adds: “Suppose it to be the ‘best government on earth’, does that 
prove its own goodness, or only the badness of all other governments?” (p. 122) 
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 Spooner goes on to argue that the “Constitution not only binds nobody now, but it 
never did bind anybody.”32 This is so because it is a general principle of law and reason 
that “all men’s important contracts”33 be written, signed, and delivered. And by delivered 
is meant that it must be “delivered to the party (or to some one for him), in whose favor it 
is made, before it can be binding on the party making it.”34 Just as he is free to refuse to 
sign it, he is free to refuse to deliver it even after he has signed it. Once delivered, 
however, he would be bound by the contract he has signed and delivered, so long as it is a 
contract he had a natural right to consent to. 
 As the Constitution has no authority, Spooner asks, “on what authority does the 
government practically rest?”35 Those who profess to administer it cannot name who their 
principals are. They cannot specify who they are acting as agents for. They have no 
“written authority…accrediting [them] as such.”36 “A secret ballot makes a secret 
government; and a secret government is a secret band of robbers and murderers. […] 
Men honestly engaged in attempting to establish justice in the world, have no occasion 
thus to act in secret; or to appoint agents to do acts for which they (the principals) are not 
willing to be responsible.”37 Thus the pretended agents of the people are really agents of 
nobody and the government’s sole source of authority rests upon the use of force. 
 Spooner ends “No Treason No. VI” thus: 
Inasmuch as the Constitution was never signed, nor agreed to, by anybody, 
as a contract, and therefore never bound anybody, and is now binding 
upon nobody; and is moreover such an one as no people can ever hereafter 
be expected to consent to, except as they may be forced to do so at the 
                                                 
32 Ibid., p. 88 (emphasis in original). 
33 Ibid., p. 90 (emphasis in original). 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., p. 95. 
36 Ibid., p. 96 (emphasis in original). 
37 Ibid., p. 97 (emphasis in original). 
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point of the bayonet, it is perhaps of no importance what its true legal 
meaning, as a contract, is. Nevertheless, the writer thinks it proper to say 
that, in his opinion, the Constitution is no such instrument as it has 
generally been assumed to be; but that by false interpretations, and naked 
usurpations, the government has been made in practice a very widely, and 
almost wholly, different thing from what the Constitution itself purports to 
authorize. He has heretofore written much, and could write much more, to 
prove that such is the truth. But whether the Constitution really be one 
thing, or another, this much is certain – that it has either authorized such a 
government as we have had, or has been powerless to prevent it. In either 
case, it is unfit to exist.38 
 
Thus has Spooner exploded (or refined) the very notion of the social contract theory of 
government. Either government contractually rests upon voluntarily and explicitly 
granted consent by each and every individual it purports to have authority over; or else it 
is government by force and fraud, and we should dispense with talk of justice and 
government by consent. 
 The consent of every individual is not the only requirement a government must 
meet in order to be just. It must uphold its side of the bargain by protecting its citizens’ 
rights and it must not itself violate their rights. It follows then that a government cannot 
justly violate an individual’s rights even if a majority of the voters support such an action. 
Moreover, it is not the business of government to be legislating morality (apart from 
protecting individual rights), because it cannot do so without violating an individual’s 
rights. In “Vices Are Not Crimes: A Vindication of Moral Liberty (1875),” Spooner 
makes a comprehensive argument that vices and crimes are two distinctly different 
things. “Crimes are those acts by which one man harms the person or property of another. 
Vices are simply the errors which a man makes in his search after his own happiness.”39 
Vices, in and of themselves, involve neither criminal intent nor interference with the 
                                                 
38 Ibid., pp. 121-122. 
39 Ibid., p. 25 (emphasis in original). 
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persons or property of others. As only interference with the persons or property of others 
without their consent can violate their rights, “unless this clear distinction between vices 
and crimes be made and recognized by the laws [i.e., unless vices are not treated as 
crimes], there can be on earth no such thing as individual right, liberty, or property; no 
such things as the right of one man to the control of his own person and property, and the 
corresponding and coequal rights of another man to the control of his own person and 
property.”40 History has shown that laws criminalizing vices, at best, do little or nothing 
to suppress the vice and, at worst, encourage real crime to spring up around the vice as it 
is forced underground (witness the fiasco that was the Prohibition, which aided the rise of 
the big crime families). Certainly it cannot be said of laws that they make men more 
virtuous (or just), for one must voluntarily choose to be moral; one who is forced to 
perform or refrain from some act is not thereby made virtuous (or just) by it, though the 
act may have been virtuous (or just) if performed (or not) voluntarily. A vice is still a 
vice, however, and the foregoing does not in any way mean that members of society are 
not free to impose nonviolent sanctions upon individuals they deem to be immoral (such 
as boycotting, blacklisting, etc.). 
 It follows, also, that taxation (or any other means of expropriation or 
redistribution of property and wealth), insofar as it is accomplished by force or the threat 
thereof, is unjust. No one has put the matter more unequivocally than Lysander Spooner: 
It is true that the theory of our Constitution is, that all taxes are paid 
voluntarily; that our government is a mutual insurance company, 
voluntarily entered into by the people with each other; that each man 
makes a free and purely voluntary contract with all others who are parties 
to the Constitution, to pay so much money for so much protection, the 
same as he does with any other insurance company; and that he is just as 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
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free not to be protected, and not to pay any tax, as he is to pay a tax, and 
be protected. 
 
But this theory of our government is wholly different from the practical 
fact. The fact is that the government, like a highwayman, says to a man: 
Your money, or your life. And many, if not most, taxes are paid under 
compulsion of that threat. 
 
The government does not, indeed, waylay a man in a lonely place, spring 
upon him from the roadside, and, holding a pistol to his head, proceed to 
rifle his pockets. But the robbery is none the less a robbery on that 
account; and it is far more dastardly and shameful. 
 
The highwayman takes solely upon himself the responsibility, danger, and 
crime of his own act. He does not pretend that he has any rightful claim to 
your money, or that he intends to use it for your own benefit. He does not 
pretend to be anything but a robber. He has not acquired impudence 
enough to profess to be merely a “protector,” and that he takes men’s 
money against their will, merely to enable him to “protect” those 
infatuated travellers, who feel perfectly able to protect themselves, or do 
not appreciate his peculiar system of protection. He is too sensible a man 
to make such professions as these. Furthermore, having taken your money, 
he leaves you, as you wish him to do. He does not persist in following you 
on the road, against your will; assuming to be your rightful “sovereign,” 
on account of the “protection” he affords you. He does not keep 
“protecting” you, by commanding you to bow down and serve him; by 
requiring you to do this, and forbidding you to do that; by robbing you of 
more money as often as he finds it for his interest or pleasure to do so; and 
by branding you as a rebel, a traitor, and an enemy to your country, and 
shooting you down without mercy, if you dispute his authority, or resist 
his demands. He is too much of a gentleman to be guilty of such 
impostures, and insults, and villainies as these. In short, he does not, in 
addition to robbing you, attempt to make you either his dupe or his slave.41 
 
It must also be pointed out, in light of the mention of protection services, that an 
individual has the right to purchase protection or legal services from entities other than 
the government or to go into business providing such services himself, even in 
competition with the government, or to rely solely upon himself if he so chooses. For a 
government to attempt to monopolize such services would be for it to commit an 
                                                 
41 Ibid., pp. 84-85 (emphasis in original). 
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injustice, for such an attempt by it would necessarily entail the initiation of force and 
therefore the violation of people’s right to their person and property. 
 One of Spooner’s arguments within the context of what the Constitution does 
authorize is pertinent to the issues raised in the previous paragraph as well as subsequent 
ones.  In “No Treason No. 2 (1867),” he addresses the treason clause in the Constitution. 
He argues that like all other laws, criminal laws included, it must be interpreted “in the 
sense most favorable to liberty and justice.”42 “The true and legitimate meaning of the 
word treason, then, necessarily implies treachery, deceit, breach of faith. Without these, 
there can be no treason. A traitor is a betrayer – one who practices injury, while 
professing friendship. […] An open enemy, however criminal in other respects, is no 
traitor.”43 
 As just governments are formed voluntarily by the people in order to protect their 
rights, and as individuals have a right to resist violations of their rights, it follows that 
individual citizens have a right to resist unjust governments. That is, individuals have the 
right to resist a government that they have not consented to and/or that violates their 
rights. Among the means of resisting an unjust government, it would seem the most 
obvious in light of the foregoing is secession. Drawing on Austrian economist Jorg Guido 
Hulsmann, I define secession as “the one-sided disruption of a hegemonic bond” by the 
subject, but unlike Hulsmann I use it here only in the revolutionary, “all-or-nothing,” 
sense of severing all hegemonic bonds with the tyrant.44 The act of secession, whether by 
                                                 
42 Ibid., p. 68. 
43 Ibid., p. 69. 
44 Jorg Guido Hulsmann, “Secession and the Production of Defense,” in The Myth of National Defense: 
Essays on the Theory and History of Security Production, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, ed., (Auburn: The 
Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2003), p. 374 and pp. 375-378. 
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an individual or a state, or resistance to rights violations, it should be obvious, are not 
acts of treason. 
 Certainly, secession is not the only means of resisting a tyrant. Others exist, such 
as tyrannicide, the slaying of the offending tyrant. Like secession, tyrannicide can be 
committed by a lone individual, a small group acting in isolation, or even at the active 
behest of a majority of the people. As Oscar Jászi and John D. Lewis point out, in Against 
the Tyrant: The Tradition and Theory of Tyrannicide, that tyrannicide is a controversial 
doctrine. Some political thinkers have regarded it as a dangerous and/or immoral one; 
others have defended the right of the individual to kill the tyrant, qualifying this, of 
course, with the assumption that the individual would be acting on behalf of the people to 
restore justice. It is not the purpose of this essay to deal with the morality (or immorality) 
of tyrannicide, however; it is mentioned only in order to show that it is in fact an aspect 
of other methods of resisting tyranny (see below). 
 The right to secede derives from the right of individuals to freely form their own 
government and to resist rights violations. Certainly a lone individual could attempt to 
secede, though as a lone individual his options would be limited: fleeing for the hills or to 
another country, ignoring the state, tyrannicide, or some other form of resistance. Flight 
has a chance of success, as does tyrannicide. Against the organized violence of the state, 
however, he will not last long in attempting to ignore it or violently oppose it. With 
tyrannicide, though a lone individual could succeed in slaying a tyrant, he might still have 
to worry about the tyrant’s successor(s). Tyrants do not oppress only lone individuals, 
however. Indeed, the victims usually make up a sizable plurality or majority of the 
population. 
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One can speak of an oppressed people, as a group of individuals, having the right 
to revolution. “[I]t is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish [an unjust government], 
and to institute a new Government”45, 46 in its place. A political revolution – as opposed 
to political reformation, which involves change within a system rather than change of a 
system – can be defined as a fundamental change in political organization, especially the 
overthrow or renunciation of one government or ruler and the substitution of another by 
the governed.47 One can think of at least two different types of political revolution: 
internal regime change48 and secession.49 With internal regime change, the goal of the 
revolutionary (-ies) is the replacement of the existing regime. The goal of secession is 
generally a separation of territory from the existing government, usually with the goal of 
forming a new government in the seceding territory. Political revolutions are often 
characterized by violence, but this need not always be so. Accordingly, the concept of 
political revolution can, I think, be subdivided into a four-fold typology consisting of: 
                                                 
45 The Declaration of Independence. 
46 In today’s day and age, in which it is fashionable to fabricate various and sundry group (or collectivized) 
“rights” such as economic rights, etc., it is necessary to point out that the term individual rights is 
redundant. All rights are individual rights and are possessed equally by all. A group (be it ethnic, economic, 
religious, political, whatever) is merely a collection of individuals and can have no rights above and beyond 
the rights of the individuals of which it is comprised. 
47 For an excellent and broad historical survey of political revolutions, see Martin Van Creveld, The 
Encyclopedia of Revolution and Revolutionaries: From Anarchism to Zhou Enlai (New York: Facts on 
File, 1996). 
48 Regime is here taken loosely to mean either or both the form of government and the particular 
government (or ruler) in power. I also depart from what seems to be the most commonly used meaning of 
“regime change,” having no other word to employ in the context of revolution, by using it to mean internal 
regime change rather than externally imposed regime change. 
49 For a historical survey of different moral justifications for secession, see Allen E. Buchanan, Secession: 
The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1991); cf. a review of it by John Tomasi, “Secession, Group Rights and the Grounds of Political 
Obligation,” Humane Studies Review 8, No. 1 (Fall 1992), 
http://www.theihs.org/libertyguide/hsr/index.php?menuid=3. Buchanan identifies no less than twelve 
different justifications for secession, such as the “Pure Self-Determination” or “Nationalist” argument, 
rectification of past injustices, cultural preservation, liberty, consent, escape from discriminatory 
redistribution, among others. As Tomasi points out, however, Buchanan regards secession as a group right 
rather than grounding it in the rights of individuals. As has already been established, rights are properly 
grounded in the individual moral agent. To speak of group rights apart from rights held by the individuals 
that make up the group is to reify the concept ‘group’ and treat it as a concrete entity rather than an 
abstraction.  
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1) violent regime change, 2) violent secession, 3) peaceful regime change, and 4) 
peaceful secession. 
There are historical examples for each of these types. Political revolutions are 
often characterized by violence, and indeed types 1 and 2 have historically been the most 
common forms of revolution. The French Revolution and the Russian Revolution are two 
examples of violent regime change (type 1). The American Revolution and the misnamed 
American Civil War are examples of violent secession (type 2). The adoption of the US 
Constitution in place of the Articles of Confederation is an example of peaceful regime 
change (type 3). And India’s successful independence from the British Empire is the 
prime example of peaceful secession (type 4). Obviously, both types 1 and 2 can (but 
need not) involve tyrannicide, while 3 and 4 cannot. Note, also, that 3 and 4 are 
compatible with La Boétie’s solution to tyranny: mass nonviolent withdrawal of consent 
(to be discussed later). 
 Which of these types of revolution is preferable? Secession should be the most 
attractive to modern liberals (i.e., libertarians) for a number of reasons. It tends toward 
the creation of smaller states with more limited governments. Moreover, secession 
generally occurs over a contiguous territory within a larger state; it thus presents less of a 
collective action problem as local communities will tend to be more homogeneous: those 
who live near each other will tend to have closer ties and will have an easier time 
communicating, coordinating activities, and lending support and aid. Other things being 
equal, it will be more difficult to get a consensus for a regime change than it would for 
secession due to the greater number of people and increasing diversity of interests and 
beliefs. 
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Though violent revolution has traditionally been the favored method of liberal 
theorists, it is problematic. The state, especially the modern nation-state, typically 
possesses the preponderance of military power. How are the people to match it? 
Moreover, violent revolution, particularly violent regime change, often results merely in 
the creation of a new set of elites in control of the political means. The people end up 
exchanging one tyrant (or set of tyrants) for another. The new tyrant(s) might even be 
worse! Intuitively, it may be difficult to see the advantage of nonviolent revolution. 
However, it is more attractive in light of the neo-Aristotelian natural law theory sketched 
above and in the eyes of the more pacific aspects of major world religions such as 
Christianity and Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism, as well as 
other less common religions. It also has the advantage of creating a revolutionary soil that 
is not as conducive to the growth of new tyranny. But is it an effective strategy? It is not 
the purpose of this essay to make a decisive case for the effectiveness of nonviolent 
revolution, but the theory and history of nonviolent resistance is promising.50 
Libertarians, particularly of the Austrian school, have in recent years begun 
extensive explorations into the theory and history of national defense. They question the 
ability of the state to provide it, and explore private market-based production of security, 
including applications to strategies of secession.51 Among these are private insurance-
protection firms and such strategies as guerrilla warfare and privateering. In the context 
                                                 
50 See Bryan Caplan, “The Literature of Nonviolent Resistance and Civilian-Based Defense,” Humane 
Studies Review 9, No. 1 (Summer 1994), http://www.theihs.org/libertyguide/hsr/index.php?menuid=3; see 
further: Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1968 [1973]), in 
particular, and other works on nonviolent action by Sharp. 
51 See Hans-Hermann Hoppe, ed., The Myth of National Defense: Essays on the Theory and History of 
Security Production (Auburn: The Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2003); for the seminal defense of security 
production under free market anarchism, see Gustave de Molinari, The Production of Security, trans. J. 
Huston McCulloch, Occasional Papers Series #2 (Richard M. Ebeling, Editor), (New York: The Center for 
Libertarian Studies, May 1977 [1849]), http://www.praxeology.net/GM-PS.htm. 
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of revolution and secession, nonviolent strategies, so successfully used by Gandhi in 




















                                                 
52 See Caplan in note 23; see also Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Democracy: The God That Failed: The 
Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2002); and Robert Mihaly, “Nonviolent Civilian Defense” and Roderick T. Long, “Defending a 
Free Nation” in Formulations, Issue #30 (Summer 2002) and Formulations 2, No. 2 (Winter 1994-95), 
respectively: http://www.libertariannation.org/a/index.html. 
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III. Étienne de la Boétie on Tyranny, Voluntary Servitude, and Civil Disobedience 
Resolve to serve no more, and you are at once freed. I do not ask that you 
place hands upon the tyrant to topple him over, but simply that you 
support him no longer; then you will behold him, like a great Colossus 
whose pedestal has been pulled away, fall of his own weight and break 
into pieces. 
– Étienne de la Boétie, The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude53 
 
Étienne de la Boétie is an unfamiliar figure from Sixteenth Century France, a 
century that saw the rise of the nation-state and absolute monarchy as well as religious 
and civil wars sparked by the Reformation. His life was short, though in that time he was 
a close friend of Montaigne and had a successful career as a royal magistrate. His 
Discourse of Voluntary Servitude, which he wrote as a young man in college, appears to 
be a masterful analysis of the nature of tyranny. In the paragraphs that follow, I first 
briefly discuss his life and the events surrounding the writing of the Discourse. I then 
explicate his definition of tyranny and explore his examination of the psychology of 
obedience. Following this, I delve into his discussion on the structure and specific 
mechanisms of tyrannical (or more generally, state) authority, the motives of those who 
obey and those who command, and the phenomenon of obedience in the absence of force. 
In the process, I attempt to make the case for the role of ‘those few who keep liberty 
alive’ in helping the people achieve their liberty. 
Étienne de la Boétie “was born in Sarlat, in the Périgord region of southwest 
France, in 1530, to an aristocratic family.”54 He was orphaned at an early age, raised by 
his uncle, and received his law degree from the University of Orléans in 1553. The 
                                                 
53 La Boétie, pp. 52-53. 
54 Murray Rothbard, “The Political Thought of Étienne de La Boétie” in The Politics of Obedience: The 
Discourse of Voluntary Servitude, p. 9. 
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following year, he was given a royal appointment to the Bordeaux Parlement despite 
being too young for the position. 
There he pursued a distinguished career as judge and diplomatic negotiator 
until his untimely death in 1563, at the age of thirty-two. La Boétie was 
also a distinguished poet and humanist, translating Xenophon and 
Plutarch, and being closely connected with the leading young Pléiade 
group of poets, including Pierre Ronsard, Jean Dorat, and Jean-Antoine de 
Baif.55 
 
He wrote the Discourse while a law student at the University. During this time France 
was experiencing “a period of questing and religious ferment,” and the University was “a 
noted center of free and untrammeled discussion.”56 His mentor was the notable 
Huguenot martyr, Anne du Bourg, and his best friend there was Du Bourg’s favorite 
student, Lambert Daneau. La Boétie himself was never connected with the Huguenot 
cause, however. The University later became a center for Calvinism and some of his 
fellow students became Huguenot leaders. 
 There is some dispute as to exactly when the Discourse was written. It was not 
published by La Boétie and was only circulated in manuscript form. Nannerl Keohane 
speculates that it was written  
under the immediate stimulus of the harsh repression of the revolte des 
gabelles in Bordeaux, which led to the execution of a number of city 
fathers who had failed to act with sufficient firmness against the rebels, as 
well as to the suppression of the parlement of Bordeaux and the 
humiliation of the city.57 
 
It is certainly likely that such an event would have a significant impression on the young 
La Boétie. Paul Bonnefon adds further elucidation on the subject: 
                                                 
55 Ibid., p. 10. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Nannerl O. Keohane, Philosophy and the State in France: The Renaissance to the Enlightenment 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p 92. 
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The teaching of the law [during the sixteenth century] was a preaching 
rather than an institution, a sort of search for truth, carried on by teacher 
and student in common, and which they feverishly undertook together, 
opening up an endless field for philosophic speculation.58 
 
The radical views expressed in the Discourse may have been an important reason for its 
being withheld from publication. It did achieve considerable fame in local intellectual 
circles, however, as evidenced by the fact that Montaigne had read it long before he and 
La Boétie met in 1559 as fellow members of the Bordeaux Parlement. They became 
extremely close friends. It was Montaigne who claimed first that La Boétie had written 
the essay at the youthful age of eighteen and then later at the even younger age of sixteen. 
Harry Kurz accepted the former and the date of 1548 as the date the essay was likely 
written.59 Keohane (in 1980), however, dates the writing of the essay to 1550, when La 
Boétie was around nineteen or twenty years old. The reason for this dating is not clear, 
however.60 Rothbard, citing (in 1975) recent scholarship that Keohane seems to have 
overlooked, argues that the claims of Montaigne are incorrect. Montaigne was probably 
trying 
to guard his dead friend’s reputation by dissociating him from the 
revolutionary Huguenots who were claiming La Boétie’s pamphlet for 
their own. Extreme youth tended to cast the Discourse in the light of a 
work so youthful that the radical content was hardly to be taken seriously 
as the views of the author.61 
 
Both internal evidence and the erudition evinced in the essay indicate that it was likely 
written in 1552 or 1553 when La Boétie was twenty-two. 
                                                 
58 Quoted in Rothbard’s intro to La Boétie’s Discourse, p. 10; cf. Paul Bonnefon, Oeuvres Complètes 
d’Éstienne de La Boétie (Bordeaux: C. Gounouilhou, and Paris: J. Rouam et Cie., 1892), p. xlvi. 
59 Harry Kurz, ed., Anti-Dictator: The Discours sur la servitude volontaire of Étienne de La Boétie, 
rendered into English by Harry Kurz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), p. x. 
60 Keohane, p. 92. 
61 Rothbard, “The Political Thought of Étienne de La Boétie,” pp. 37-38, n. 4. 
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 What is it that makes the Discourse so radical? Its abstract and timeless nature is 
one aspect of the answer to this question. As Rothbard points out in his introduction, the 
essay is structured around a single axiom: that all governments rest upon the consent of 
the governed. On the basis of this insight, La Boétie elucidates the nature of tyranny, 
transcending the two-fold classical conception of tyranny as either usurpation of power or 
government against the laws by exploring the nature of power itself. Contrary to earlier 
theorists, tyranny does not depend on the means of acquiring power.  
There are three kinds of tyrants; some receive their proud position through 
elections by the people, others by force of arms, others by inheritance. 
Those who have acquired power by means of war act in such wise that it is 
evident they rule over a conquered country. Those who are born to 
kingship are scarcely any better, because they are nourished on the breast 
of tyranny, suck in with their milk the instincts of the tyrant, and consider 
the people under them as their inherited serfs; and according to their 
individual disposition, miserly or prodigal, they treat their kingdom as 
their property. He who has received the state from the people, however, 
ought to be, it seems to me, more bearable and would be so, I think, were 
it not for the fact that as soon as he sees himself higher than the others, 
flattered by that quality which we call grandeur, he plans never to 
relinquish his position. Such a man usually determines to pass on to his 
children the authority that the people have conferred upon him; and once 
his heirs have taken this attitude, strange it is how far they surpass other 
tyrants in all sorts of vices, and especially in cruelty, because they find no 
other means to impose this new tyranny than by tightening control and 
removing their subjects so far from any notion of liberty that even if the 
memory of it is fresh it will soon be eradicated. Yet, to speak accurately, I 
do perceive that there is some difference among these three types of 
tyranny, but as for stating a preference, I cannot grant there is any. For 
although the means of coming into power differ, still the method of ruling 
is practically the same; those who are elected act as if they were breaking 
in bullocks; those who are conquerors make the people their prey; those 
who are heirs plan to treat them as if they were their natural slaves.62 
 
From this passage alone one might interpret the Discourse as an indictment of all 
personal power, that is, all forms of monarchy. Indeed, Keohane and other La Boétie 
scholars do so. This conclusion is incorrect, however. If La Boétie meant his analysis to 
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apply only to monarchy, surely he would not have remarked thus in the opening 
paragraph of his essay: “Yet in the light of reason, it is a great misfortune to be at the 
beck and call of one master, for it is impossible to be sure that he is going to be kind, 
since it is always in his power to be cruel whenever he pleases. As for having several 
masters, according to the number one has, it amounts to being that many times 
unfortunate.” Tyranny, then, is the exercise of power over others, whether by one tyrant 
or many. 
La Boétie was not an anarchist as some earlier scholars have supposed.63 He 
remarks that he does “not wish at this time to discuss this much debated question, namely 
whether other types of government are preferable to monarchy[.]”64 The Discourse does 
not present an explicit indictment of republican government or of government in general, 
and indeed, La Boétie evinced a clear conservative bent during his career as a 
government official. As Rothbard points out, it is certainly not unusual for a radical 
young student to “settle into a comfortable and respectable conservatism once well 
entrenched in a career bound to the emoluments of the status quo.”65 Rothbard may well 
also be right in his suggestion that the very abstractness and universality of the Discourse 
allowed La Boétie to divorce theory from practice, permitting him “to be sincerely radical 
in the abstract while continuing to be conservative in the concrete.”66 It would seem this 
argument is strengthened by Montaigne’s contention (if it can be entirely trusted) that the 
Discourse was treated by La Boétie “only by way of an exercise, as a common theme 
hashed over in a thousand places in books” though Montaigne has “no doubt that [La 
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Boétie] believed what he wrote, for he was so conscientious as not to lie even in jest.”67 I 
think that Rothbard is also correct, however, that La Boétie’s analysis is sufficiently 
vague to allow one to easily extend it to anarchist conclusions (though this would no 
doubt have caused La Boétie no little distress). Keohane seems to obliquely address this 
issue when she remarks: “If all authority is tyrannical, it matters little whether one is 
ruled by an Egyptian pharaoh, a senate, or a Valois king.”68 Her contention that the only 
liberty possible to human beings is mental or spiritual liberty is overly pessimistic, 
however. 
 La Boétie’s motivation for writing the Discourse is lucidly evident: 
I should like merely to understand how it happens that so many men, so 
many villages, so many cities, so many nations, sometimes suffer under a 
single tyrant who has no other power than the power they give him; who is 
able to harm them only to the extent to which they have the willingness to 
bear with him; who could do them absolutely no injury unless they 
preferred to put up with him rather than contradict him. Surely a striking 
situation! Yet it is so common that one must grieve the more and wonder 
the less at the spectacle of a million men serving in wretchedness, their 
necks under the yoke, not constrained by a greater multitude than they…69 
 
He is not merely puzzled and curious but appalled. 
Shall we call subjection to such a leader cowardice? Shall we say that 
those who serve him are cowardly and faint-hearted? If two, if three, if 
four, do not defend themselves from the one, we might call that 
circumstance surprising but nevertheless conceivable. In such a case one 
might be justified in suspecting a lack of courage. But if a hundred, if a 
thousand endure the caprice of a single man, should we not rather say that 
they lack not the courage but the desire to rise against him, and that such 
an attitude indicates indifference rather than cowardice? When not a 
hundred, not a thousand men, but a hundred provinces, a thousand cities, a 
million men, refuse to assail a single man from whom the kindest 
treatment is the infliction of serfdom and slavery, what shall we call that? 
Is it cowardice? Of course there is in every vice inevitably some limit 
beyond which one cannot go. Two, possibly ten, may fear one; but when a 
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thousand, a million men, a thousand cities, fail to protect themselves 
against the domination of one man, this cannot be called cowardly, for 
cowardice does not sink to such a depth…What monstrous vice, then, is 
this which does not even deserve to be called cowardice, a vice for which 
no term can be found vile enough, which nature herself disavows and our 
tongues refuse to name?70 
 
The subject is all the more disturbing once we realize that violence is not required to 
overthrow this single tyrant, “for he is automatically defeated if the country refuses to 
consent to its own enslavement: it is not necessary to deprive him of anything, but simply 
to give him nothing; there is no need that the country make an effort to do anything for 
itself provided it does nothing against itself.”71 
 In light of the above, La Boétie concludes that it is the people themselves who 
bring about their own subjection. They enslave themselves by choosing to be vassals 
instead of free men. If they but “cease to submit they would put an end to their 
servitude.”72 In keeping with this conclusion, La Boétie does not urge tyrannicide or 
violence of any kind, though he does not explicitly disapprove of such action. Rather, he 
argues as if to encourage people to resist tyranny by showing them that it does not require 
great boldness or entail heavy cost. 
If in order to have liberty nothing more is needed than to long for it, if 
only a simple act of the will is necessary, is there any nation in the world 
that considers a single wish too high a price to pay in order to recover 
rights which it ought to be ready to redeem at the cost of its blood, rights 
such that their loss must bring all men of honor to the point of feeling life 
to be unendurable and death itself a deliverance?  
 
Just as a fire requires fuel to burn or a tree nourishment to grow, so too does a 
tyrant. If he is simply not obeyed, he will become “naked and undone and as 
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nothing,”73 but the more he is yielded to the stronger and more insatiable he 
becomes. 
 For this reason, La Boétie exhibits a degree of contempt for the stupid and 
cowardly who long for liberty but make no effort to claim it. He laments that if they but 
did so, they would be happy and contented, but wonders that it seems liberty is the only 
joy men do not insist upon. 
Poor, wretched, and stupid peoples, nations determined on your own 
misfortune and blind to your own good! You let yourselves be deprived 
before your own eyes of the best part of your revenues; your fields are 
plundered, your homes robbed, your family heirlooms taken away. You 
live in such a way that you cannot claim a single thing as your own; and it 
would seem that you consider yourselves lucky to be loaned your 
property, your families, and even your lives. All this havoc, this 
misfortune, this ruin, descends upon you not from alien foes, but from the 
one enemy whom you yourselves render as powerful as he is, for whom 
you go bravely to war, for whose greatness you do not refuse to offer your 
own bodies unto death. He who thus domineers over you has only two 
eyes, only two hands, only one body, no more than is possessed by the 
least man among the infinite numbers dwelling in your cities; he has 
indeed nothing more than the power you confer upon him to destroy you. 
Where has he acquired enough eyes to spy on you, if you do not provide 
them yourselves? How can he have so many arms to beat you with, if he 
does not borrow them from you? The feet that trample down your cities, 
where does he get them if they are not your own? How does he have any 
power over you except through you? How would he dare assail you if he 
had no cooperation from you? What could he do to you if you yourselves 
did not connive with the thief who plunders you, if you were not 
accomplices of the murderer who kills you, if you were not traitors to 
yourselves? You sow your crops in order that he may ravage them, you 
install and furnish your homes to give him goods to pillage; you rear your 
daughters that he may gratify his lust; you bring up your children in order 
that he may confer upon them the greatest privilege he knows – to be led 
into his battles, to be delivered to butchery, to be made the servants of his 
greed and the instruments of his vengeance; you yield your bodies unto 
hard labor in order that he may indulge in his delights and wallow in his 
filthy pleasures; you weaken yourselves in order to make him the stronger 
and the mightier to hold you in check. From all these indignities, such as 
the very beasts of the field would not endure, you can deliver yourselves if 
you try, not by taking action, but merely by willing to be free. Resolve to 
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serve no more, and you are at once freed. I do not ask that you place hands 
upon the tyrant to topple him over, but simply that you support him no 
longer; then you will behold him, like a great Colossus whose pedestal has 
been pulled away, fall of his own weight and break into pieces.74 
 
The rhetoric of this passage implies that people are not free when their will is not their 
own, that is, when someone else controls how they make use of their person and property. 
A people are collectively complicit in their subjection to a tyrant, however. La Boétie 
sharply criticizes fighting someone else’s war and working for someone else’s interest to 
the exclusion of your own. What he advocates as a solution is clearly secession, the one-
sided severance of a hegemonic bond. Highly hierarchical and militarized organization, 
and organized mass violence, are not necessary; the people, or some critical mass of 
them, need only withdraw consent. Without a significant portion of the people’s help, the 
tyrant’s power to dominate dissipates. As we will see in part five, the French Revolution  
greatly violated the spirit of this passage; in overthrowing a tyrannical monarch the 
people became cogs in a new tyrannical machine, victims and/or petty tyrants in a 
popular despotism. 
The complicity of the people in their own subjection begs two questions: why do 
people give up their natural liberty and is it really in man’s nature to be free? 
 La Boétie answers the second question first with a definite affirmative. He argues 
“that nature, the handmaiden of God, governess of men, has cast us all in the same mold 
in order that we may behold in one another companions, or rather brothers.”75 It is true, 
he admits, that men are not born with equal abilities, but he maintains that our own 
natures and that of the world are such that we need not live life as if in a battlefield but 
rather we are eminently suited to cooperation. “One should…conclude that in distributing 
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larger shares to some and smaller to others, nature has intended to give occasion for 
brotherly love to become manifest, some of us having the strength to help others who are 
in need of it.”76 We all have the gift of speech and, as the faculty of reason is our main 
advantage over other animals, for we do not possess the advantageous physical traits of 
other species, it is in our mutual best interest to pursue cooperation rather than conflict. 
The advantage of cooperation is such that La Boétie argues “there can be no further doubt 
that we are all naturally free, inasmuch as we are all comrades. Accordingly it should not 
enter the mind of anyone that nature has placed some of us in slavery, since she has 
actually created us all in one likeness.”77 Liberty, then, is natural: one cannot be held as a 
slave without being wronged. This is reminiscent of Aristotle’s arguments that, since man 
is a political animal, a life pursuant with his nature is one of reason and discourse not  
force.78 Finally, as freedom is our natural state, we have a natural urge to defend it. 
Indeed, La Boétie holds that this fact is so self-evident that even the lower animals are 
seen to possess this urge, and that only the severely corrupted could fail to recognize it. 
 Man’s natural liberty, and his seeming readiness to give it up and forget about it, 
leads La Boétie to wonder how such a tragedy could come about. What could so denature 
man “that he, the only creature really born to be free, lacks the memory of his original 
condition and the desire to return to it?”79 He can see only two ways that a free man could 
allow himself to become enslaved: he must either be driven into it by force or else led 
into it by deception. A people can be conquered or duped. Moreover, he finds that when a 
people loses “their liberty through deceit they are not so often betrayed by others as 
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misled by themselves.”80 This often happens during crisis, for example, when a people, 
thrust into war, entrust a general with a large army and emergency powers. Upon his 
victorious return he is greeted as a hero, transforms himself into a king and then into a 
tyrant. 
 La Boétie finds it to be amazing how quickly and easily a people fall “into such 
complete forgetfulness of their freedom” once they become subject; they can scarcely “be 
roused to the point of regaining it,” so easily and readily do they obey.81 In the beginning, 
force and constraint are generally necessary to compel submission. Successive 
generations, however,  
obey without regret and perform willingly what their predecessors had 
done because they had to. This is why men born under the yoke and then 
nourished and reared in slavery are content, without further effort, to live 
in their native circumstance, unaware of any other state or right, and 
considering as quite natural the condition into which they were born.82 
 
The first explanation, then, for man’s readiness to give up his natural liberty and submit 
to slavery is custom, “namely, habituation to subjection.”83 Just as a man can build up an 
immunity to poison by slowly imbibing greater amounts of it, so too does man “learn to 
swallow, and not to find bitter, the venom of servitude.”84 La Boétie foreshadows the 
modern ‘nature vs. nurture’ debate, ascribing a far greater role in man’s mental formation 
to custom rather than to biology. Like a seed our faculty of reason and love of liberty 
must be nurtured if it is to bear good fruit; if it is planted in poor soil and abused, it will 
grow stunted at best, be entirely perverted or destroyed at worst. 
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 Custom, then, “becomes the first reason for voluntary servitude.”85 “[A]ll those 
things to which [man] is trained and accustomed seem natural to [him]” whereas that 
which is truly native to him is that “which he receives with his primitive, untrained 
individuality.”86 
Men will grow accustomed to the idea that they have always been in 
subjection, that their fathers lived in the same way; they will think they are 
obliged to suffer this evil, and will persuade themselves by example and 
imitation of others, finally investing those who order them around with 
proprietary rights, based on the idea that it has always been this way.87 
 
Not all men, however. 
There are always a few, better endowed than others, who feel the weight 
of the yoke and cannot restrain themselves from attempting to shake it off: 
these are the men who never become tamed under subjection…who… 
cannot prevent themselves from peering about for their natural privileges 
and from remembering their ancestors and their former ways. These are in 
fact the men who, possessed of clear minds and far-sighted spirit, are not 
satisfied, like the brutish mass, to see only what is at their feet, but rather 
look about them, behind and before, and even recall the things of the past 
in order to judge those of the future, and compare both with their present 
condition. These are the ones who, having good minds of their own, have 
further trained them by study and learning. Even if liberty had entirely 
perished from the earth, such men would invent it. For them slavery has 
no satisfactions, no matter how well disguised.88 
 
But these men face an obstacle. Tyrants are well aware that education undermines their 
authority and so seek to suppress learning or, more so in modern times, to pervert it into 
supporting the status quo. These few may have difficulty finding one another, particularly 
if they have lost freedom of action and speech; however, though this might lead lovers of 
liberty to despair, La Boétie reminds us of history’s many examples of heroes who have 
not “failed to deliver their country from evil hands when they set about their task with a 
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firm, whole-hearted, and sincere intention. Liberty, as if to reveal her nature, seems to 
have given them new strength.”89 
Keohane has a different interpretation of the Discourse, however. She initially 
focuses on La Boétie’s condemnation of tyranny and analysis of the psychology of 
subjection and explains away his call for nonviolent withdrawal of consent as mere 
rhetoric to facilitate the former. She argues that unlike his friend, he had nothing but 
contempt for the popular will and evinced “none of the ability to identify with ordinary 
people that Montaigne developed with the years.”90 As we have seen, the Discourse is 
indeed an elitist essay. But is it, as Keohane suggests, an attempt to rationalize a narrowly 
delimited sphere of joy out of an essentially bleak worldview? She argues that La Boétie 
“holds out a vision of a community of brothers, a fraternity of educated men throughout 
the ages that binds together the natural free spirits.”91 In support of this thesis, she points 
out an obscure and isolated reference to the “liberty of the Republic of Plato.”92 Further 
evidence is that the radicalism of the Discourse is never expressed in his public life. His 
later friendship with Montaigne is yet further evidence. Certainly, Keohane’s thesis is 
compatible and even complementary to Rothbard’s explanation for La Boétie’s 
conservatism. 
I am not convinced that La Boétie’s “beautiful vision of a transtemporal 
fraternity” is the whole story, however. It may very well have been the underlying theme 
of his essay, and it does indeed provide solace to lovers of liberty who find their bodies 
but not their minds subjected to slavery. Yet, in light of his celebration of liberty and of 
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heroes who help free their country, and given his superlative analysis of the nature of 
tyranny, how it comes about, and how people can be rid of it, it seems to me that we 
would be remiss in not also interpreting the Discourse as a call, to those who will hear it, 
to throw off our shackles and embrace liberty in mind and body. Surely, in the spirit of 
the brotherhood of mankind that La Boétie expresses so well in his explanation of natural 
liberty, it is the great task of those who keep freedom alive to educate their brothers and 
help them be free, both in mind and body, when and however possible. Even if escaping 
the cave is only possible for a select few – those with a philosophic temperament – one 
need not necessarily infer that the philosophers have no obligation to help (when and 
however possible) the great mass of the people achieve what liberty they can, that is, 
political liberty. 
To return to our analysis of tyranny and subjection: “the essential reason why men 
take orders willingly is that they are born serfs and are reared as such. From this cause 
there follows another result, namely that people easily become cowardly and submissive 
under tyrants.” Valor is lost with liberty. Many Americans have had the immediate 
experience in the twentieth century of seeing firsthand the superiority of a voluntary army 
over a conscripted one. This is because, as La Boétie rightly observes,  
Among free men there is competition as to who will do most, each for the 
common good, each by himself, all expecting to share in the misfortunes 
of defeat, or in the benefits of victory; but an enslaved people loses in 
addition to this warlike courage all signs of enthusiasm, for their hearts are 
degraded, submissive, and incapable of any great deed. Tyrants are well 
aware of this, and, in order to degrade their subjects further, encourage 
them to assume this attitude and make it instinctive.93 
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Due to his precarious position, the tyrant must always fear his subjects. For this reason, 
he cannot “consider his power firmly established until he has reached the point where 
there is no man under him who is of any worth.”94 
 Tyrants throughout history have used countless ingenious methods of deceiving 
and stultifying their subjects. Among the more blatant examples cited by La Boétie is that 
of Cyrus. In order to quell a rebellion in the recently conquered capital city of the 
Lydians, rather than squashing the city by force of arms or establishing a garrison to 
police it, Cyrus “established in it brothels, taverns, and public games, and issued a 
proclamation that the inhabitants were to enjoy them.”95 La Boétie marvels at how 
suspicious city dwellers are of those who have their welfare at heart and yet are so 
gullible toward those who would fool them. So easily are they duped by such things as 
“[p]lays, farces, spectacles, gladiators, strange beasts, medals, pictures, and other such 
opiates”; such things “were for ancient peoples the bait toward slavery, the price of their 
liberty, the instruments of tyranny.”96 
By these practices and enticements the ancient dictators so successfully 
lulled their subjects under the yoke, that the stupefied peoples, fascinated 
by the pastimes and vain pleasures flashed before their eyes, learned 
subservience as naively, but not so creditably, as little children learn to 
read by looking at bright picture books. Roman tyrants invented a further 
refinement. They often provided the city wards with feasts to cajole the 
rabble, always more readily tempted by the pleasure of eating than 
anything else. The most intelligent and understanding amongst them 
would not have quit his soup bowl to recover the liberty of the Republic of 
Plato. Tyrants would distribute largess, a bushel of wheat, a gallon of 
wine, and a sesterce: and then everybody would shamelessly cry, “Long 
live the King!” The fools did not realize that they were merely recovering 
a portion of their own property, and that their ruler could not have given 
them what they were receiving without having first taken it from them. A 
man might one day be presented with a sesterce and gorge himself on a 
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public feast, lauding Tiberius and Nero for handsome liberality, who on 
the morrow, would be forced to abandon his property to their avarice, his 
children to their lust, his very blood to the cruelty of these magnificent 
emperors, without offering any more resistance than a stone or a tree 
stump.97 
 
The mob has always behaved this way, and so have tyrants. Indeed, one has merely to 
look around to see the above mentioned practices being performed, merely modern 
variations on the same theme. 
 Another favorite tactic of the Roman emperors was to claim to be a man of the 
people. The emperors generally assumed the title of Tribune of the People, traditionally 
an office of sacred trust, dedicated to the defense and protection of the people. Indeed, the 
rulers of Rome and La Boétie’s France are little different: “they never undertake an 
unjust policy, even of some importance, without prefacing it with some pretty speech 
concerning public welfare and common good.”98 The people themselves will even create 
their own myths to glorify the nation to which they belong. 
 La Boétie also remarks on the frequent use by tyrants of religion to support their 
rule. Tyrants often wrap themselves in divinity. The kings of the Assyrians and the 
Medes would show themselves as little as possible in public so as to encourage the 
imaginations of their people into making them out to be more than men. La Boétie does 
not spare even his own kingdom. Even the leaders of France have “employed…certain 
similar devices, such as toads, fleur-de-lys, sacred vessels, and standards with flames of 
gold.”99 
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 The absence of criticism of the Catholic Church in the foregoing is a curious one. 
To be sure, La Boétie sharply criticizes attempts by tyrants to wrap themselves in divinity 
and cloak themselves behind religion. This would seem to extend logically to the ‘divine 
right of kings’ doctrine embraced by medieval European monarchs. La Boétie’s further 
(apparently sarcastic) remarks about the French kings may shed some light on the 
subject: 
I do not wish, for my part, to be incredulous, since neither we nor our 
ancestors have had any occasion up to now for skepticism. Our kings have 
always been so generous in times of peace and so valiant in time of war, 
that from birth they seem not to have been created by nature like many 
others, but even before birth to have been designated by Almighty God for 
the government and preservation of this kingdom. Even if this were not so, 
yet should I not enter the tilting ground to call in question the truth of our 
traditions, or to examine them so strictly as to take away their fine 
conceits. Here is such a field for our French poetry…These poets are 
defending our language so well that I dare believe that very soon neither 
the Greeks nor the Latins will in this respect have any advantage over us 
except possibly that of seniority. And I should assuredly do wrong to our 
poesy…I should do the Muse great injury if I deprived her now of those 
fine tales about King Clovis…Certainly I should be presumptuous if I 
tried to cast slurs on our records and thus invade the realm of our poets.100 
 
King Clovis was the first Christian (Catholic, to be precise) king of France. The Frankish 
king, one of the first of the line known as Merovingians, was baptized in 496. Three 
thousand of his warriors soon followed him in baptism, thus beginning the conversion of 
Gaul (France) to Catholicism.101 
Kurz, Rothbard, and Keohane all indicate that La Boétie was Catholic himself, 
however. Indeed, Rothbard and Keohane refer to only one other political writing 
attributed to him and written shortly before he died, Memoir Concerning the Edict of 
January, 1562, in which he wrote approvingly of the “king’s Catholic cause against the 
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[Protestant] Huguenots”102 and advised the government to “punish Protestant leaders as 
rebels, [and] to enforce Catholicism upon France[.]”103 Yet Kurz, writing about four 
decades earlier, refers to the same work as approving of the Chancellor of France’s edict  
“conferring greater freedom of worship upon the Huguenots.”104 These two accounts 
appear to be in direct conflict. Rothbard and Keohane make no mention of this apparent 
discrepancy whatsoever, making it a fruitful area for future research. The Edict itself, 
promulgated under Charles IX, was an attempt to avoid civil war by declaring over two 
thousand French Protestant churches to be legal and repealing many restrictive laws. 
Rothbard indicates that in the Memoir La Boétie also calls for “reform [of] the 
abuses of the Church moderately and respectably by the agency of the king and his 
Parlements.”105 And Kurz mentions that during the last three years of his life, La Boétie 
was extremely active at Agen, a hotbed of angry dispute where churches 
were violently entered and images destroyed. […] His sense of fairness 
generally led him to assign to the disputants different churches, and, in 
towns with only one place of worship, different hours for religious 
services.106 
 
Without an English translation of the Memoir available, it is pure speculation on my part, 
but it appears these differing accounts might be at least partially reconcilable through the 
Discourse. La Boétie is critical of tyrants and their use of religion to bolster their power. 
Yet in the absence of any call on the people to commit tyrannicide or violence of any 
kind; with an apparent call instead to withdraw their consent; coupled with his remarks 
praising liberty, reason, and the brotherhood of mankind, it might be that La Boétie 
detested abuse of authority and violence by French officials, Catholics, and Protestants 
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alike. Weight is lent to this conjecture by the conservatism he evinced in life and 
Montaigne’s claim regarding his devotion “to the tranquillity of his country” and his 
hostility “to the commotions and innovations of his time.”107 
 To return from this digression to the text of the Discourse: Tyrants have used the 
above-mentioned tricks and more “to train their people not only in servility and 
obedience toward themselves, but also in adoration,”108 yet identification of these varied 
instruments of tyranny does not get us to the heart of the matter. La Boétie observes that 
the guards and armies employed by tyrants are rather more for ceremony and show of 
force than for any practical effect of security they can provide; they offer little protection 
from stealthy assassins, for example. He also notes the frequency with which tyrants are 
slain by their own followers. 
Ultimately, La Boétie finds a hierarchical pyramid of privilege to be “the 
mainspring and the secret of domination, the support and foundation of tyranny.”109 
[T]here are only four or five who maintain the dictator, four or five who 
keep the country in bondage to him. Five or six have always had access to 
his ear, and have either gone to him of their own accord, or else have been 
summoned by him, to be accomplices in his cruelties, companions in his 
pleasures, panders to his lusts, and sharers in his plunders. These six 
manage their chief so successfully that he comes to be held accountable 
not only for his own misdeeds but even for theirs. The six have six 
hundred who profit under them, and with the six hundred they do what 
they have accomplished with their tyrant. The six hundred maintain under 
them six thousand, whom they promote in rank, upon whom they confer 
the government of provinces or the direction of finances, in order that they 
may serve as instruments of avarice and cruelty, executing orders at the 
proper time and working such havoc all around that they could not last 
except under the shadow of the six hundred, nor be exempt from law and 
punishments except through their influence.110 
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In this way, the tyrant’s regime permeates through society until “not the six thousand but 
a hundred thousand, and even millions, cling to the tyrant by this cord to which they are 
tied.”111 By handing out favors and profits, large and small, “all the wicked dregs of the 
nation…all those who are corrupted by burning ambition or extraordinary avarice, these 
gather around him and support him in order to have a share in the booty and to constitute 
themselves petty chiefs under the big tyrant.”112 The structural incentives of the 
tyrannical regime bind men into a web of interest and ambition. 
 Thus the tyrant divides his people against one another. He uses some of his 
subjects to subdue the others and “thus is protected by those from whom, if they were 
decent men, he would have to guard himself[.]”113 Consequently, while toppling the 
tyrant appears at first glance to be a simple matter of withdrawing consent, in light of this 
insight the matter turns out to be far more complicated. It is evident that the subjects face 
a collective action problem. Would-be resisters face many obstacles, from having to 
operate underground to possessing inferior firepower and training to organizing and 
motivating resistance in the face of danger to life and limb. The revolutionaries have to 
deal with the problem of free riders, for there is ample temptation to avoid the risk of 
losing one’s life and property by letting others do all the work. But they also have to 
contend with the temptation for illicit gain through selling out to the tyrant. 
Defenders of liberty possess a powerful ally in the unnatural lives of the tyrant 
and his followers, however. Such is the nature of a tyrant that even his followers suffer at 
his hands. Such men will “endure evil if permitted to commit it, not against him who 
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exploits them, but against those who like themselves, submit, but are helpless.”114 Yet 
ultimately to live in such a way is folly. Such men are still slaves, albeit privileged ones. 
Indeed, La Boétie argues that while their lives may be materially better than those whom 
they exploit, the helpless people they exploit are actually freer and better off. The 
downtrodden are merely forced to do what they are told when they are told to do it. By 
contrast, the tyrant’s followers are constantly in competition amongst themselves to woo 
him and gain his favor. They must not only anticipate his every desire but do so before 
their competitors, necessarily to the neglect of their own preferences. Not a moment of 
their lives is really their own. A moment’s failure can spell the end. “What condition is 
more wretched than to live thus, with nothing to call one’s own, receiving from someone 
else one’s sustenance, one’s power to act, one’s body, one’s very life?”115 And this is 
often the reason why so many tyrants have died at the hands of their followers, even 
“their closest favorites who, observing the nature of tyranny, could not be so confident of 
the whim of the tyrant as they were distrustful of his power.”116 To ally with men such as 
this in order to be free of a tyrant is to risk exchanging an old tyrant for a new and 
possibly worse tyrant, however. 
La Boétie’s solution to tyranny – mass nonviolent withdrawal of consent – is not 
the only possible solution. As I have noted, traditional political thought and history have 
favored violent resistance to tyranny. La Boétie’s theory, despite its originality, had little 
if any influence on subsequent theorists until the nineteenth century, over two hundred 
years after the Discourse was written. It is almost certain that Henry David Thoreau was 
at least indirectly influenced by La Boétie; his close friend Ralph Waldo Emerson was 
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familiar with the Discourse117 and Thoreau’s Civil Disobedience bears a striking kinship 
to it as we shall see. Leo Tolstoy’s nonviolent anarchism was directly influenced by La 
Boétie; he quotes a passage from the Discourse in his The Law of Love and the Law of 
Violence. Such important twentieth century figures as Mohandas Gandhi and Martin 
Luther King, Jr., were indirectly influenced by La Boétie as well. Though Gandhi had 
already begun to develop his own doctrine of nonviolent resistance independently, 
Tolstoy’s Letter to a Hindu had a deep influence on him.118 Gandhi also read and was 
influenced by Thoreau’s Civil Disobedience.119 And King was certainly influenced by 
Gandhi and Thoreau.120 
Until Thoreau and Tolstoy, resistance to tyranny continued to be equated with 
violence. This was the case even for such eminent resistance theorists of seventeenth-
century England as Milton, Sidney, and Locke. These thinkers had a profound influence 
on the colonization of North America, as the colonists fled the religious oppression of 
England; on the subsequent struggle of the colonists from English tyranny; and on the 
formation of the United States of America. 
There are many lessons would-be revolutionaries can learn from La Boétie’s 
Discourse aside from how to identify the means by which a tyrant acquires and maintains 
his power. Consider the discussion of the tyrant’s followers in the previous paragraph. 
Not all men who serve a tyrant are necessarily evil, without a decent bone in their bodies. 
Moreover, a friendless life of sycophancy is far from a happy one. Also, observing and 
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carrying out atrocities may weigh on one’s conscience. This is particularly true of the 
followers of the lowest rank, the soldiers and police who see and carry out the oppression 
firsthand, who often have chosen their jobs, if they have chosen them at all, merely to 
make a living and/or purchase some measure of security. While defending oneself, even 
against these, is certainly justified, fighting tends to polarize the two sides and makes 
conversion more difficult. Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. developed civil 
disobedience tactics that have proven in theory and practice to be effective at changing 
the hearts and minds of others. The genius of nonviolent resistance is that it creates a 
tension in the minds of the doers of injustice. It forces one to confront the cognitive 
dissonance that must exist between one’s actions and what one knows to be right; it 
forces the recognition of the fundamental humanity of those who are oppressed.121 
 Consider also La Boétie’s claim that it is difficult for ‘those few who keep 
freedom alive’ to find one another. Advanced communication technology such as the 
internet can make it far easier for interested people to find one another, promote their 
ideas, and coordinate their activities. Talk of strategy and tactics is moot, however, if the 
people lack the motivation and organization to resist their oppressors. The people need to 
be made aware of their rights and of their power to resist. Advanced means of 
communication can also be a medium for revealing that, indeed, the emperor has no 
clothes. Yet economists have a difficult time explaining how the collective action 
problem, which becomes all the more complicated in a democracy due to the obscured 
line between ruler and ruled, can be surmounted. The explanation, at least with regard to 
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our subject, is ideology. Despite the seemingly insurmountable obstacles in the way of 
freedom, there are countless examples of peoples rising up to overthrow their oppressors. 
Invariably, such freedom movements were motivated by religious and political ideologies 
of varying degrees of sophistication. I will now turn to an illustration of the role of 





















IV. The Role of Religious and Political Ideology 
in the American Revolution and Founding 
 
WE hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, 
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness – That to 
secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving 
their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any 
Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of 
the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new Government, 
laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in 
such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and 
Happiness. 
– Thomas Jefferson, Declaration of Independence, 1776 
 
Some scholars have correctly pointed out that natural law is inherently radical and 
revolutionary. Lord Acton wrote, “Liberalism wishes for what ought to be, irrespective of 
what is.”122 This means that the individual, “armed with natural law moral principles, is 
then in a firm position from which to criticize existing regimes and institutions, to hold 
them up to the strong and harsh light of reason.”123 The very fact that “natural-law 
theorists derive from the very nature of man a fixed structure of law independent of time 
and place, or of habit or authority or group norms, makes that law a mighty force for 
radical change.”124 I am indebted to Rothbard for bringing to my attention the following 
pertinent observation by conservative political scientist Samuel Huntington: 
No ideational theory can be used to defend existing institutions 
satisfactorily, even when those institutions in general reflect the values of 
that ideology. The perfect nature of the ideology’s ideal and the imperfect 
nature and inevitable mutation of the institutions create a gap between the 
two. The ideal becomes a standard by which to criticize the institutions, 
much to the embarrassment of those who believe in the ideal and yet still 
wish to defend the institutions. 
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He then adds in a footnote: “Hence any theory of natural law as a set of transcendent and 
universal moral principles is inherently non-conservative…Opposition to natural law 
[is]…a distinguishing characteristic of conservatism.”125 
 In what follows I attempt to illustrate the conflict between liberty and power by 
sketching the role of religious and political ideology in the American Revolution and in 
the later Founding of the United States through the ratification of the Constitution. I 
begin by tracing the roots of these ideas through the Protestant Reformation and 
revolutionary Seventeenth Century England, then their role in motivating the colonists to 
secede from England are discussed, though space limitations obviously prevent this from 
being even close to an exhaustive treatment. Following this is a discussion on whether the 
Revolution was radical or conservative, or, not necessarily the same thing, (classical) 
liberal or conservative. Finally, I pose the question of whether the Constitutional 
Convention represented a liberal innovation or a conservative counter-revolution (or, 
alternatively, as Albert Jay Nock put it, an industrial coup d’Etat). These issues bear on 
the overall focus of this entire essay, which is not merely voluntary subjection to tyranny 
and what motivates people to withdraw their consent but also what constitutes tyranny. 
Different peoples at various times in history have had different definitions of what 
constitutes tyranny. However, if there is such a thing as natural law, and I believe there is, 
then by improving our understanding of it we can arrive at an increasingly refined 
conception of what constitutes tyranny. The seed of this understanding was already 
present in early liberalism. It had only to be brought to its logical conclusion by  
subsequent liberals (i.e., libertarians).126 
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IV.1 The Role of Religious and Political Ideology in the American Revolution 
In America today, we take for granted the separation of church and state. Indeed, 
at least in part due to the complications arising from an extensive public education 
system, the separation of church and state that we have today appears more like a jagged 
wound when compared to the separation of church and state as it was conceived in 
Jefferson’s day. The phrase “separation of church and state” does not actually appear in 
the Constitution. The 1st Amendment reads: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” The phrase “separation of church 
and state” originated from Jefferson as his interpretation of the 1st Amendment in his 
January 1, 1802 letter to the Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association; therein, he 
called it a "wall of separation between church and State." In comparison to the American 
experience leading up to the framing of the Constitution, the Constitution itself is a 
secular document influenced by classical republicanism, English constitutionalism, and 
Lockean (classical) liberalism. The 1st Amendment was not meant to completely expunge 
religion from government as is commonly supposed these days by modern Leftist 
liberals, judges, and atheists, however. It was merely meant to protect freedom of religion 
by prohibiting the establishment of a federal religion as well as the enforcement or 
prohibition of specific religious practices by the state. The early Americans were, with 
few exceptions, a profoundly religious people. Religion played a powerful role in the 
colonization of America, the subsequent development of the colonies, and the American 
Revolution. Contrary to prevailing opinion, the early United States of America was 
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shaped not only by classical republicanism, English constitutionalism, and (classical) 
liberalism but by the Christian religion also.127 As we shall see, for the early Americans, 
religious and political ideology were intimately intertwined. 
IV.1.1 The English Roots of American Religious and Political Ideology128 
 Before delving into the role of religious and political ideology in the American 
Revolution, it is important to trace the roots of these beliefs back to the Protestant 
Reformation, English constitutionalism, and the upheaval that was the Seventeenth-
Century Revolution in England. Of particular interest to us is the political thought of John 
Milton, Algernon Sidney, and John Locke, for their influence on the Founders was 
profound. Let us begin, then, by setting the stage for the Protestant Reformation; if it was 
not for this monumental event in history the United States of America might never have 
been founded. 
 Prior to the Reformation, Medieval Europe was subject to canon and feudal law. 
In his essay “A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law,” John Adams called these 
institutions the “two greatest systems of tyranny.”129 Both systems are derived and  
perverted from Christianity in order to gratify the passions of the “great.” According to 
Adams and other Protestants, they are lies promulgated by the great to keep the poor 
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willingly in subjection. The canon law was the province of the Catholic Church. Its 
clergy 
persuaded mankind to believe, faithfully and undoubtingly, that God 
Almighty had entrusted them [the clergy] with the keys of heaven, whose 
gates they might open and close at pleasure; with a power of dispensation 
over all the rules and obligations of morality; with authority to license all 
sorts of sins and crimes; with a power of deposing princes and absolving 
subjects from allegiance; with a power of procuring or withholding the 
rain of heaven and the beams of the sun; with the management of 
earthquakes, pestilence, and famine; nay, with the mysterious, awful, 
incomprehensible power of creating out of bread and wine the flesh and 
blood of God himself.130 
 
Such beliefs were instilled and maintained in the people by keeping them ignorant and by 
instilling in them a religious aversion to letters and knowledge, and thereby keeping them 
in awe of the clergy. 
 The feudal law is similar to canon law, albeit not as subtle and refined. It too 
serves to keep the people in ignorance and poverty, relegated to the bottom of a rigid 
social hierarchy. The general or chief or king claimed all the land of a given territory as 
his property. All of the lesser lords and officers down to the common people themselves 
held their lands 
by a variety of duties and services, all tending to bind the chains the faster 
on every order of mankind. In this manner the common people were held 
together in herds and clans in a state of servile dependence on their lords, 
bound, even by the tenure of their lands, to follow them, whenever they 
commanded, to their wars, and in a state of total ignorance of every thing 
divine and human, excepting the use of arms and the culture of their 
lands.131 
 
While the use and threat of force by the elites was no doubt more prevalent in the 
enforcement of feudal law than in canon law, La Boétie and Hume have shown us that all 
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governmental institutions ultimately depend for their continuation upon general popular 
acceptance, even the worst tyrannies, and even such institutions as the Catholic Church. 
 The unholy alliance of canon and feudal law, of Pope and monarch, with each 
giving legitimacy to and reinforcing the other, held the people “in ignorance, [without] 
liberty, and with her, knowledge and virtue too.”132 Thanks in no small part to the 
invention of the printing press, which made available cheap mass produced copies of the 
Bible in the vernacular, the Protestant Reformation broke the monopoly of the Catholic 
Church on Christ’s teachings and, in so doing, disrupted the ties between King and 
Church. The door was opened to individual interpretation of the Bible and, consequently, 
there was an increased incentive among the general population to become literate and, in 
general, educated. This in turn increased demand for books and the further development 
of printing.133 With the diffusion of Biblical knowledge came a desire for religious 
liberty. The decentralization of the Christian religion was soon followed by a desire for 
political liberty and political decentralization. If we are all equal in the eyes of God, why 
not in our political relations as well?134 Along with the diffusion of religious knowledge 
came a religion-inspired desire among the people for the realization of their political 
rights; it brought them the realization that they were the rightful and actual source of 
political power, not their rulers. A rigid and hierarchical society of status was disrupted 
and gradually dismantled, to be replaced by a dynamic and voluntary society of contract. 
  The Bible became a living document in England and in continental Europe. The 
English had already extracted some measure of protection for their rights by limiting the 
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power of the king with the Magna Carta in 1215. England in the seventeenth-century was 
experiencing two countervailing forces, however. On the one hand, the people were 
finding compelling support and motivation in the Bible for greater political liberty. On 
the other hand, the kings, particularly Charles I, saw this trend as a threat to their power 
and sought to consolidate power in their hands to suppress it. As Hill notes, “Direct 
access to the sacred text gave a sense of assurance to laymen which they had previously 
lacked, and so fortified long-standing criticisms of the church and its clergy.”135 Quarrels 
broke out between Protestants and Catholics, and between divergent groups of 
Protestants, as to the meaning of Scripture. Each side was able to find support in the 
Bible for its position. Biblical scholarship exploded as positions were laid out and 
defended, and the accuracy of the text itself was questioned. What “had been muttered in 
ale-houses could now be read by anybody.”136 And debate was not limited to merely 
theological matters; the Bible was used to support various and conflicting political beliefs 
as well. 
England in the seventeenth-century did indeed experience a cultural revolution. 
The Bible became an integral part of every aspect of life. Hill cites the Puritan oracle, 
William Perkins, who “declared that Scripture ‘comprehendeth many holy sciences’, 
including ethics, economics, politics, academy (‘the doctrine of governing schools 
well’).”137 In 1642, Milton “spoke of the Bible as ‘that book within whose sacred context 
all wisdom is enfolded’.”138 In response to Sir Robert Filmer’s defense of absolute 
monarchy, Patriarcha, both Sidney and Locke employed the authority of the Bible. All 
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sides were agreed, however, in the wake of the Reformation, that “[c]hurch and state in 
Tudor England were one.”139 
 As early as the first half of the sixteenth-century, censorship was attempted. King 
Henry VIII tried to “abolish ‘diversity of opinions’ by Act of Parliament,” though he was 
not very successful, and neither were his successors.140 Matters came to a head during the 
reign of Charles I. “In 1628 Charles I was outraged when the Commons called for the 
Petition of Right – the first significant modification of the royal prerogative – to be 
printed, because he did not want ordinary people to read or discuss it.”141 He dissolved 
Parliament in 1629 and ruled personally for eleven years. Desperately needing money to 
subdue the Scots, he recalled Parliament in 1640; it became known as the Short 
Parliament because within three months he dissolved it again when they proved 
unamenable to his wishes. After another military defeat he was once again persuaded to 
recall Parliament, now known as the Long Parliament. “In 1641 a proposal to print the 
Grand Remonstrance, a list of the Commons’ grievances against Charles I’s government, 
led to uproar in the House, in which swords were drawn for the only recorded time in 
history. It presaged civil war, in which Parliament had to appeal to the common people if 
Charles was to be defeated.”142 
 Into this period strides John Milton with Areopagitica, a compelling though 
ultimately (concerning its practical purpose) ineffective call for a free press. Milton had 
expected prior censorship to be relaxed under the new revolutionary regime. His hopes 
and the cause of liberty were delivered a setback when the new Parliament passed a bill 
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that provided for the licensing of the press. In Areopagitica, Milton appealed to the new 
regime to reconsider its decision and free England’s press from its restraints. 
To Milton, a free and unlicensed press was of paramount importance: “Give me 
liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all 
liberties.”143 His central argument for freedom of conscience is that mature adults must 
learn the great virtue of temperance, but they can only do so by the light of their own 
reason and through hard-earned experience. This task God has given to every man, by 
giving each free will; each must be free to choose, to make mistakes and to learn from 
them.144 Without the possibility of vice there can be no virtue, or at least virtue would be 
a pale and pathetic thing: impure. We are purified by trial, i.e., confronting that which is 
contrary to the good and/or to what we know (or think we know).145 It is for this reason 
that we must be free to exercise our own conscience. And it is the need for freedom of 
conscience, founded in human nature, that is at the root of Milton’s other arguments. He 
further argues that the knowledge contained in a corrupt book will not defile the 
conscience of the pure, for “To the pure all things are pure.”146 Whereas even the best 
books are to a “naughty mind…not unappliable to occasions of evill.”147 Bad books, on 
the other hand serve a “discreet and judicious Reader…in many respects to discover, to 
confute, to forewarn, and to illustrate.”148 Truth will emerge from the healthy discourse of 
free and open debate that an unlicensed press allows. In contrast, censorship will help to 
prolong error and falsehood. Among others, he also makes a consistency argument: “If 
                                                 
143 John Milton, Areopagitica and Other Political Writings of John Milton (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
Inc., 1999), p. 44. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
146 Ibid., p. 15. 
147 Ibid., p. 16. 
148 Ibid. 
 58 
we think to regulat Printing, thereby to rectifie manners, we must regulat all recreations 
and pastimes, all that is delightful to man.”149 
In his other works, Milton defended the revolution and the practice of regicide. 
Milton argues that all men were born naturally free150 and that while “the Magistrate was 
set above the people, so the Law was set above the Magistrate.”151 Moreover, “if the King 
or Magistrate prov’d unfaithful to his trust, the people would be disingag’d,” meaning 
that they would have no obligation towards him.152 Milton agreed with the lawyer and 
churchman, Lord Henry de Bracton, that “kings ought to use the power of law and right 
as God’s servant and viceregent; the power to do wrong is the Devil’s, and not God’s; 
when the king turns aside to do wrong, he is the servant of the Devil.”153 Milton 
favorably quotes a passage from Seneca: “There can be slaine/No sacrifice to God more 
acceptable/Then an unjust and wicked King.”154 The revolution, conducted “under the 
inspection of God first implored, and under his manifest guidance, setting examples and 
performing deeds of valor, the greatest since the foundation of the world – delivered the 
Commonwealth from a grievous domination, and religion from a most debasing 
thralldom.”155 In “The Readie and Easie Way to Establish a Commonwealth,” Milton 
criticizes centralized government and lays out his vision of an essentially republican 
government that included an aristocratic and a popular assembly. 
Like his contemporary, John Locke, and his predecessor, John Milton, Algernon 
Sidney argues in Discourses Concerning Government that good government must be 
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founded upon the consent of the governed. Like Locke, Sidney strongly stresses the 
individual’s right to liberty. For Sidney and Locke, liberty means a natural equality of 
authority, of an “independency upon the will of another,”156 for “God is our lord by right 
of creation, and our only lord, because he only hath created us.”157 Unlike Locke, 
however, who is far more a modernist, Sidney’s thought harkens back to the classical 
philosophers in that he criticizes “liberty without restraint” (licentiousness158) as being 
“inconsistent with any government, and the good which man naturally desires for 
himself, children, and friends.”159 Rational liberty is supported by virtue, and 
consequently, good government, contra Locke, does not merely protect liberty but 
rewards virtue and punishes vice.160 The form of government that best performs these 
functions, Sidney argues, is a mixed-constitution republic, consisting not only of 
monarchic elements but also of aristocratic and democratic. Further, government must be 
restrained to operate only within the general principles of law or else the people will be 
ruled by the arbitrary whims of men. In arriving at this conclusion and his refutation of 
absolute monarchy, he criticizes blind faith, arguing instead for the importance of 
reasoning from first principles,161 though his arguments make liberal use of Scripture as 
well as reason and historical experience. 
 It is with Locke that we find what has become the best known, perhaps the 
standard, liberal doctrine for the proper purpose of government. As the meat of his 
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political philosophy has already been dealt with in part two and will be again in part six, 
discussion of his importance to the American Revolution is dealt with in the next section. 
IV.1.2 Religious and Political Ideology in the American Revolution 
 It is as an outgrowth of the religious ferment in revolutionary Seventeenth 
Century England that the settlement of America by English Protestants fleeing 
persecution, and the later Revolution and Founding, are to be understood. Milton, Sidney, 
Locke, and others had argued that God had bestowed upon mankind the tools that made 
him fit to judge what is best in matters religious and civil. The settlers fled to America in 
search of the liberty to do just that. 
America was viewed as a promised land. Under the reign of Charles I, John 
Winthrop, the first governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, preached his famous 
“City on a Hill” sermon, which was based on Matthew 5:14 (“You are the light of the 
world. A city set on a hill cannot be hid."). In this sermon, he urged the soon-to-be 
Puritan colonists of New England to make their new community a “city on a hill,” an 
example to the Christian world. Puritans believed that the Anglican Church had fallen 
from grace by accepting Catholic rituals. Moreover, Winthrop and other Puritans 
believed that all nations have a covenant with God, and since England had violated this  
covenant, the Puritans had to leave the country. It was his hope and theirs that  
Christianity would be purified in the New World and serve as an example of a proper 
Protestant community to the Old World. He warned his fellow colonists, “if wee shall 
deale falsely with our god in this worke wee have undertaken and soe cause him to 
withdrawe his present help from us, wee shall be made a story and a byword through the 
world, wee shall open the mouthes of enemies to speake evill of the wayes of god and all 
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professours for Gods sake."162 Massachusetts maintained exceedingly strict regulations 
on religious and moral conduct early on, particularly in contrast to the loosely-bound 
societies of the Chesapeake Bay and Jamestown colonies. In general, however, religious 
‘liberty’ in early colonial America meant only freedom from Canterbury and Rome; that 
is, from the Anglican and Catholic Churches. Even after the Constitution was ratified 
some states still had established religions – only the national government was prohibited 
from establishing religion. 
 In the 1730s and 1740s, America experienced a spiritual revolution called the 
Great Awakening. “Narrowly construed as occurring in the years 1739 to 1742,”163 the 
Great Awakening was a religious revival movement that sought a return to the Pilgrim’s 
strict Calvinist roots and to reawaken the fear of God. It was brought on in response to a 
decline in religiosity that had been occurring for decades, perhaps due in part as a 
reaction to the Salem witch trials. Alan Heimert and Perry Miller write that the Great 
Awakening “clearly began a new era, not merely of American Protestantism, but in the 
evolution of the American mind.”164 Indeed, it was perhaps the first truly “American” 
event and, as such, it represented a step towards a common identity in the hearts and 
minds of the colonists. Throughout the period and later as well, itinerant preachers sprang 
up across the colonies calling themselves the “New Lights.” In contrast to the “Old 
Lights,” as the new brand of preachers called them, “who eschewed emotion and 
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experimental religion,”165 the New Lights sought to revive religious feeling in the 
colonists. The intent was for each person to experience a 
vivid communion with God…, with the consequence that this concourse 
becomes the transformative core for that person, who therewith sees 
himself as a “new man”: initially in the conversion experience 
(represented as a spiritual rebirth) and subsequently in the continuing 
meditative nurture of the soul, pursued by every means but chiefly, in 
American Protestantism, through prayer, sermons, and scriptural 
meditation.166 
 
“The great cry of the awakeners was for a converted ministry, one able to revive religious 
communities lacking vitality and zeal, so as to make the presence of God with his people 
a palpable reality.”167 
 The New Lights did not confine themselves to theological issues solely. American 
preachers had several means available for expounding Protestant political theology.168 
Among these were election sermons “preached annually to the governor and legislature 
after the election of officers.”169 Other vehicles were artillery sermons, convention 
sermons, sermons given on holidays such as the day Charles I was executed, sermons on 
holy days, and century sermons such as the Glorious Revolution’s centenary in 1788, and 
more. Thousands of sermons were examined for inclusion into Dr. Sandoz’s anthology; 
of these, fifty-five were selected. As a measure not merely of the quality of published 
political sermons but also of the quantity preached in colonial America, “very few of the 
sermons preached ever were published; thus, Samuel Dunbar, an Old Light minister of 
Stoughton, Massachusetts, wrote out some eight thousand sermons during his long career 
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but published only nine of them.”170 Due to space constraints I will limit myself to citing 
just a few of the political sermons from Sandoz’s anthology. 
Though not the only one to do so, Elisha Williams is notable for his seamless 
melding of a Lockean framework and Scriptural foundation for natural rights. Though his 
sermon does not primarily deal with the general purview of civil government but rather 
with the right to liberty of conscience, he nevertheless provides an excellent treatment of 
the origin and end of government, and his argument is easily generalizable beyond 
religious liberty. He notes that “the sacred scriptures are the alone rule of faith and 
practice to a Christian…that every Christian has a right of judging for himself what he is 
to believe and practice in religion according to that rule,” which he finds “perfectly 
inconsistent with any power in the civil magistrate to make any penal laws in matters of 
religion.”171 
Christ alone is our master in matters of religion, and matters of religion for a 
Christian covers quite a lot of ground. The Scriptures are Christ’s Word and our means of 
knowing his Will, therefore as God has created us with free will and the faculty of reason, 
we alone bear the responsibility of interpreting it. 
[F]or any to assume the power of directing the consciences of men, not 
leaving them to the scriptures alone, is evidently a declaring them to be 
defective and insufficient to that purpose; and therefore that our Lord who 
has left us the scriptures for that purpose, did not know what was 
necessary and sufficient for us, and has given us a law, the defects of 
which were to be supplied by the wisdom of some of his own wiser 
disciples. How high an impeachment this is of his infinite wisdom, such 
would do well to consider, who impose their own doctrines, interpretations 
or decisions upon any men by punishments, legal incapacities, or any 
other methods besides those used and directed to in the sacred scriptures. 
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And as all imposers on men’s consciences are guilty of rebellion against 
GOD and CHRIST, of manifest disobedience to and contempt of their 
authority and commands; so all they who submit their consciences to any 
such unjust usurp’d authority[.]172 
 
This is not merely an indictment of the interference of civil government in religious 
matters but of private interference as well. Everyone must be free to join, leave, or form 
any worshipping assembly that their judgment sees fit to join, leave, or form, or to 
worship singly, so long as they do so peaceably. 
 Williams’s line of reasoning in matters of religious liberty is fascinatingly 
paralleled by Christian-Lockean arguments on the origin and end of government, and for 
resisting tyranny. Consider Williams’s own. “For the freedom of man and liberty of 
acting according to his own will (without being subject to the will of another) is grounded 
on his having reason, which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by, 
and make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will.”173 All men are 
naturally equal in authority. Our natural liberty consists not in being free to do absolutely 
anything we please, that is, to satisfy our whims of the moment. Rather, “it consists in a 
freedom from any superior power on earth, and not being under the will or legislative 
authority of man, and having only the law of nature (or in other words, of its Maker) for 
his rule.”174 Consequently, every man has an equal right to his person, and to performing 
the legitimate actions necessary for his preservation, which means that he has a right to 
his property as well and the right to defend his person and property from those who 
would take it against his will. In typical Lockean fashion, Williams argues that men come 
together to form civil governments in order to provide a measure of security unavailable 
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in a state of nature. This then is the just, if rarely the historical, origin of government. The 
only just end of government is thus the protection of person and property from the 
initiation of force. Christians not only have a right but a duty to resist an unjust 
government. 
Jonathan Mayhew, writing in the wake of the repeal of the Stamp Act, affirmed 
that Americans “were free-born…so we have a natural right to our own, till we have 
freely consented to part with it, either in person, or by those whom we have appointed to 
represent, and to act for us.”175 This natural right is “affirmed and secured to us, as we are 
British subjects, by Magna Charta; all acts contrary to which, are said to be ipso facto 
null and void[.]”176 At issue were an American aversion to being taxed without 
representation and fears of the money being used to support an oppressive standing army 
and state religion. He nevertheless urged the Christian “duty of cultivating a close 
harmony with the mother-country, and a dutiful submission to king and Parliament, our 
chief grievances being redressed;” however, he means not to “disswade people from 
having a just concern for their own rights, or legal, constitutional privileges.”177 
Americans must be ever on their guard, for Christ is the only King “that, in a religious or 
moral sense, ‘can do no wrong’.”178 While “men sleep, then the enemy cometh and 
soweth tares, which cannot be rooted out again till the end of the world, without rooting 
out the wheat with them.”179 He reminds his listeners that “God gave the Israelites a king 
[or absolute monarch] in his anger, because they had not sense and virtue enough to like a 
free commonwealth, and to have himself for their king; that the Son of God came down 
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from heaven to make us ‘free indeed’; and that ‘where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is 
liberty’; this made me conclude, that freedom was a great blessing.”180 
In a more radically patriotic and revolutionary sermon, regarding the Gaspee 
affair, John Allen appeals to the Earl of Dartmouth’s Christianity: “The law of GOD 
directs us to do unto others, as we would they should do unto us.”181 What true Christian, 
he asks, then, “will oppress his fellow-creatures?”182 He remarks threateningly that “such 
men, who will take away the rights of any people, are neither fit for heaven; nor earth, 
neither fit for the land or the dunghill.”183 Again, the issue was taxation without 
representation. The Gaspee had been burned in response to the oppressive mission of its 
crew to expropriate the peoples’ property against their will. The grievance was 
compounded with England’s intent to try the perpetrators not in an American court under 
American law, but in a special Admiralty court three thousand miles from their homes 
under English law, for treason. Quoting Scripture, Allen contends that “where there is no 
Law, there is no transgression.”184 America is the native right of Americans. The King 
“can have no more right to America, than what the people have, by compact, invested 
him with, which is only a power to protect them, and defend their rights civil and 
religious; and to sign, seal, and confirm, as their steward, such laws as the people of 
America shall consent to.”185 The Americans, therefore, were in the right to defend their 
property. He echoes Mayhew in professing that Americans have a Christian love and duty 
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to their King and mother-country, but warns against provoking a revolution that could 
destroy both England and America. 
Two passages of Christ’s teachings, quoted in Elisha Williams’s sermon convey 
the general theme of the political sermons. The first is “no Man can serve two Masters, 
but he must unavoidably prefer the one and neglect the other.”186 The second is “For one 
is your Master even Christ, and all ye are Brethren: And call no Man your Father upon 
Earth; for one is your Father which is in Heaven: Neither be ye called Masters; for one is 
your Master even Christ.”187 Taken together, these two passages indict all earthly 
authority, aside from, as we have seen, each individual’s conscience in interpreting 
Scripture, though a man can choose to delegate his authority voluntarily to a 
representative in civil government who is tasked with looking after his interests. 
The political sermons were not the only medium through which politics and 
religion met in colonial America. Religion played a direct role in the conduct, debate, and 
policies of government officials from the lowliest town selectman to the colonial 
legislatures and governors. Politics and religion also met in print via newspapers in the 
form of open letters to the people as well as in the activity known as pamphleteering. 
Among those who took active part in both of these mediums was John Adams, one of the 
Founding Fathers, a man whom Benjamin Rush called “the Atlas of American 
Independence.”188 Rush “thought there was a consensus among the generation of 1776 
that Adams possessed ‘more learning probably, both ancient and modern, than any man 
who subscribed the Declaration of Independence.’”189 He “wrote some of the most 
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important and influential essays, constitutions [most notably that of Massachusetts in 
1780], and treatises of the Revolutionary period.”190 
Like his contemporaries, John Adams defends the preexisting liberties of the 
American people from English oppression. Though he recognized the policies of England 
as growing increasingly tyrannical towards the colonies, he did not mean to suggest 
overturning the English form of government. David McCullough argues that Adams 
viewed English constitutionalism in an extremely positive light. 
The English constitution, Adams declared – and knowing he would be 
taken to task for it – was the ideal…it was “the most stupendous fabric of 
human invention” in all history. Americans should be applauded for 
imitating it as far as has been done, but also, he stressed, for making 
certain improvements in the original[.]191 
 
To Adams, the English system of government was not the problem but rather the current 
government was. 
To be more precise, the current policies towards the colonies, because they were 
crafted without the consent of the colonists since the colonies were not represented in 
Parliament, were tyrannical. In 1765, Adams “called for a town meeting in order to 
instruct its representative to the General Court on how the colony should respond to 
Parliament and the Stamp Act.”192 In “Instructions of the Town of Braintree to Their 
Representative,” Adams argues that the “Stamp Act is unconstitutional and therefore void 
because it deprives Americans of their traditional English rights to taxation by consent 
and trial by jury.”193 He laments the current situation: 
Such is our loyalty to the King, our veneration for both houses of 
Parliament, and our affection for all our fellow-subjects in Britain, that 
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measures which discover any unkindliness in that country towards us are 
the more sensibly and intimately felt. And we can no longer forbear 
complaining, that many of the measures of the late ministry, and some of 
the late acts of Parliament, have a tendency, in our apprehension, to divest 
us of our most essential rights and liberties.194 
 
The forcing of laws upon the colonists without their consent could only lead to slavery. In 
“Novanglus,” he argues against an apologist for England that the potential revolutionaries 
in the colonies 
can hardly be losers if unsuccessful; because, if they live, they can be but 
slaves, after an unfortunate effort, and slaves they would have been if they 
had not resisted. So that nothing is lost. If they die, they cannot be said to 
lose, for death is better than slavery. If they succeed, their gains are 
immense. They preserve their liberties.195 
 
Revolution, then, was the only reasonable choice for the colonists, if England could not 
be persuaded to restore justice. 
 “In late 1775, Adams assumed a leading role in the Continental Congress to 
encourage the thirteen colonies to begin designing and constructing new 
governments.”196 In his “Thoughts on Government: Applicable to the Present State of the 
American Colonies,” he lays out, by popular request, the general principles that he 
thought most essential to framing a just and proper government. Building on English 
constitutionalism and classical republicanism, Adams was strongly in favor of a 
separation of powers between the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of 
government. The legislature should be divided into two houses. This separation of 
powers, he thought, would better ensure the effective functioning of government as well 
as restrain potential abuses of power by posing each branch (and house, in the legislature) 
as a check on the other. 
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 Adams echoes Sidney when he declares that “the happiness of man, as well as his 
dignity, consists in virtue. […] The noblest principles and most generous affections in our 
nature, then, have the fairest chance to support the noblest and most generous models of 
government;”197 namely, a republican one. Moreover, the preservation of liberty and just 
government rests upon the virtue of the citizens, which in turn is supported by proper 
education. Small wonder, then, that in “A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law,” he 
praises the Puritans whose “civil and religious principles, therefore, conspired to prompt 
them to use every measure and take every precaution in their power to propagate and 
perpetuate knowledge. For this purpose they laid very early the foundations of colleges, 
and invested them with ample privileges and emoluments.”198 And in “Thoughts on 
Government,” he argues that “[l]aws for the liberal education of youth, especially of the 
lower class of people, are so extremely wise and useful, that, to a humane and generous 
mind, no expense for this purpose would be thought extravagant.”199 In the 1780 
Massachusetts Constitution, he went further by including provisions that made it a 
requirement to be Christian in order to be elected to public office. Also constitutionalized 
was recognition of and support for the university of Massachusetts, Harvard College, 
which was a seminary at the time. Too, support was stipulated in the Massachusetts 
Constitution for  
the university at Cambridge, public schools and grammar schools in the 
towns; to encourage private societies and public institutions, rewards and 
immunities for the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, 
trades, manufactures, and a natural history of the country; to countenance 
and inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence, public 
and private charity, industry and frugality, honesty and punctuality in their 
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dealings, sincerity, good humor, and all social affections and generous 
sentiments of the people.200 
 
Like Sidney, Adams recognizes that the longevity of a just government depends 
fundamentally upon the continued virtue of its citizens. What both failed to understand is 
that government is the last institution one should want attempting to inculcate virtue. 
While the New Light preachers and figures such as John Adams and the other 
Founders played important roles in arousing the colonists’ passion for liberty, two of the 
most important figures in this regard were Locke himself, by proxy, and Thomas Paine. 
Not long after the battles of Lexington and Concord, Paine issued a fiery pamphlet 
entitled Common Sense. In it he openly called for American independence, as the only 
alternative to slavery to Britain. He attacked the very principle of monarchy and was 
perhaps the first to openly denounce King George as the villain. And he criticized so-
called republican government in England, with its mixed constitution and checks and 
balances such that each branch was supposed to act as a check on the other. This 
complicated system of government made it difficult for the people to determine where 
responsibility lay when they had grievances. Moreover, the monarchic and aristocratic 
elements were independent of the people. In reality, the complexity of the system masked 
the repression of the democratic element. And, in any event, for the government to act, 
one branch had to be at least temporarily dominant; the checks of the other branches at 
best served to gum up the works, so to speak, and slow the progress of the dominant 
branch. He favored instead, simple republican governments with single-chamber 
legislatures, and spoke of ordinary farmers and artisans as making “the best 
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governors.”201 He also favored free trade with the world rather than the mercantilist 
policies of Britain. He makes a libertarian distinction between society and government: 
“Society is produced by our wants and government by our wickedness; the former 
promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, the latter negatively by 
restraining our vices.”202 He also, while taking a Lockean stance on the nature and 
purpose of government, correctly recognizes that the origin of government has almost 
invariably been through conquest not voluntary social contract. Common Sense spread 
like wildfire and inspired many others to similar exertions. 
We have already seen how at least one preacher incorporated Lockean natural 
rights arguments into popularized Christian political theology. Among other more notable 
writers were John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon of Cato’s Letters, which were 
published from 1720 to 1723. Indeed, in his book Seedtime of the Republic, historian 
Clinton Rossiter once remarked that “no one can spend any time in the newspapers, 
library inventories, and pamphlets of colonial America without realising that Cato’s 
Letters rather than Locke’s Civil Government was the most popular, quotable, esteemed 
source of political ideas in the colonial period.”203 Trenchard and Gordon, many 
preachers, and others, popularized dry and theoretical arguments and were extremely 
influential in America. Consider Gordon’s thoughts on what is liberty: 
By Liberty I understand the Power which every Man has over his own 
Actions, and his Right to enjoy the Fruits of his Labour, Art, and Industry, 
as far as by it he hurts not the Society, or any Members of it, by taking 
from any Member, or by hindering him from enjoying what he himself 
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enjoys. The Fruits of a Man's honest Industry are the just Rewards of it, 
ascertained to him by natural and eternal Equity, as is his Title to use them 
in the Manner which he thinks fit: And thus, with the above Limitations, 
every Man is sole Lord and Arbiter of his own private Actions and 
Property.204 
 
From such a foundation, Trenchard and Gordon made passionate arguments in defense of 
freedom of speech and conscience. The colonists eagerly imbibed their rhetoric that 
“government in general, and the British government specifically, was the great violator of 
such rights, and warned also that power – government – stood ever ready to conspire to 
violate the liberties of the individual. To stop this crippling and destructive invasion of 
liberty by power, the people must be ever wary, ever vigilant, ever alert to conspiracies of 
the rulers to expand their power and aggress against their subjects.”205 And the colonists’ 
conspiracy view of the British government turned out to be justified. 
IV.2 The American Revolution: Radical or Conservative? 
At this point it would be fruitful to compare the American Revolution with one 
that it helped to inspire, the French Revolution. Many Americans were at first elated by 
this event and initially gave it high praise. Elation soon turned to horror, however, as the 
French Revolution transformed into the worst tableau of tyranny: popular despotism. 
What was the difference? What had gone wrong? Many conservative scholars, 
particularly neoconservatives, hold that the difference lies in the fact that the American 
Revolution was essentially a conservative revolution. The Americans sought only to 
restore justice by overthrowing tyranny, to defend preexisting rights and traditions that 
England was violating. It was also a holy revolution in the Christian sense of the word. 
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 In so far as the French Revolution sought liberty, says Noah Webster, its cause 
was “the noblest ever undertaken by men. It was necessary; it was just.”206 
The feudal and papal systems were tyrannical in the extreme; they fettered 
and debased the mind; they enslaved a great portion of Europe. While 
legislators of France confined themselves to a correction of real evils, they 
were the most respectable reformers: they commanded the attention, the 
applause and the admiration of surrounding nations. But when they 
descended to legislate upon names, opinions and customs, that could have 
no influence upon liberty or social rights, they became contemptible; and 
when faction took the lead, when a difference of opinion on the form of 
government proper for France, or a mere adherence to a solemn oath, 
became high treason punishable with death, the triumphant faction [the 
Jacobins] inspired even friends of the revolution, with disgust and horror. 
Liberty is the cry of these men, while with the grimace of a Cromwell, 
they deprive every man who will not go all the lengths of their rash 
measures, of both liberty and life [and property]. A free republic, is their 
perpetual cant; yet to establish their own ideas of this free government, 
they have formed and now exercise throughout France a military 
aristocracy, the most bloody and despotic recorded in history.207 
 
While in its initial fazes the French Revolution sought to secure liberty, its ultimate 
mission became a complete and total overturning of the old order. The hubris of the 
utopian visionaries of the French Revolution led them to believe they could remake the 
entire social order in all its infinite complexity and do so through central planning. They 
forgot that human reason has its limitations; and one of the traditions they threw off was 
the Christian doctrine of original sin, which served the function of reminding man that he 
is not infallible or omniscient. “In seeking liberty, France [had] gone beyond her.”208 
 But if the French Revolution was radical, does that necessarily make the 
American Revolution conservative, even if only by comparison? To the American 
colonists, the fight for independence was intimately a matter of both reason and faith, 
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mind and heart, civil and religious tradition. These intertwined elements were the 
motivation and raison d’etre of the American Revolution. This is no better expressed than 
in the Declaration of Independence. 
Are not all revolutions inherently radical, however? A political revolution is a 
fundamental change in political organization. Such an event can hardly be termed 
conservative. But as revolutions go – that is, relatively speaking – was it a conservative 
revolution? In a certain sense, it is possible to speak of all revolutions as “conservative” 
in that all are reactions against increasing oppression; they are generally attempts to 
restore some previous better condition. But to use the word “conservative” in this way is 
to make it meaningless. The Declaration of Independence makes clear “that mankind is 
more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing 
the forms to which they are accustomed.” To overthrow such habits, even in the face of a 
long train of abuses leading them into slavery, is a fundamentally radical act.209 
 The ideology of natural rights, individual liberty, and popular sovereignty is an 
inherently revolutionary one, overthrowing the old orders of feudal and canon law as well 
as their more modern descendants and all forms of oppression. We have seen how it 
began in Seventeenth Century England and became more radical in America, culminating 
in the Revolution, the liberating spirit of which motivated the colonists to resist not only 
English tyranny but tyranny at home as well. The liberating spirit of Revolution also 
induced many colonists, mostly in the North, to challenge slavery.210 
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As Murray Rothbard argues in his four-volume work, Conceived in Liberty, there 
were other ways in which the American Revolution was radical. “It was the first 
successful war of national liberation against western imperialism.”211 It was also a 
people’s war and, insofar as it was successful, it was won with guerrilla strategy and 
tactics against an otherwise superior army.212 Moreover, the Revolution resulted 
in permanent expulsion of 100,000 Tories from the United States. Tories 
were hunted, persecuted, their property confiscated, and themselves 
sometimes killed…Thus, the French Revolution was, as in so many other 
things, foreshadowed by the American. The inner contradiction of the goal 
of liberty and the struggle against the Tories during the Revolution 
showed that revolutions will be tempted to betray their own principles in 
the heat of battle. The American Revolution also prefigured the misguided 
use of paper money inflation, and of severe price and wage controls which 
proved equally unworkable in America and in France. 
 
The Americans had a long tradition of spontaneous local government that started at the 
town level. Their tendency to form spontaneous local and county committees, quasi-
anarchistic institutions that paralleled or replaced old and established governmental ones, 
only increased with the Revolution.213 Herein lies the primary difference between the 
American and French Revolutions. The American Revolution was largely a grass-roots, 
decentralized revolution and the ideology of natural rights, individual liberty, and popular 
sovereignty was deeply ingrained in the hearts and minds of the people. By contrast, the 
French Revolution was far more collectivist, organized rigidly and planned from the top 
down, though there were elements of this in the American Revolution as well.214 And the 
French people were experientially lacking in the tradition of liberty the Americans had 
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come to take for granted. The French did not truly understand liberty, small wonder that 
they went so far beyond her. 
 We can identify two major sides within the American Revolution, the liberals and 
the conservatives, though this is not to say that the conservatives did not hold classical 
liberal ideas.215 The former were more local in their interests, democratic, radical, and 
more consistent proponents of the ideology of natural rights and individual liberty and of 
popular sovereignty. The conservative movement emerged as a reaction to the liberals. 
After the Revolution got underway and the British-supported governments and favorites 
were overthrown, the problem of who would rule at home arose. The conservatives were 
made up of those who were radical in their desire for independence from Britain but 
highly conservative on domestic affairs as well as quasi-Tories who opposed 
independence until the last minute. The conservatives tended to be strongly aristocratic 
and nationalist, and distrusted the will of the people. Rothbard summarizes the tension 
between the liberals and conservatives nicely: 
The basic issue in internal affairs was simply: Would the American 
governments remain as they had emerged at the outset of the Revolution: 
spontaneous, libertarian, democratic, and responsive to the checks of the 
people? Or would they revert to something very like oligarchic British 
rule: strong government, with an executive and upper legislative house far 
removed from the people and only partially checked by them? Would 
oligarchic power be resumed by a new set of Tory lords in another 
guise?216 
 
Men like Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson generally fell into the liberal camp, 
while men like John Adams, George Washington, and Alexander Hamilton generally fell 
into the conservative camp. We have already glimpsed the work of John Adams and, 
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indeed, his “Thoughts on Government” was written in reaction to Thomas Paine’s 
Common Sense.217 In contrast to Paine, Adams strongly favored a mixed constitution with 
three branches and checks and balances. He favored aristocracy, though not hereditary 
aristocracy; few people in America favored hereditary aristocracy. He distinguished 
between ‘artificial aristocracy’, “those inequalities of weight and superiorities of 
influence which are created and established by civil laws,” favoring instead what he 
called ‘natural aristocracy’, which he defined as “those superiorities of influence in 
society which grow out of the constitution of human nature.”218 His definition of 
aristocracy, however, was decidedly republican: “By aristocracy, I understand all those 
men who can command, influence, or procure more than an average number of votes; by 
an aristocrat, every man who can and will influence one man to vote besides himself.” 
Even the most ‘democratic’ of the Founders, Thomas Jefferson, held this position: 
There is a natural aristocracy among men. The grounds of this are virtue 
and talents... There is also an artificial aristocracy founded on wealth and 
birth, without either virtue or talents; for with these it would belong to the 
first class. The natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift of 
nature for the instruction, the trusts, and government of society. And, 
indeed, it would have been inconsistent in creation to have formed man for 
the social state and not to have provided virtue and wisdom enough to 
manage the concerns of the society. May we not even say that that form of 
government is the best which provides the most effectually for a pure 
selection of these natural aristoi into the offices of government? The 
artificial aristocracy is a mischievous ingredient in government, and 
provision should be made to prevent its ascendency.219 
 
However, it was not on the existence of a natural aristocracy that the liberals and 
conservatives disagreed, but rather they disagreed on how it would be expressed in the 
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form and function of government. Men like Adams saw the natural aristocracy primarily 
in terms of the wealthy and well-born, and the politico-economic policies of the 
conservatives tended to create an artificial aristocracy whether or not they intended them 
to. 
Not only was “Thoughts on Government” a reactionary document, but so too was 
Adams’s 1780 Massachusetts Constitution. By the time it was written, most of the other 
states had already written new constitutions. 
The worst example in the eyes of the gentry was that of Pennsylvania, 
where in the summer of 1776 “radical” forces [influenced by Paine] had 
gained control and fashioned a document without any system of “checks 
and balances.” Written by Revolutionaries, it discriminated against all 
those who opposed taking up arms against the king, Quaker pacifists as 
well as Tories. Yet, in its treatment of those who supported the war effort, 
it was remarkably “democratic,” empowering poor men as well as rich 




[T]he new Pennsylvania constitution established a single, all-powerful 
legislature, elected annually by taxpaying males over the age of twenty-
one. There were no property qualifications for holding office. And instead 
of a powerful governor with a veto, there was a plural executive consisting 





A year later Vermont took the Pennsylvania model a step further. In just 
six days [Ethan Allen’s] Green Mountain Boys drafted a constitution that 
largely copied the Pennsylvania document, except that it also banned 
slavery and enhanced the power of local governments, even allowing 
towns to decide such matters as legal fees. In the eyes of many in western 
Massachusetts, Vermont was an example to be followed. Strengthening 
town government, enhancing the power of town meetings, was clearly the 
direction in which to move. In the eyes of the Massachusetts gentry, 




Rhode Island, which did not even bother to write a new constitution but rather “simply 
deleted all references to the British crown from its old colonial charter,” had a similar 
form of government and was viewed in much the same light as Vermont by the 
Massachusetts gentry.220 
The new Massachusetts constitution was highly conservative and had much in 
common with Maryland’s. In it Adams advocated a high property-value qualification for 
suffrage. Real estate was made the sole qualification for eligibility to public office;  
money and other personal property would not count. Intervals between elections longer 
than those of Pennsylvania were established. The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution was, 
in many ways, a prototype of the US Constitution. The executive and upper house of the 
legislature were strong and independent; both were highly aristocratic. The upper house 
was designed to represent the interests of the wealthy. And the judiciary was independent 
of the control of ordinary people. The governor had veto power and complete control 
over the military. He could appoint all judges, whose tenure rested on good behavior 
unless removed by him and his council. 
This constitution, which followed on the heels of the rejected conservative 
Constitution of 1778, was bitterly contested. 
The heaviest opposition to the constitution came over the declaration of 
rights and its weakness in insuring freedom of speech or habeas corpus. 
Many towns opposed the property qualifications, as well as the appointive 
power of the executive and the oligarchy of independent judges. Also 
bitterly fought in the press and in the towns was the clause on 
establishment of religion.221 
 
The greatest opposition to the property qualifications came from the western towns, the 
backcountry of Massachusetts, which were made up mostly of yeoman farmers. They 
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pointed out the inconsistency of property qualifications with the revolutionary principle 
of no taxation without representation. “Other demands by opposition towns were for 
election of local officials, a tight rein on the governor, a unicameral legislature [like that 
of Vermont and Rhode Island], and a loosening of the highly restrictive provisions for 
amendment of the constitution.”222 
 No small amount of chicanery was involved in getting this constitution ratified. 
The 1778 constitution had required unqualified support of a two-thirds majority, the 
entire document would be rejected if any detail was objected to, and so it was rejected. 
Having learned from this, the proponents of the new constitution contrived 
a ratification process that virtually guaranteed approval of their 
handiwork. Instead of requiring unqualified support, this time a town 
might suggest scores of amendments and still be counted as a ‘yes’ vote. 
Every town was to vote on the constitution, clause by clause, and state 
objections to any clause that did not obtain a majority. Then the adjourned 
constitutional convention was to look at the results, and if there appeared 
to be a two-thirds majority for each clause to declare the constitution 
ratified, and if there did not appear to be a two-thirds majority to make 
alterations ‘in accord with the popular will’. 
 
What if there was no popular will? What if sixty towns objected to a 
provision for one reason, and another sixty for the opposite reason? Such 
was the case when it came to the relationship of church to state. And what 
if a town never took a vote on an article it objected to? If it had just 
suggested an amendment and voted on the amendment? Should the votes 
for the amendment be counted as votes against the original article? That 
might seem logical, but that is not what happened. In fact, most towns 
never took a vote on an article that the majority clearly opposed, just on 
the substituted amendment, and these votes were not counted against the 
original article. Similarly, the vote counters decided other ticklish issues in 
behalf of their creation. Every article thus passed by a landslide.223 
 
It did not sit well with the people of the backcountry that the new constitution took power 
out of their hands and gave it to the Boston gentry. In addition to the objections already 
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mentioned, many of the western towns preferred “superior court judges to be either 
elected or appointed annually,…justices of the peace to be elected,” and “censured the 
new constitution for allowing the house to do business when only sixty members were 
present. This, they argued, was especially biased in favor of the mercantile elite and the 
eastern part of the state.”224 
 The conflict between liberals and conservatives also manifested in the Continental 
Army under George Washington. The citizen militias of the colonists were individualistic 
and democratic in spirit. “[T]he officers of the militia were elected by their own men, and 
the discipline of repeated elections kept the officers from forming an aristocratic ruling 
caste typical of European armies of the period. The officers often drew little more pay 
than their men and there were no hierarchical distinctions of rank imposed between 
officers and men. As a consequence, officers could not enforce their wills coercively on 
the soldiery.”225 These militias were eminently well-suited to guerrilla warfare and a 
libertarian-style revolution. Washington, however, proceeded to mold the new 
Continental Army on the European model. He “insisted on distinctive decorations of 
dress in accordance with minute gradations of rank” and, despite the unfeasible expense 
involved, “tried to stamp out individuality in the army by forcing uniforms upon 
them[.]”226 He also introduced extensive inequality in pay between the officers and 
common soldiers. Strict and harsh discipline was enforced. 
The Continental Army proved expensive, not only for the Continental Congress 
which went heavily into debt financing the war, but also for the soldiers who, when they 
were paid, were paid in depreciating paper notes. Being away from their farms for 
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extended periods of time, they too went into debt. Many of the officers, particularly those 
not independently wealthy, were no better off, despite their higher pay; “Washington 
wanted his officers to be more like European officers, to dress elegantly, to have an 
enlisted man as a body servant, to haul around lots of personal baggage, to ride a horse 
rather than march, to dine in taverns rather than in field messes.”227 
 It has already been noted that the Revolutionary War was a people’s war. The war 
had the support of a majority of the people and could not have been won without it. The 
British military possessed superior firepower and fought with conventional military 
strategy and tactics. In recent decades scholars have become increasingly aware of the 
effectiveness of guerrilla warfare in wars of liberation, both in terms of strategy and 
tactics as well as morale and monetary cost. The Revolutionary War, insofar as it was 
successful, was largely won due to the fact that it was a people’s war fought with 
guerrilla-style strategy and tactics (including privateering). Attempts to fight a 
conventional war resulted in many of the Americans’ worst defeats, required an 
increasing consolidation of power in the Congress, and enriched well-connected 
individuals while saddling the people with debt.228 
 By 1780, with the victories in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, the war was 
already winding down. Congress and the several states had put severe strain on the 
economy with rampant inflation and price controls begun early in the war. As Secretary 
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of Finance between 1780-83, Robert Morris consolidated immense power under his 
control, virtually every function of government, including America’s first central bank. 
Congress created quasi-independent executive departments each headed by a nonelected 
bureaucrat. Morris demanded and received from Congress the power to hire anyone for 
his own department and fire anyone in any other department. The naval and admiralty 
boards were consolidated under his department. In other departments, he helped friends 
and associates into positions of power. “[E]very Monday night Morris called together the 
major executive officers of government…in an informal but effective cabinet 
meeting.”229 He also demanded and received advance sanction for any private business 
dealings he might have while in office. With the Bank of North America, Morris issued 
his own notes called “Morris notes” and “Morris warrants” which depreciated rapidly, 
and he amassed a considerable public debt on behalf of Congress. Morris, it seems, 
“wanted to bind the national government to powerful ‘private interest,’ to the ‘interests of 
monied men.’” Alexander Hamilton, too, it is well known, favored mercantilist policies; 
he wrote that 
there are some who maintain that trade will regulate itself, and is not to be 
benefited by the encouragements, or restraints, of government. Such 
persons will imagine, that there is no need of a common directing power. 
This is one of those wild speculative paradoxes which have grown into 
credit among us, contrary to the uniform practice and sense of the most 
enlightened nations.230 
 
Rather than apportioning the Congressional debt among the states as befit the idea behind 
the Articles of Confederation, the conservatives pushed for Congress to assume all of the 
public debt, even that held by the several states, which would help tie the interests of the 
nation to a central government and bureaucracy. In other words, as the passage by 
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Hamilton indicates, the idea was to recreate a version of the mercantilist States of Europe 
in America.231 
In the foregoing I have attempted to illustrate the conflict between the liberals and 
the conservatives. I have not attempted to tell the whole story here, for such would be 
impossible. The American Revolution, insofar as it was a revolution against England, 
was fundamentally a radical event. The conflict between the liberals and conservatives 
was over the question of the extent to which the principles of the Revolution were to 
apply at home with the end of British rule. By the early 1780s, conservatives had swept 
into power in most states. In 1781, conservatives pushed for a federal tariff that was 
narrowly defeated by Rhode Island’s failure to ratify the necessary amendment to the 
Articles of Confederation and Virginia’s last minute repeal of its ratification. Insofar as 
there was a revolution at home, the conflict between the liberals and the conservatives 
was not decided until 1787. It is in this light that the Constitutional Convention and 
ratification of the Constitution can be evaluated. Do these events represent a liberal 
innovation in government? Or a conservative counter-revolution? 
IV.3 The American Constitution: 
Liberal Innovation or Conservative Counter-Revolution?  
 
The Federalist Papers, letters written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, 
and John Jay in support of the newly proposed Constitution, are well known and well 
read even over two hundred years after they were written.232 Collectively, these letters are 
considered a milestone in American political science. While they present a systematic 
defense of the Constitution, this fundamental document did not yet include the Bill of 
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Rights we are so familiar with today. It is the less well-known and less well-studied 
writings of the opponents of the Constitution, the so-called Anti-Federalists, that we have 
to thank for this much needed addition. The opponents of the Constitution were as 
diverse in their reasons for opposing it as were the supporters of the proposed new 
system. However, one can find common themes that run through many of the Anti-
Federalists’ writings. Among these is a distrust of the elites, the aristocratic class, who 
were promoting the new system of government and no doubt would assume a prominent 
role within it. The Anti-Federalists also feared, and rightly so, what they perceived as 
features of the new Constitution that would inevitably lead to a consolidation of power in 
the national government. The state governments would be abolished, or at the very least 
be so subordinated to the national government as to have been stripped of sovereignty. 
Such a government would be tyrannical. As it turns out, history has proven the Anti-
Federalists right in many respects and wrong in others. Ultimately, they failed in 
preventing the ratification of the Constitution, though they were instrumental in forcing 
the Federalists to add the Bill of Rights. Why did they oppose the Constitution? And what 
did they find so objectionable about it? 
 First, in order to gain perspective on the arguments of the Anti-Federalists and the 
Federalists, it would be fruitful to delve briefly into the background history that led to the 
framing of the Constitution in the first place. The United States were at the time a federal 
republic.233 The word federal was used differently at the time, our current form of 
government not having been invented yet. A federal form of government, or 
confederation, consists of a council (which the later Federalists would define as a weak 
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central government) that serves certain delegated functions for, and whose powers are 
delegated by, a number of sovereign states. In this sense, The Impartial Examiner was 
correct when he argued that the Anti-Federalists were the true Federalists.234 The term 
confederation is now used solely to identify this form of government, while federation or 
federalism has shifted in meaning to identify a form of government that is structurally 
similar to that of a confederation but with a significantly stronger central government that 
shares sovereignty with its component regions. 
The United States were governed by the Articles of Confederation. The men who 
would become known as Federalists saw three principal deficiencies in the current form 
of government. It became apparent, in the wake of the Revolution, that Congress was 
unable to pay off the national debt that had been taken on in order to fight the war for 
independence; Congress was unable to raise revenue by taxation or force the states to pay 
up. It also did not have sufficient power to regulate relations between the states and 
foreign nations. Congress could not force the states to abide by treaties or prevent them 
from signing their own at cross-purposes with each other. Thus it was recognized by 
many that the Articles of Confederation had to be strengthened. But these were not 
sufficient reasons to jettison the old system of government entirely, so the Anti-
Federalists thought. 
The third principal deficiency of the Articles of Confederation was the perceived 
weakness of the national and state governments in the face of civil unrest and 
insurgencies. The immediate catalyst of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was an 
event in Massachusetts called Shays’s Rebellion. This event was used by the ruling elites 
as an impetus for improving the system of government and, later, as a justification for the 
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dire need of ratifying the new Constitution. Most importantly, it was this event, as it was 
reported to him by his friends, that stirred George Washington out of his retirement and 
convinced him to preside over the Constitutional Convention. His presence was pivotal, 
as it gave the convention and the controversial Constitution a special air of legitimacy, 
for though the “other delegates…were men of great prestige,…none as yet had been 
deemed demigods. Washington, in contrast, was already a towering figure, larger than 
life, the nation’s most influential citizen. With Washington as presiding officer, everyone 
in the country had to take notice.”235 
Of the rebellion that occurred in Massachusetts in 1786-87, Washington was 
informed by his former aide, Daniel Humphreys, that the uprising was due to the 
“licentious spirit prevailing among the people”; that the malcontents were “levellers” 
determined to “annihilate all debts public & private.”236 The rebels had shut down courts, 
allegedly to suspend debt suits, and had attempted to seize the national arsenal at 
Springfield to do…what? The arsenal would have made the rebels better armed than the 
state of Massachusetts had they been successful.237 Reports from Humphreys, Henry 
Knox, and others instilled in Washington a fear that the political fabric of the nation was 
unraveling and that something drastic had to be done to save it. 
This popular account of Shays’s Rebellion is a highly distorted one, however. Far 
from being a mob of destitute farmers, Shays and his approximately 4,000 fellow rebels 
ranged from the heavily indebted and poor to the wealthy and well-to-do. Moreover, 
there is absolutely no correlation between debt and the backcountry towns of 
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Massachusetts that rebelled. A large number of the rebels were veterans of the 
Revolutionary War, including Daniel Shays. The rebellion had popular support in 
western Massachusetts. Even those who did not actively take up arms were sympathetic 
to the rebel cause. Indeed, nearly all of the citizen militia of Massachusetts either refused 
to suppress the rebellion or joined forces with the rebels. And the authorities in Boston 
were well aware of this. 
If it was not to suspend debt suits and eradicate ‘all debt, public and private’, why 
did the farmers of the Massachusetts backcountry rebel? In their eyes, they were fighting 
an unjust government. They were the victims of a regressive tax system, an overly 
expensive and complicated judicial system, and were not adequately represented in the 
Massachusetts government, which was dominated by the Boston gentry and unresponsive 
to their needs. In short, their rebellion was in the spirit of the Revolution; they saw 
themselves as “Regulators…for the Suppressing of tyrannical government in the 
Massachusetts State,”238 a state that was no better than the British colonial rule they had 
so recently fought to throw off. It is a not unimportant fact that the government Shays and 
his fellows were rebelling against was established by John Adams’s 1780 constitution. 
Shays’s Rebellion was sparked by a sharp rise in regressive taxes. The taxes 
themselves were increased as part of the plan to pay off the state debt in less than ten 
years, and enrich the few at the expense of the many in the process. During and after the 
Revolutionary War, the states had issued notes to the soldiers as payment for their 
services. Few of these soldiers could afford to wait until their state was able to pay off its 
debts, particularly in the face of depreciating paper money, so they often sold them at a 
fraction of their value to speculators in order to receive payment that was more 
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immediately useful for paying expenses. Large portions of these notes ended up in the 
hands of a relative few, note speculators, many of whom had political connections. The 
mercantile-dominated legislature managed to get the state debt consolidated at face value, 
twice the value necessary to make the state creditworthy, and intended to have it paid off  
quickly. Thus, taxes were raised to an oppressive level. Especially hard hit were the 
backcountry farmers, particularly those with grown sons. To make matters worse, 
payment had to be made in hard money (that is, in gold). 
The Massachusetts elite was able to put a negative spin on Shays’s Rebellion. 
Their version of the event not only served as the catalyst for the Constitutional 
Convention and got Washington out of retirement, but intensified the distrust felt among 
the elite about the ability of the common people to govern themselves. “The general 
conviction was that ordinary people, especially in Rhode Island and Massachusetts, were 
out of control and that there were “combustibles,” as Washington termed them, in every 
state.”239 Madison proclaimed, “The insurrections in Massachusetts admonished all the 
States of the danger to which they were exposed.”240 Even Elbridge Gerry, who would 
later oppose the Constitution, declared, “The evils we experience flow from the excess of 
democracy.”241 Indeed, the new Constitution was decidedly aristocratic, especially the 
Senate – elected indirectly by the people through their state legislatures and designed 
with strong powers to counter the more popularly elected House of Representatives – and 
the President, who would be elected indirectly by the people through the Electoral 
College. The Supreme Court Justices are not elected at all, but even further removed from 
the people in that they are nominated by the President and approved by the Senate. 
                                                 




Suffrage requirements were left up to the several states and, though property 
qualifications were not included for federal officials, the very nature of the offices would 
virtually ensure that the wealthy and well-born would tend to dominate them. 
The Massachusetts towns that produced Shays’s Rebellion had much in common 
with the Anti-Federalists. Most of the former voted against the new Constitution. Like 
many of the Anti-Federalists, they distrusted a powerful, unrepresentative government in 
the hands of a wealthy and aristocratic elite. Richards points out that in Massachusetts 
chicanery was involved in the ratification process of the national Constitution as well. 
The document “began with ‘We the People’, but it was not the ‘people’ who had 
demanded a new national government. Instead, the Constitution was the handiwork of a 
small segment of governing elite, and everyone knew it.” Some of the people’s main 
criticisms were the direct tax clause, the three-fifths clause, and the lack of a bill of 
rights. “To prevail, noted George Richards Minot, the clerk of the state legislature, King 
and his allies had ‘to pack a Convention whose sense would be different from that of the 
people.” Even Minot, “an ardent Federalist [himself] and a seasoned observer of deal-
making, was appalled. ‘Never was there a political system introduced by less worthy 
means,’ wrote Minot.”242 
As Richards also shows, Shays’s Rebellion was not unique; the Regulator 
movement was not confined to Massachusetts. These most prominent examples received 
nationwide attention: Backcountry yeoman farmers attempted to rebel against tyrannical 
state government in North Carolina in 1768 and in South Carolina later in the year; the 
former were crushed, while the latter were generally successful in their more limited 
aims. A failed insurgency had occurred in New York two years earlier in 1766. And in 
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the 1770’s Ethan Allen and the Green Mountain Boys succeeded in carving the 
independent republic of Vermont out of New York and New Hampshire.243 The new  
Constitution would enable the national government to put an end to such rebellions, 
however. One might say, with Richards, that Shays’s Rebellion was the final battle of the 
Revolution. 
Though not recognizing the justness of Shays’s Rebellion, The Federal Farmer 
nevertheless percipiently identifies the aristocratic elite pushing for the adoption of the 
Constitution. 
Though I have long apprehended that fraudulent debtors, and embarrassed 
men, on the one hand, and men, on the other, unfriendly to republican 
equality, would produce an uneasiness among the people, and prepare the 
way, not for cool and deliberate reforms in the governments, but for 
changes calculated to promote the interests of particular orders of men.244 
 
The latter party, in reaction to the former (Shays & Co.), “in 1787, has taken the political 
field, and with its fashionable dependents, and the tongue and the pen, is endeavoring to 
establish in great haste, a politer kind of government.”245 Though he does not necessarily 
identify the Convention delegates as all being part of this group, he nevertheless holds 
that this group of “aristocrats support and hasten the adoption of the proposed 
constitution, merely because they think it is a stepping stone to their favorite object.”246 
 Though the tactics used in other states were not as underhanded as in 
Pennsylvania, it will be instructive to have a look at the ratification process in the first 
state to call a convention on the Constitution. Samuel Bannister Harding informs us: 
In the State were two parties, embittered by a dozen years of violent 
struggle. On the one side, and for the moment in power, stood the greater 
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proportion of the men of property, of education, of large ideas, and federal 
views; six of the eight delegates sent by the State to the Federal 
convention had come from their number, and the other two – Franklin and 
Ingersoll – if not neutral, were at most but moderate Constitutionalists. On 
the other side [the Constitutionalists] the leadership had been assumed by 
men of obscure birth, of little education or property, and of the narrowest 
views. Small wonder, then, that the cause espoused by the first met with 
the violent condemnation of the second, and that the contest which ensued 
was unprecedented in virulence and animosity.247 
 
The Republican-controlled legislature moved quickly to call a ratifying convention before 
the opposition could get organized or obtain thorough information. Sixteen of the Anti-
Federalist legislators attempted to prevent a quorum by fleeing the assembly. Two were 
rounded up and forcibly detained, so that a quorum was established; a vote was 
eventually taken and the Constitution was ratified. Though each article was debated, the 
dissenting opinion of the minority was kept out of the official record and no amendments 
were allowed to be proposed. Moreover, the sixty-nine delegates that made up the 
quorum represented a mere ten percent of eligible voters. Less than a week later, an open 
letter was published by a person or group claiming to be the Pennsylvania Minority.248 
 After criticizing the lack of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution, a sticking point 
for the Anti-Federalists, and recommending fourteen, the Pennsylvania Minority goes on 
to raise three general objections. The first raises the point that, “the most celebrated 
writers on government, and…uniform experience, [tell us] that a very extensive territory 
cannot be governed on the principles of freedom, otherwise than by a confederation of 
republics, possessing all the powers of internal government; but united in the 
management of their general, and foreign concerns.”249 The only other way to govern 
such a vast territory is through despotism. This position echoes that of the Federal 
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Farmer, who elaborated further “that one government and general legislation alone, never 
can extend equal benefits to all parts of the United States: Different laws, customs, and 
opinions exist in the different states, which by a uniform system of laws would be 
unreasonably invaded.”250 Well aware of how large a territory the United States were and 
how fast they were expanding, he notes: 
the laws of a free government rest on the confidence of the people, and 
operate gently – and never can extend their influence very far – if they are 
executed on free principles, about the centre, where the benefits of the 
government induce people to support it voluntarily; yet they must be 
executed on the principles of fear and force in the extremes – This has 
been the case of every extensive republic of which we have any accurate 
account.251 
 
Agrippa, too, argues that no extensive empire can or has been “governed upon republican 
principles, and that such a government will degenerate into a despotism, unless it be 
made up of a confederacy of smaller states, each having the full powers of internal 
regulation.”252 
 The Anti-Federalists feared that the Constitution, at least partly due to the large 
territory of the United States but also on its own merits (or demerits), would lead to a 
consolidated government and the abolition of the states, in fact if not in name. Brutus 
acknowledges that “although the government reported by the convention does not go to a 
perfect and entire consolidation, yet it approaches so near to it, that it must, if executed, 
certainly and infallibly terminate in it.”253 The Federal Farmer,254 Pennsylvania Minority,  
and Agrippa agree. Brutus goes further, arguing that such is the very object of the 
Constitution itself. The preamble of the Constitution established the United States as “a 
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union of the people…considered as one body” and does not secure the existence of the 
state governments.255 Its stated purpose is “To form a more perfect union” but a more 
perfect union of this kind would necessitate the abolition of “all inferior governments, 
and to give the general one compleat legislative, executive and judicial powers to every 
purpose.”256 So too with its professed purposes of establishing justice and ensuring  
domestic tranquillity. The Pennsylvania Minority echo this argument, pointing out that 
“We the people of the United States” is “the style of a compact between individuals 
entering into a state of society, and not that of a confederation of states.”257 
 The Pennsylvania Minority conclude that “consolidation pervades the whole 
constitution”258 and Brutus agrees that the declared intention of the preamble “proceeds 
in the different parts”259 of the Constitution. Two very important issues to the Anti-
Federalists, relating to the size and diversity of the United States, were “full and equal 
representation of the people in the legislature, and the jury trial of the vicinage in the 
administration of justice.”260 The Federal Farmer defines full and equal representation as 
that which possesses the same interests, feelings, opinions, and views the 
people themselves would were they all assembled – a fair representation, 
therefore, should be so regulated, that every order of men in the 
community, according to the common course of elections, can have a 
share in it – in order to allow professional men, merchants, traders, 
farmers, mechanics, etc. to bring a just proportion of their best informed 
men respectively into the legislature, the representation must be 
considerably numerous.261 
 
The number of legislators allotted to the House of Representatives and the Senate was far 
too few to effect full and equal representation. In an era without the automobile or the 
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train, this deficiency was aggravated by the extensive territory of the United States; “it 
would be impossible to collect a representation of the parts of the country five, six, and 
seven hundred miles from the seat of government”262; only the wealthy would be able to 
afford being elected. But, as I have previously noted, full and equal representation is 
precisely what the framers of the Constitution did not want. A jury trial of the vicinage, 
or vicinity, meant a jury trial of your peers from the nearby area in which you lived. The 
Anti-Federalists were afraid that this vital tradition would be obviated by the single 
supreme judiciary under the new Constitution, even with its inferior courts.263 
Brutus argues that the general welfare clause in Section 8 of Article 1 grants 
Congress the authority to do anything “which in their judgment will tend to provide for 
the general welfare, and this amounts to the same thing as general and unlimited powers 
of legislation in all cases.”264 The Federal Farmer agrees that the powers lodged in the 
general government under the new Constitution are “very extensive powers – powers 
nearly, if not altogether, complete and unlimited, over the purse and the sword.”265 Brutus 
fears, however, that: 
In a republic of such vast extent as the United States, the legislature cannot 
attend to the various concerns and wants of its different parts. It cannot be 
sufficiently numerous to be acquainted with the local condition and wants 
of the different districts, and if it could, it is impossible it should have 
sufficient time to attend to and provide for all the variety of cases of this 
nature, that would be continually arising. 
 
In so extensive a republic, the great officers of government would soon 
become above the controul of the people, and abuse their power to the 
purpose of aggrandizing themselves, and oppressing them. The trust 
committed to the executive offices, in a country of the extent of the United 
States, must be various and of magnitude. The command of all the troops 
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and navy of the republic, the appointment of officers, the power of 
pardoning offences, the collecting of all the public revenues, and the 
power of expending them, with a number of other powers, must be lodged 
and exercised in every state, in the hands of a few. When these are 
attended with great honor and emolument, as they will be in large states, 
so as greatly to interest men to pursue them, and to be proper objects for 
ambitious and designing men, such men will be ever restless in their 
pursuit after them. They will use the power, when they have acquired it, to 
the purposes of gratifying their own interest and ambition, and it is 
scarcely possible, in a very large republic, to call them to account for their 
misconduct, or to prevent their abuse of power.266 
 
Something like this has indeed come to pass in the United States. The problems foreseen 
by Brutus in the first long passage have plagued every centralized state lawmaking body 
and bureaucracy throughout history, such is inherent in their nature. As for the 
pronouncements of the second long passage, one has only to look at the vast proliferation 
and intrusive growth of federal bureaucracies in nearly every aspect of life that we have 
seen in the last century. To name just a few examples: the EPA, IRS, OSHA, DEA, ATF,  
FCC, FTC, NTSB, etc.267 Although the potential power of the executive branch was one 
to be feared, the Anti-Federalists were far more concerned at the moment with the 
consolidating powers of the legislative and judicial branches. 
 Among the powers of Congress that most disturbed the Anti-Federalists were its 
powers of internal taxation, its expansive power to maintain a standing army and regulate 
militias, its powers to regulate commerce and trade, and its treaty-making power. All of 
these would tend toward a consolidation of power in the national government. Internal 
taxation was disliked by the American people in general and the first two together, 
internal taxation and the power over the military, left room for an alarming degree of 
discretionary power. The two year limit on appropriations would hardly prevent Congress 
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from simply renewing them every two years. In light of the discussion on Shays’s 
Rebellion, it is interesting to point out that the Constitution gave the national government 
the power not merely to repel invasions but also to suppress insurrections. Such a 
provision could be used to prevent secession or rebellion, by states or within states, be it 
just or unjust. Standing armies were widely recognized by Federalists and Anti-
Federalists alike as a bane to free republics; they are a tool of repression and a vehicle for 
conformity and uniformity, of social engineering. Anti-federalists were also afraid that 
the concurrent powers of taxation, held by both the national and state governments, 
would eventually lead to the national government crowding the state governments out 
and depriving them of revenue. With power over commerce and trade and over the 
making of treaties, and with the laws and treaties passed and ratified by Congress as the 
supreme law of the land, there was also the danger that the national government could by  
way of these whittle away at the sovereignty of the several states. Most of these fears 
have to a great extent been realized, albeit largely a century or more after the Constitution 
was ratified. 
 The judiciary was also seen as a major feature of the Constitution that would tend 
to abolish the state governments or at least greatly emasculate them. Brutus complains 
that the power of judging the constitutionality of the laws is best left up to the people, 
who can decide to whether or not to re-elect legislators. Instead, in the Constitution, the 
unelected Supreme Court is given the sole authority of judging the constitutionality of the 
laws, and neither the “people, nor state legislatures, nor the general legislature can 
remove [the Supreme Court Justices] or reverse their decrees.”268 He also was concerned 
that the national judiciary would contribute to the “entire subversion of the legislative, 
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executive and judicial powers of the individual states.”269 This would be accomplished 
through its original jurisdiction in cases between states and between states and citizens of 
other states, and through its appellate jurisdiction and its power to judge the 
constitutionality of state laws. Just thirty years later, Thomas Jefferson had similar fears 
of the judiciary: “Our government is now taking so steady a course as to show by what 
road it will pass to destruction; to wit: by consolidation first and then corruption, its 
necessary consequence. The engine of consolidation will be the Federal judiciary; the two 
other branches the corrupting and corrupted instruments."270 
As a final indignity in the eyes of the Anti-Federalists, the nail in the coffin so to 
speak, Articles Six of the Constitution stipulates that it and all the laws and treaties made 
in pursuance thereof would be the supreme law of the land. Moreover: “The senators and 
representatives before-mentioned, and the members of the several state legislatures, and 
all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States, and of the several states, 
shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this constitution.” Brutus exclaims: “It 
is therefore not only necessarily implied thereby, but positively expressed, that the 
different state constitutions are repealed and entirely done away, so far as they are 
inconsistent with this, with the laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof, or with 
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States[.]”271 
 The Federalist Papers were written both to promote the new Constitution and to 
rebut the objections of the Anti-Federalists. While many of the Anti-Federalists were 
concerned with the possibility of consolidation through it, the Federalists feared the 
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opposite; they feared that if the Constitution were not adopted, the Union would not last. 
Hamilton, as Publius, argues in Federalist #1 that the Articles of Confederation were 
insufficient to the task. A more ‘energetic’ government was needed. He presents the issue 
in stark either-or terms: either adopt the new Constitution or face a dismemberment of the 
Union, a false alternative to be sure. The situation was not as urgent and dire as the 
Federalists made it out to be, and at least one alternative was available, amending the 
Articles of Confederation so as to rid it of its deficiencies, which is what the 
Constitutional Convention had been tasked to do. 
 In perhaps the most famous of the Federalist Papers, #10, Madison addresses the 
issue of faction in connection with representation and an extensive republic. The most 
important issue in a popular government is to control the violence of faction. Madison 
argues that direct democracies are so tumultuous because it is easy for a majority faction 
to gain control of the government and do away with the minority faction’s rights. A 
republic or representative democracy, on the other hand, can serve to control majority 
faction by filtering the passions of the people through their representatives. However, in a 
republic it is possible that men “of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister 
designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and 
then betray the interests of the people.”272 Madison argues that a large republic would be 
better able to prevent this than a small one: 
In the first place it is to be remarked that however small the republic may 
be the representatives must be raised to a certain number in order to guard 
against the cabals of a few; and that however large it may be they must be 
limited to a certain number in order to guard against the confusion of the 
multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being 
in proportion to that of the constituents, and being proportionally greatest 
in a small republic, it follows that if the proportion of fit characters be not 
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less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a 
greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice. 
 
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater 
number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more 
difficult for unworthy candidates to practise with success the vicious arts 
by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people 
being more free, will be more likely to center on men who possess the 
most attractive merit and the most diffuse and established characters.273 
 
Yet if the number of fit characters in a large republic is likely to be greater than in a small 
one, does it not seem just as likely that the number of unfit characters will be greater as  
well? Furthermore, it seems counterintuitive that the people will be able to better judge 
the fitness of character in a candidate whom they know less well due to a more extensive 
territory and a smaller proportion of representatives. 
Madison also argues that a larger republic will make majority faction control of 
the government less likely due to a greater diversity of interests. This may be true to 
some degree. A two party system developed early on, however, and though the national 
parties had to build platforms on broad issues, once in office politicians could pursue 
whatever specific policies interested them or their friends. Moreover, by the very nature 
of things one of these two parties had to be dominant at any given time. And while the 
tyranny of the majority may have been avoided or dampened, except in times of severe 
crisis, a multiplicity of special interest groups have not faced the collective action 
problem of the majority. Politicians, especially in the twentieth century, have not failed to 
make compromise deals with each other to support these interests. 
With regards to the nature of representation itself, in Federalist #56 Madison 
attempts to answer contention of the Federal Farmer and other Anti-Federalists that the 
federal government should have a full and equal representation that possesses the same 
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varied interests as the people themselves would have if they all assembled. He agrees that 
indeed representatives “ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his 
constituents. But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and 
interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate.”274 For the federal 
legislature, the three most important objects are the regulation of commerce, taxation –  
largely through tariff duties, and the militia. Therefore, the representatives did not need 
knowledge of “a variety of minute and particular objects” for this.275 In America today, 
however, the objects of the federal legislature extend into a wide array of subjects. 
Among the chief differences between the Articles of Confederation and the 
Constitution were the latter’s expansive powers over commerce, taxation, and the 
military. The Constitution did achieve the object of the Federalists, which was to create a 
more energetic and efficient central government. For example, Hamilton was afraid that, 
far from the states wreaking havoc with each other’s commerce, tariffs would be too low 
without the Constitution: 
In America it is evident that we must a long time depend for the means of 
revenue chiefly on such duties. In most parts of it excises must be 
confined within a narrow compass. The genius of the people will ill brook 
the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise laws. The pockets of the 
farmers, on the other hand, will reluctantly yield but scanty supplies in the 
unwelcome shape of impositions on their houses and lands; and personal 
property is too precarious and invisible a fund to be laid hold of in any 




The relative situation of these States; the number of rivers with which they 
are intersected and of bays that wash their shores; the facility of 
communication in every direction; the affinity of language and manners; 
the familiar habits of intercourse – all these are circumstances that would 
conspire to render an illicit trade between them a matter of little difficulty 
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and would insure frequent evasions of the commercial regulations of each 
other. The separate States, or confederacies, would be necessitated by 
mutual jealousy to avoid the temptations to that kind of trade by the 
lowness of their duties.276 
 
It is therefore evident that one national government would be able at much 
less expense to extend the duties on imports beyond comparison, further 
than would be practicable to the States separately, or to any partial 
confederacies. Hitherto, I believe, it may safely be asserted that these 
duties have not upon an average exceeded in any State three percent. In 
France they are estimated at about fifteen percent, and in Britain the 
proportion is still greater. There seems to be nothing to hinder their being 
increased in this country to at least treble their present amount.277 
 
But to what end? Tariffs higher than a few percent would begin to constitute protective 
tariffs. As he indicates in Report on Manufactures (1791) that is precisely what he wants 
in order to encourage the growth of certain industries. Hamilton was also in favor of 
internal improvements as well as a national bank. Not all of the Federalists agreed with 
Hamilton on these issues, but a sizable number of them did. It is also interesting to note 
that the first quoted passage seems to indicate that Hamilton looked forward to a time 
when the people would not be so adverse to direct taxes. 
 Regarding the Anti-Federalists’, and Jefferson’s, fears of the judiciary, Hamilton, 
who wrote all of the Federalist Papers on the subject, thought it to be the weakest of the 
three branches of government.278 The judiciary has no control over the purse or the 
sword. It may be a minor quibble, but how are the three branches supposed to balance 
and check each other if they are not roughly equal in strength? The greatest fear of the 
Anti-Federalists and Jefferson was that the judiciary would, either out of weakness or 
complicity, allow the gradual increase and consolidation of power in the federal 
government not necessarily through action solely but also through inaction. With the 
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federal judiciary, and the Supreme Court in particular, set up as the ultimate arbiter of 
what is constitutional, this was a very real danger. 
 Over two centuries after the ratification of the Constitution, many of the fears of 
the Anti-Federalists have been realized, though not necessarily in the way that they or 
even the Federalists would have expected. It is also true that most of these 
transformations took a century or more after they wrote to begin in earnest. It is my 
opinion that the Bill of Rights and the tradition of republicanism and liberty prevailing 
among the people helped to slow this process down. Ultimately, the greatest degree of 
consolidation into the hands of the national government (and the executive in particular) 
has occurred during times of crisis, such as the Civil War, the Great Depression, and 
World Wars I & II.279 The seeds were sown in the Constitution, however. And the road 
was embarked upon right in the beginning. 
Alexander Hamilton sought, as the first Secretary of the Treasury, and succeeded 
in, tying the interests of the wealthy and well-born to the national government by 
consolidating the debts of all the states into the hands of the national government and 
paying off the notes at face value, thus enriching the wealthy speculators such as those in 
Massachusetts. He rightly recognized that the wealthy were a threat to any government 
that got in their way, but with political connections and the expansive power of the new 
government at their disposal they would also prove to be a threat to liberty.280 
The Constitution was a compromise document in many ways. It was a 
compromise between large and small states, between the Northern free states and the 
Southern slave states; and it was a compromise between liberal ideas and conservative 
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ideas. Among the liberal innovations were the Bill of Rights, particularly the 
establishment clause and freedom of religion clause in the 1st Amendment, and the lack 
of constitutionalized property qualifications for suffrage and eligibility for office. 
Madison’s Notes on the Convention Debates show us that there were indeed 
compromises made between the Southern slaveholders and the Northern merchants. The 
Southern slaveholders attempted to ensure that their already politically supported  
economic interests continued to be so in the new government, giving the North various 
concessions such as the simple majority rather than two-thirds majority requirement to 
regulate commerce. 
Albert Jay Nock traces the merchant-State in America back to the colonial 
governments (and beyond them, to England herself). In light of what we have seen, it 
may come as no surprise that he favored the Articles of Confederation over the 
Constitution as a more tolerable form of government. The Articles more closely 
approximated the classical liberal principles of the Revolution and the Declaration of 
Independence although British mercantilism had not been completely shaken off. 
Consequently, he saw the Constitution, with its greater centralization and expansive 
powers, as an ominous step back. Nock describes the Constitutional Convention as an 
industrial coup d’Etat.281 He identifies the Convention as being made up “wholly of men 
representing the economic interests of the first division. The great majority of them, 
possibly as many as four-fifths, were public creditors; one-third were land-speculators; 
some were money-lenders; one-fifth were industrialists, traders, shippers; and many of 
them were lawyers.”282 Rather than strengthening the Articles of Confederation, as the 
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convention was expressly called for, the delegates tossed the Articles “into the 
wastebasket” and drafted a “constitution de novo.”283 The provision for amendment of the 
Articles provided by the Articles themselves was ignored. As we have seen, the 
ratification process was manipulated in favor of the Federalists, and the Constitution 
passed by a slim margin with only a fraction of the population voting. The United States  
government was successfully transformed into a new and improved version of the British 
merchant-state, though it would be many years until the mercantilists would be able to 
use the powerful new central government to institute their programs in full. 
 Against Nock it might be argued that he was relying upon the outdated Beard-
Becker “economic-determinist” model of human motivation.284 That the Constitution had 
wealthy opponents is not in itself an argument against Nock’s thesis. The criticism 
implies the unlikely situation that every wealthy person would see his economic interests 
as being better served by a stronger central government, that they would recognize its  
potential benefit to them, and that they were in a position to benefit. It also implies that 
none of them placed the value of classical liberal ideas higher than their economic 
interests. 
 Rothbard, in volume three of Conceived in Liberty, argues that the Beard-Becker 
approach is indeed flawed. While it serves admirably in the analysis of statist government 
activities, it fails miserably when applied to antistatist events like the American 
Revolution. The Beard-Becker approach fails to appreciate the “necessarily primary role 
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of ideas in guiding any revolutionary or opposition movement.”285 The rhetoric of the 
Declaration, of the political sermons, of Paine’s Common Sense, of Cato’s Letters, and 
other such speeches and writings, were indispensable to the Revolution. For people to be 
motivated by them, they had to believe the ideas conveyed in them and that belief 
generally had to be passionate enough to overcome the economic incentives of “selling 
out.” Rothbard argues: 
Statists tend to be governed by economic motivation, with ideology 
serving as a smokescreen for such motives, while libertarians or 
antistatists are ruled principally and centrally by ideology, with economic 
defense playing a subordinate role. By this dichotomy we may at last 
resolve the age-old historiographical dispute over whether ideology or 
economic interests play the dominant role in historical motivation.286 
 
Another flaw in the Beard-Becker approach is that it fails to “understand that 
there are no inherent economic conflicts in the free market; without government 
intrusion, there is no reason for merchants, farmers, landlords, et al. to be at loggerheads. 
Conflict is created only between those classes that rule the state and those that are 
exploited by the state.” The colonists did not begin coming into conflict with each other 
until some began to employ the State for their own benefit and/or the “nation.” 
The conflict between the liberals and the conservatives, which can be traced back 
to its roots in England and is evident in the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, 
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V. Post-Founding and the War of Southern Secession 
When a sixth of the population of a nation which has undertaken to be the 
refuge of liberty are slaves, and a whole country is unjustly overrun and 
conquered by a foreign army, and subjected to military law, I think that it 
is not too soon for honest men to rebel and revolutionize 
– Henry David Thoreau 
 
Part five of this essay is concerned with major events and figures surrounding the 
American Civil War, with particular emphasis on the growing abolitionist and 
individualist anarchist movements. I focus mainly on the abolitionist writings of 
individualist anarchists Henry David Thoreau287 and Lysander Spooner. I argue also that 
the war, though not inevitable, was prefigured in the Constitution through the 
compromises on slavery and the extensive powers granted to the federal government. In 
so doing, I briefly sketch American history before, during, and after the war. 
V.1 The Problem of Slavery 
The founding of the United States of America under a written constitution was a 
monumental event in human history. Never before had a group of people come together 
to design and agree upon the structure of their own government. To be sure, not everyone 
had a say in the ratification of the new Constitution. The number of eligible voters was 
but a fraction of the total population of the several States. Forty-two of these were the 
representatives of each state (except for Rhode Island) sent to Philadelphia to discuss 
revising the Articles of Confederation. From May 25th, 1987 through September 17th, 
1987, these representatives engaged in the project of crafting the Constitution. In the end, 
three refused to sign the document, largely because it lacked a Bill of Rights. All of the 
states eventually ratified the Constitution, and the familiar Bill of Rights was introduced 
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and ratified by December 15th, 1791. There have been seventeen amendments since the 
Bill of Rights. The Constitution was not perfect when it was first ratified and it is not 
perfect now, despite twenty-seven amendments, yet it has lasted longer than any other 
written form of government (though the US is certainly not the longest lived government 
in history). One of the flaws in the Constitution helped bring about one of the most 
catastrophic events in our country’s history: the attempted secession of the southern 
slave-holding states, popularly known as the Civil War, but more properly termed the 
War of Southern Secession. This flaw in the Constitution was the embodiment of a 
fateful compromise over the issue of slavery between the northern and southern states. 
About a third of the way through the Constitutional Convention, James Madison 
made the prescient observation that the main division of interests was in fact between the 
northern and southern states rather than between the large and small states. The states 
“were divided into different interests not by their size, but by other circumstances; the 
most material of which resulted partly from climate, but principally from the effects of 
their having or not having slaves.”288 
The issue of slavery constituted not merely economic and political divisions, but 
growing cultural and moral ones as well.289 Already in the convention, northern delegates 
were beginning to pose moral objections to slavery. Some, at least, in the North, 
recognized slavery as a violation of the principles human equality and individual liberty 
embodied in the Declaration of Independence. Roger Sherman of Connecticut remarked 
that he regarded the slave trade as iniquitous. Gouverneur Morris echoed Sherman, 
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regarding slavery as a nefarious institution. Morris demanded, “Upon what principle is it 
that the slaves shall be computed in the representation? Are they men? Then make them  
Citizens and let them vote."290 Luther Martin of Maryland also recognized slavery as 
being “inconsistent with the principles of the revolution and dishonorable to the 
American character[.]”291 
The issue of state’s rights was already present in the convention as well. Oliver 
Elsworth of Connecticut took a position not unsympathetic to that of other delegates: 
“The morality or wisdom of slavery are considerations belonging to the States 
themselves.”292 Sherman, however, observed “that the abolition of Slavery seemed to be 
going on in the U.S. & that the good sense of the several States would probably by 
degrees compleat it.”293 He and others failed to see, however, how the compromises made 
over slavery would serve to artificially support the institution in the South. 
 The slavery compromise-flaw in the Constitution was given form in three separate 
places in the document. Let us have a look at the clauses: 
Art. I, Sec. 2, Para. 3: Representatives and direct Taxes shall be 
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this 
Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined 
by adding the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to 
Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths 
of all other Persons. 
 
Art. I, Sec. 9, Para. 1: The Migration or Importation of such Persons as 
any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be 
prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred 
and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not 
exceeding ten dollars for each Person. 
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Art. IV, Sec. 2, Para. 3: No Person held to Service or Labour in one 
State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in 
Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such 
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to 
whom such Service or Labour may be due. 
 
“Three fifths of all other Persons” was political code for black people held as slaves in 
the South. This first clause, the so-called “three-fifths compromise,” insured that every 
“five slaves counted as three free persons for both political representation and direct 
taxes.”294 Slaves, of course, were not themselves represented in the South, unless you 
count their masters as their representatives. Thus, Southern representation would be 
artificially inflated. Presciently, Gouverneur Morris argued that direct taxation is not of 
equal importance to representation, “for direct taxes would only be levied four times in 
the next seventy-two years, while the larger voice that southern slave masters obtained in 
the House and the electoral college had enormous impact, affecting not only scores of 
congressional decisions but virtually every aspect of the nation’s political fabric.”295 
The second clause, as well as the third, together with the decision to enable 
Congress to regulate commerce by majority vote rather than two-thirds, became known 
as the “dirty compromise.”296 The South had little need to regulate commerce (at least at 
the time of the convention). The New England delegates and merchants, on the other 
hand, had an interest in regulating commerce to protect their young and growing 
industries. A two-thirds requirement would make regulating commerce exceedingly hard 
and give the minority group in Congress disproportionate leverage. On the other hand, a 
mere majority vote requirement would eventually give the Northern states power over 
commerce that could be injurious to the South as their populations grew to exceed that of 
                                                 




the Southern states even with slaves partially counted. The second clause prevented 
Congress from banning the importation of slaves (i.e., from ending the international slave 
trade to the US) for twenty years until 1808, upon which time they promptly did so. The 
final clause, which became known as the “fugitive slave clause,” supported the Fugitive 
Slave Laws, obligating northern states to assist Southern slaveholders by hunting down 
and returning runaway slaves, effectively subsidizing the South’s institution of slavery. 
One after another, northern states, starting with Vermont in 1777 and ending with 
New Jersey in 1804, set about to end slavery in the north either through “outright 
abolition or gradual emancipation.”297 An event transpired on July 13, 1787 that altered 
and amplified the North-South dynamic. The Continental Congress, under the Articles of 
Confederation, passed the Northwest Ordinance. The Northwest Ordinance created the 
Northwest Territory, the first organized territory of the United States, and banned slavery 
within it and any states arising out of it. This mapped the future westward expansion of 
the country, creating a geographical dividing line between free states and slave states, 
between the North and the South. National politics between the North and the South after 
ratification of the Constitution was flavored by the tension of maintaining a balance 
between the two in Congress and the Electoral College, a balance that collapsed 
following the Mexican War (1846-48). 
It was not until the decade following the War of 1812 that slavery came to “fully 
divide the South from the North.” The last attempts to legalize slavery in Indiana and 
Illinois were defeated and “the free states were beginning to overwhelm the slave states 
in total population,” in large part due to immigration. “Already in 1819, the North 
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outvoted the South in the lower house of Congress, 105 to 81. Only the Senate 
maintained a balance between the country’s two sections: eleven free states to eleven 
slave states.”298 
When the territory of Missouri petitioned Congress for admission to the Union it 
was fought over by the North and the South. Would it be admitted as a free state or as a 
slave state? A remark from one of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, Senator 
Rufus King, highlights the fact that the division of slavery was not merely a moral one: 
“The disproportionate power and influence allowed to the slave-holding states, was a 
necessary sacrifice to the establishment of the constitution[.] But the extension of this 
disproportionate power to the new states would be unjust and odious. The states whose 
power would be abridged, and whose burdens would be increased by the measure, cannot 
be expected to consent to it.”299 The famous Missouri Compromise, proposed by 
Kentucky slaveowner and Speaker of the House, Henry Clay, maintained the sectional 
balance between the North and the South by admitting Missouri as a slave state and 
admitting Maine, a former district of Massachusetts, as a free state. Additionally, the 
remainder of the Louisiana Territory, with the exception of Missouri, would be closed to 
slavery north of the line running west from Missouri’s southern border and open to 
slavery south of the line. 
The conflict over Missouri galvanized the South to seek the expansion of slavery, 
however, while the North was not yet united in stopping the expansion of the institution. 
In the wake of the Missouri Compromise, Southerners also became ardent defenders of 
inviolate states’ rights. They feared the power of the federal government to endanger their 
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slave institution. John Randolph of Roanoke in particular saw that if the Constitution’s 
war powers authorized the federal government to finance “roads, canals, and other 
internal improvements” then they would also authorize the emancipation “of every slave 
in the United States.”300 
The conflict over slavery in the territories subsided for nearly a quarter of a 
century, but states’ rights remained a contentious issue. Though a strict construction 
interpretation of the Constitution allowed tariffs for the purpose of revenue only, 
protectionist tariffs saw a steady rise after the War of 1812. The election of John Quincy 
Adams to the presidency in 1824 with the alleged aid of the so-called “corrupt bargain” 
with Henry Clay – which made possible the Tariff of Abominations, the rise of the 
Democratic Party, the subsequent victory of Andrew Jackson over Adams in 1828 – and 
Adams’s famous career as an abolitionist Congressman afterward, helped to further 
polarize the country.301 South Carolina, the state most heavily reliant on slavery, 
denounced the Tariff of Abominations as unconstitutional. 
Vice-President John C. Calhoun developed the Doctrine of Nullification, which 
held that states had a right to nullify within their borders federal laws that were 
unconstitutional. The Nullification Doctrine was based on the compact, or contract, 
theory of the Constitution, which originated in the Constitutional Convention and the 
ratification process and held that in ratifying the Constitution the states had entered into a 
compact, the federal government was the agent of the states, and the states had a right to 
judge its infractions of the Constitution. South Carolina did not invoke nullification until 
1832 when it nullified both the Tariff of Abominations and the Tariff of 1832. It 
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threatened to secede if coerced. Henry Clay, the “Great Pacificator” staved off armed 
conflict again with the Compromise Tariff of 1833,302 though out of principle, South 
Carolina nullified the Force Act of 1833, which permitted the President to use the 
national military to enforce the laws. 
Calhoun revealed in a letter, however, that the contest over tariffs was actually 
about slavery. “I consider the Tariff act as the occasion, rather than the real cause of the 
present unhappy state of things[.] The truth can no longer be disguised, that the peculiar 
domestick institution of the Southern States, and the consequent direction, which that and 
her soil and climate have given to her industry, has placed them in regard to taxation and 
appropriations in opposite relation to the majority of the Union.”303 He argued that 
“[w]ithout the protection of states’ rights,” Southerners would have to rebel or submit and 
have their interests sacrificed.304 
Also out of the tariff and nullification controversy we see the first systematic 
defenses by nationalists of the notion of perpetual Union that Lincoln would later adopt 
as a justification for preventing secession. “A permanent consolidated government had 
been what many of the Constitution’s framers had hoped for.”305 In 1830, Daniel Webster 
of Boston argued that the people ratified the Constitution not the states. In doing so they 
had created a consolidated government. The states therefore did not have a right to 
secession or to nullify national laws. Webster called for “Liberty and Union, now and 
forever, one and inseparable!”306 “Webster’s theory did not have the venerable tradition 
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to match that of the compact theory[,]”307 however, and prohibition of secession would 
violate natural law in any case. 
Over a decade later, President James Polk fought hard “to preserve national unity 
in the face of intense divisive pressures imposed by the proponents of slavery.”308 
Ultimately, however, his aggressive war against Mexico (1846-48) in pursuit of 
“Manifest Destiny” opened up new territory for the North and the South to fight over. 
Senator Stephen Douglas was able to pass the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, which 
potentially opened up the two territories to slavery by applying to them the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty. As Minnesota and Oregon were preparing to enter the Union as free 
states, this sparked off a race between both sides to populate Kansas and resulted in a 
good deal of fighting between the settlers. Kansas ended up rejecting a pro-slavery 
constitution, but the South was handed a victory by the Supreme Court with the Dred 
Scott decision. It was deemed that blacks were not citizens and never could be; they 
therefore could not sue in a federal court. Even more importantly, it was decided that the 
Missouri Compromise excluding slavery from the territories was unconstitutional, and 
that the “property rights of a slaveholder to his slaves merited full protection under the 
Constitution, particularly the protection of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause” 
even if the slave(s) was taken to live in a free state or territory for an extended period of 
time.309 Tellingly for future events, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, over fifty years 
earlier on July 13, 1787, mentioned that he thought the distinction between the North and 
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the South groundless, but if it were “real, instead of attempting to blend incompatible 
things, let us at once take a friendly leave of each other.”310 
V.2 The Abolitionists 
 The “world’s first antislavery society” was organized in Philadelphia in 1775 by 
Quakers inspired by the liberating spirit of the Revolution, “and soon [after] similar 
organizations dotted the colonies.”311 Following the Revolution and the ratification of the 
Constitution, it was thought that slavery would eventually wither away in America. It is 
notable that the Constitution contains no mention of the term “slavery,” instead referring 
to slaves only obliquely by phrases like “other persons.” In the wake of ratification, anti-
slavery fervor died down. At the same time that slavery was being ended around the 
world through emancipation and slave revolts, “American slavery enjoyed an economic 
resurgence,” thanks in large part to a cotton boom.312 
 Jeffrey Rogers Hummel explains that “the last expression of Revolutionary 
antislavery” was the “colonization scheme,” which entailed “the removal of freed blacks 
to Africa[.]”313 This policy was favored by abolitionists who, like Jefferson (though not 
an abolitionist himself) and Lincoln, “believed that a biracial American society was 
untenable.”314 Though several thousand free blacks colonized the nation of Liberia that 
was established by the American Colonization Society after the War of 1812, in general 
freed blacks were not enthusiastic about the idea.315 
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 In the 1830s, however, a young group of radical abolitionists swept onto the 
national scene.316 They were strongly opposed to colonization. “Exasperated at the 
betrayal of the Revolutionary promise that American slavery would wither away, and 
marshaling all the evangelical fervor of the religious revivals then sweeping the country, 
they demanded immediate emancipation.”317 One such radical abolitionist was William 
Lloyd Garrison. To him and his fellow abolitionists, slavery was a moral evil that must be 
condemned. He denounced colonization as racist and demanded immediate emancipation 
without compensation to the slaveholders as well as immediate and full political rights 
for all blacks.318 He eschewed politics, however, opting instead for 
[m]oral suasion and non-violent resistance…strategies. By agitation, he 
hoped to shame slaveholders into repentance. Indeed, he went so far as to 
denounce the Constitution for its proslavery clauses as ‘a covenant with 
death and an agreement with hell’. During one 4th of July celebration, he 
publicly burned a copy, proclaiming: ‘So perish all compromises with 
tyranny!’ He believed that if anything the North should secede. [And he 
was not the only one.] That way it could become a haven for runaway 
slaves.319 
 
On January 1, 1831, in Boston, he started a new weekly paper called The Liberator, on 
whose masthead appeared the slogan “No Union with Slave-Holders.”320 And in 1833, he 
“helped to organize the American Anti-Slavery Society[.] Two thousand local societies 
with 200,000 members had sprung into existence by 1840.”321 This was a small 
percentage of the northern population, to be sure, but they were a vocal group and made 
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themselves heard, and they were seen as part of an international movement by 
Southerners. 
 Another important abolitionist, on whom I am focusing because his work appears 
to have been influenced by La Boétie, was Henry David Thoreau. In 1848, he worked on 
an essay that was never published in his lifetime, called “Reform and the Reformers,” in 
which he “argued that persons feeling the urge to reform others should begin with 
themselves[.]”322 His famous essay entitled “Resistance to Civil Government,” but 
popularly known as “Civil Disobedience,” is a “classic statement of the relation of the 
individual to the state.”323 He wrote it in response to being jailed for his refusal to pay his 
poll tax in protest over the Mexican-American War, which he considered immoral. In 
“Civil Disobedience,” first published in 1849, he argued that moral principles “are the 
private domain of the individual citizen, and governments are oppressive which attempt 
to legislate them.”324 In 1854, applying the principles set forth in “Resistance to Civil 
Government, he gave a speech titled “Slavery in Massachusetts” that was printed by 
Garrison in The Liberator on July 21. The speech, “a response to the apprehension in 
Boston in 1854 of the fugitive slave, Anthony Burns, and his forced return by state 
authorities to his owner in Virginia,” was given before anti-slavery protesters at 
Framingham.325 
 Thoreau begins his essay “Resistance to Civil Government” with a quotation from 
Thomas Jefferson but continues with a devastatingly insightful addendum: 
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I heartily accept the motto, - “That government is best which governs 
least;” and I should like to see it acted up to more rapidly and 
systematically. Carried out, it finally amounts to this, which I also believe, 
- “That government is best which governs not at all;” and when men are 
prepared for it, that will be the kind of government they will have. 
Government is at best but an expedient; but most governments are usually, 
and all governments are sometimes, inexpedient. The objections which 
have been brought against a standing army, and they are many and 
weighty, and deserve to prevail, may also at last be brought against a 
standing government. The standing army is only an arm of the standing 
government. The government itself, which is only the mode which the 
people have chosen to execute their will, is equally liable to be abused and 
perverted before the people can act through it. Witness the present 
Mexican war, the work of comparatively few individuals using the 
standing government as their tool; for, in the outset, the people would not 
have consented to this measure. 
 
This American government, - what is it but a tradition, though a recent 
one, endeavoring to transmit itself unimpaired to posterity, but each 
instant losing some of its integrity?326 
 
He admits that the American government is necessary, “for the people must have some 
complicated machinery or other, and hear its din, to satisfy that idea of government which 
they have.”327 
[Y]et this government never of itself furthered any enterprise, but by the 
alacrity with which it got out of its way. It does not keep the country free. 
It does not settle the West. It does not educate. The character inherent in 
the American people has done all that has been accomplished; and it 
would have done somewhat more, if the government had not sometimes 
got in its way. For government is an expedient by which men would fain 
succeed in letting one another alone; and, as has been said, when it is most 
expedient, the governed are most let alone by it. Trade and commerce, if 
they were not made of India rubber, would never manage to bounce over 
the obstacles which legislators are continually putting in their way; and, if 
one were to judge these men wholly by the effects of their actions, and not 
partly by their intentions, they would deserve to be classed and punished 
with those mischievous persons who put obstructions on the railroads.328 
 
                                                 
326 Ibid., p. 134. 
327 Ibid. 
328 Ibid., p. 135 (emphasis in original). 
 121
These passages, reminiscent of La Boétie, highlight an understanding of the role of 
custom in supporting and maintaining the institution of government. They also evince a 
Lockean understanding of the proper role of government and a sound grasp of economic 
theory. 
 His purpose, Thoreau says, is to speak not as an anarchist but as a practical 
citizen. He does not ask for “at once no government, but at once a better government.”329 
He asks for a government in which individual conscience, not majorities, decides right 
and wrong. “[W]e should be men first, and subjects afterward”; consequently, it “is not 
desirable to cultivate a respect for the law,” to resign conscience to the legislator, but 
rather it is desirable to cultivate a respect for the right.330 The only obligation any of us 
has a right to assume is to do what we think is right. 
Law never made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for 
it, even the well-disposed are daily made the agents of injustice. A 
common and natural result of an undue respect for law is, that you may 
see a file of soldiers, colonel, captain, corporal, privates, powder-monkeys 
and all, marching in admirable order over hill and dale to the wars, against 
their wills, aye, against their common sense and consciences, which makes 
it very steep marching indeed, and produces a palpitation of the heart. 
They have no doubt that it is a damnable business in which they are 
concerned; they are all peaceably inclined. Now, what are they? Men at 
all? or small moveable forts and magazines, at the service of some 
unscrupulous man in power?331 
 
Thoreau continues to identify three classes of men who serve the State. One class is the 
mass of men who serve the State mindlessly with their bodies. Another class includes the 
“legislators, politicians, lawyers, ministers, and office-holders” who serve the state 
primarily with their minds; “and, as they rarely make any moral distinctions, they are as 
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likely to serve the devil, without realizing it, as God.”332 The third class are “heroes, 
patriots, martyrs, reformers in the great sense, and men, [who] serve the State with their 
consciences also, and so necessarily resist it for the most part; and they are commonly 
treated by it as enemies.”333 
 How then should a man of conscience relate to the American government? 
Thoreau argues that men cannot, in good conscience, and without being disgraced, be 
associated with it. He “cannot for an instant recognize that political organization as my 
government which is the slave’s government also.”334 “All men recognize the right of 
revolution; that is, the right to refuse allegiance to and to resist government, when its 
tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable.”335 To those who argue that things 
were not that bad, he replies that he would not make a fuss about taxes on certain 
imports. “All machines have their friction” and it would be a moral evil to make much 
ado about relatively nothing. However, 
when friction comes to have its machine, and oppression and robbery are 
organized, I say, let us not have such a machine any longer. In other 
words, when a sixth of the population of a nation which has undertaken to 
be the refuge of liberty are slaves, and a whole country [Mexico] is 
unjustly overrun and conquered by a foreign army, and subjected to 
military law, I think that it is not too soon for honest men to rebel and 
revolutionize.336 
 
Voting is not the answer; it is like a game, playing with justice, and like any game it is 
accompanied by betting. As a voter we are each one voice out of many and are thus 
leaving the thing voted on up to the majority to decide. When we vote, we must not then 
be vitally concerned with the outcome, because even by voting for the right thing we 
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have not done anything for it but rather merely expressed a feeble wish that it should 
prevail. By the time the majority votes for the abolition of slavery they will have done so 
because they have become indifferent to it or because it has all but withered away 
already. “A wise man will not leave the right to the mercy of chance, nor wish it to  
prevail through the power of the majority.”337 Thoreau echoes Garrison in rejecting any 
political means of effecting reform, even to the point of stating: “in this case the State has 
provided no way: its very Constitution is the evil.”338 
 He calls on all abolitionists to withdraw their support from the State. If the law 
requires you to commit injustice against another, then break the law. Against the charge 
that resisting even an unjust law is a cure worse than the disease, he points out that 
insofar as this is true it is because the government has made it so by being resistant to 
reform. “Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man 
is also a prison.”339 “Cast your whole vote,” he argues, 
not just a strip of paper merely, but your whole influence. A minority is 
powerless while it conforms to the majority; it is not even a minority then; 
but it is irresistible when it clogs by its whole weight. If the alternative is 
to keep all just men in prison, or give up war and slavery, the State will 
not hesitate which to choose. If a thousand men were not to pay their tax-
bills this year, that would not be a violent and bloody measure, as it would 
be to pay them, and enable the State to commit violence and shed innocent 
blood. This is, in fact, the definition of a peaceable revolution, if any such 
is possible. If the tax-gatherer, or any other public officer, asks me, as one 
has done, “But what shall I do?” my answer is, “If you really wish to do 
any thing, resign your office.” When the subject has refused allegiance, 
and the officer has resigned his office, then the revolution is 
accomplished. But even suppose blood should flow. Is there not a sort of 
blood shed when the conscience is wounded? Through this wound a man’s 
real manhood and immortality flow out, and he bleeds to an everlasting 
death. I see this blood flowing now.340 
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The only thing the state can reach, and punish, is our bodies. It possesses only superior 
physical strength (and that, as La Boétie has shown, is only what we as a people give it). 
It is we who compromise our minds. We are obligated by a higher law not to. 
Thoreau ends his essay on “Resistance to Civil Government” with a restatement 
and extension of the promise of the Declaration of Independence and the Revolution: 
The authority of government, even such as I am willing to submit to…is 
still an impure one: to be strictly just, it must have the sanction and 
consent of the governed. It can have no pure right over my person and 
property but what I concede to it. The progress from an absolute to a 
limited monarchy, from a limited monarchy to a democracy, is a progress 
toward a true respect for the individual. Is a democracy, such as we know 
it, the last improvement possible in government? Is it not possible to take a 
step further towards recognizing and organizing the rights of man? There 
will never be a really free and enlightened State, until the State comes to 
recognize the individual as a higher and independent power, from which 
all its own power and authority are derived, and treats him accordingly.341 
 
 So long as the abolitionists believed that the Constitution sanctioned slavery, they 
were left with no other recourse but to amendment (a dubious prospect) or reject it as a 
moral evil. The Liberty Party, which viewed the Constitution “as antislavery in spirit” 
and accused the South of betraying the implicit constitutional understanding that slavery 
should disappear within United States[,]” was formed in 1839.342 In 1845, Lysander 
Spooner gave them ammunition when he applied his legal genius to a demonstration of 
the unconstitutionality of slavery (in a book of that name). Spooner himself eschewed 
politics and recognized a higher law than that of man-made law, higher even that the 
Constitution, that is, natural law. If and insofar as the Constitution sanctioned slavery, it 
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could have no binding force or authority. While he held slavery to be in violation of 
natural law, his purpose here was a final attempt to salvage the Constitution, to show that 
on its own terms the Constitution holds slavery to be illegal and unjust. 
In The Unconstitutionality of Slavery, Spooner argues that the Constitution is a 
legal contract. As such, it must be evaluated using the ordinary legal rules of 
interpretation, the most important of which is 
that all language must be construed “strictly” in favor of natural right. This 
rule is laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in these 
words, to wit: “Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles 
are overthrown, where the general system of the law is departed from, the 
legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness, to 
induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects.”343 
 
He then proceeds to demonstrate in exhaustive detail that slavery has never had any 
constitutional existence in this country, from the colonial charters and statutes to the state 
constitutions to the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution itself. The colonists 
brought with them “the common law of England, including the writ of habeas corpus (the 
essential principle of which…is to deny the right of property in man,)” and the “trial by 
jury.”344 Moreover, the Declaration of Independence declared that “all Men are created 
equal” with unalienable rights to “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” 
 Spooner explicates thirteen other rules of interpretation and applies them to the 
Constitution. Among these are that “the intention of the instrument must prevail”345; “the 
intention of the constitution must be collected from its words”346; “we are always, if 
possible, to give a word some meaning appropriate to the subject matter of the instrument 
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itself”347; “where technical words are used, a technical meaning is to be applied to 
them”348; “the sense of every word, that is ambiguous in itself, must, if possible, be 
determined by reference to the rest of the instrument”349; “a contract must never, if it be 
possible to avoid it, be so construed, as that any one of the parties to it, assuming him to 
understand his rights, and to be of competent mental capacity to make obligatory 
contracts, may not reasonably be presumed to have consented to it”350; “where the 
prevailing principles and provisions of a law are favorable to justice, and general in their 
nature and terms, no unnecessary exception to them, or to their operation, is to be 
allowed”351; “be guided, in doubtful cases, by the preamble”352; “one part of the 
instrument must not be allowed to contradict another, unless the language be so explicit 
as to make the contradiction inevitable”353; “‘An act of congress’ (and the rule is equally 
applicable to the constitution) ‘ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, 
if any other possible construction remains’”354; “all reasonable doubts must be decided in 
favor of liberty”355; “instruments must be so construed so as to give no shelter or effect to 
fraud”356; “we are never unnecessarily to impute to an instrument any intention 
whatsoever which it would be unnatural for either reasonable or honest men to 
entertain.”357 
                                                 
347 Ibid., p. 165. 
348 Ibid., p. 168. 
349 Ibid., p. 180. 
350 Ibid., p. 182. 
351 Ibid., p. 196. 
352 Ibid., p. 198. 
353 Ibid., p. 199. 
354 Ibid., p. 200. 
355 Ibid. 
356 Ibid., p. 201. 
357 Ibid., pp. 204-205. 
 127
 The terms slave and slavery appear nowhere in the Constitution. Following the 
above-given rules, we must interpret the phrase “We the people” in the preamble at its 
broadest, that is, to mean all of the people. We cannot presume blacks to have consented 
to a Constitution that made legal slaves of them. Accordingly, in the representation and 
direct taxation clause under Article I, Section 2, we cannot construe the phrase “free 
Persons” to mean nonslave” and “three fifths of all other Persons” as slaves. Rather, we 
are compelled to take “free Persons,” as a technical term used in England and the 
colonies, to mean “those persons possessed of the privilege of citizenship.”358 The phrase 
“three fifths of all other persons” can then only mean, astonishingly, resident aliens, that 
is, noncitizens living in the United States!359 Similarly, the phrases in Art. I, Sec. 8 and 
Art. IV, Sec. 2 regarding importation of persons and those bound to service or labor 
cannot be construed as referring to slaves. Without a constitutional basis, we can only say 
that slavery has been tolerated in America, and “[t]oleration of a wrong is not law. And 
especially the toleration of a wrong (i. e. the bare omission to punish it criminally,) does 
not legalize one’s claim to property obtained by such wrong.”360 
 Abolitionists eager for political ammunition against the institution of slavery 
eagerly welcomed The Unconstitutionality of Slavery. Spooner “insisted that the national 
government directly abolish slavery in the southern states.”361 But most members of the 
Liberty Party believed that the national government should simply cordon off slavery and 
that abolition in the South would necessarily follow. Before long members of the “Whig 
and Democratic Parties centered their political careers around antislavery stands right out 
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of the Liberty Party’s Platform.”362 Spooner wrote another abolitionist work before the 
Civil War titled “A Defense for Fugitive Slaves (1850),” in which he argues for the right 
of jury nullification, i.e., that juries have a right to judge the facts and the law in a case. 
This argument he expanded into one of his most famous works, “An Essay on the Trial 
By Jury.” 
Southerners were more worried about slave insurrections than they were of the 
political influence of the abolitionists, however. And in 1858, Spooner, impatient with the 
slow progress of politics and moral suasion, circulated pamphlets titled “A Plan for the 
Abolition of Slavery” and “To the Non-Slaveholders of the South.” The former 
“apparently influenced John Brown, who tried to implement Spooner’s plan in his 
abortive raid on Harper’s Ferry, Virginia. After Brown had been captured and sentenced 
to hang, Spooner hatched a plan to kidnap Governor Henry Wise of Virginia and hold 
him as hostage in exchange for Brown.”363 Due to lack of funds the plan was never 
carried out. 
V.3 The War of Southern Secession 
 In 1860, Abraham Lincoln was elected to the office of President of the United 
States. He carried every free state except New Jersey from which he received four out of 
its seven electoral votes. He won only 40 percent of the popular vote and did not carry a 
single slave state. “Within ten of them, he did not get a single recorded vote.”364 
Nevertheless, Lincoln still won the election. For Southerners, the election of 1860 
highlighted their minority position, a position they could only look forward to 
deteriorating further. Lincoln was not an abolitionist and “promised to enforce the 
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Fugitive Slave Law and respect slavery in the existing states.”365 Southerners, however, 
were not reassured. A major faction of the “Republican Party did endorse further steps to 
divorce the general government from slavery. Lincoln appointed at least two of these 
radical Republicans: [William Henry] Seward as Secretary of State and Salmon P. Chase 
[author of the Liberty Party’s 1844 platform] as Secretary of the Treasury.”366 
Furthermore, the Republican Party now had firm control of the national government’s 
patronage powers. 
 I have argued that the Civil War was prefigured in the compromises over slavery 
in the Constitution, though it was not inevitable. Initially, the South benefited from the 
compromises with an artificially enhanced representation in the federal government. 
However, the Southern states soon lost their advantage due to the ban on the importation 
of slaves in 1808 and the rapidly growing populations of the Northern states. The 
extensive powers granted to the federal government by the Constitution to regulate  
commerce (part of the slavery compromises) and the internal affairs of the several states 
made secession by the Southern states, when they were consigned to permanent minority 
status, almost inevitable. 
Ironically, it was also the slavery compromises that helped to artificially prop up 
the institution of slavery in the South. In Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men, 
Jeffrey Rogers Hummel makes a compelling case that “[s]lavery flourished because the 
country’s political and legal structure socialized its enforcement costs”; “the economic 
viability of the peculiar institution rested on political power.”367 “Only one-fourth of 
white households owned slaves, and about half of those owned fewer than five. The 
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typical Southerner was a yeoman or herdsman. [P]olitical power was concentrated in the 
hands of large planters[.]”368 Although slavery could achieve a higher output than wage 
labor in some industries such as cotton production due to overworking the slaves, slavery 
involved a great deal of deadweight loss (meaning loss due to changes in behavior). 
Slaves would intentionally avoid work, break tools, feign incompetence, etc. Moreover, 
on large plantations most slaves required overseers who needed to be paid. 
The runaway slave was the system’s Achilles heel. Each fugitive slave did 
more than deprive the slaveholder of a valuable capital asset; if running 
away became easier, enforcement costs rose. This in turn reduced the 
value of remaining slaves. Manumission through self-purchase would 
become more appealing to slaveholders, but if they were to succumb to 
this appeal, the dissolution would accelerate. More manumissions meant 
more free blacks which further eased escape and raised costs until the 
viability of the peculiar institution itself came into question.369 
 
Slaveholders used their state governments to socialize enforcement costs by conscription 
into slave patrols that largely fell onto small slaveholders and poor whites who owned no 
slaves. Southern states also passed laws prohibiting manumission through self-purchase 
and compelling deportation of free blacks, practices that a pro-slavery interpretation of 
the Constitution tolerated. The fugitive slave clause in the Constitution and corresponding 
Fugitive Slave Laws shifted onto the Northern states the cost of returning fugitive slaves 
who fled to there. Yet, by 1860, political support for slavery in general and the Fugitive 
Slave Laws in particular were declining sharply.370 Despite this decline, William Lloyd 
Garrison was right that slavery was more secure in the Union than out of it. 
 It is commonly thought that the Civil War was fought to end slavery. Nothing 
could be further from the truth. While the South probably did secede in order to protect 
                                                 
368 Ibid., p. 22. 
369 Ibid., p. 82. 
370 DiLorenzo, p. 276. 
 131
its peculiar institution, if only because it made them extremely vulnerable to the 
Republican mercantilist program; Thomas DiLorenzo provides strong evidence in The 
Real Lincoln that the principal object of Lincoln’s war was to preserve the Union. The 
editor of Lincoln’s Collected Works, Roy Basler, commented that Lincoln barely 
mentioned slavery before 1854.371 Lincoln had promised the South, upon assuming 
office, to respect the institution of slavery. He did consider slavery to be immoral but he 
also saw blacks as an inferior race.  
I have no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the 
white and the black races. There is a physical difference between the two, 
which, in my judgment, will probably forever forbid their living together 
upon the footing of perfect equality, and inasmuch as it becomes a 
necessity that there must be a difference, I, as well as Judge Douglas, am 
in favor of the race to which I belong having the superior position. I have 
never said anything to the contrary, but I hold that, notwithstanding all 
this, there is no reason in the world why the negro is not entitled to all the 
natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, the right to 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. I hold that he is as much entitled 
to these as the white man. I agree with Judge Douglas he is not my equal 
in many respects – certainly not in color, perhaps not in moral or 
intellectual endowment. But in the right to eat bread, without the leave of 
anybody else, which his own hand earns, he is my equal and the equal of 
Judge Douglas, and the equal of every living man.”372 
 
He preferred, if possible, to “free all the slaves, and send them to Liberia – to their own 
native land.”373 However, political expediency demanded that he settle instead for 
blocking the expansion of slavery. Lincoln’s primary agenda upon assuming office was 
the Whig economic agenda – the “American System” of his political idol, Henry Clay – 
and after the South began to secede, to preserve the Union: “My politics are short and 
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sweet…I am in favor of a national bank…the internal improvement system and a high 
protective tariff.”374 In other words: “The American System…was the framework for a 
giant political patronage system[,]” the policies of which “tend to generate a 
centralization of governmental power[.]”375 
The overwhelming desire of Lincoln and other Northerners to preserve the Union 
at all costs, against the principles of the Revolution, insured the onset of the Civil War. In 
his first inaugural address, he echoed Daniel Webster’s argument of thirty years previous, 
by repeating a phrase from the discarded Articles of Confederation, “I hold that…the 
Union of these States is perpetual.”376 He continued: 
The Union is unbroken, and to the extent of my ability I shall take care, as 
the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the 
Union be faithfully executed in all the States. 
 
There needs to be no bloodshed or violence, and there shall be none unless 
it be forced upon the national authority. The power confided to me will be 
used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the 
Government and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may 
be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using force 
against or among the people anywhere.377 
 
Rather than let the Southern states secede peacefully, as widespread sentiment in the 
North favored prior to the attack on Fort Sumter by the Confederacy, an attack Lincoln 
maneuvered them into for propaganda purposes, Lincoln was determined to fight a war to  
keep them in the Union and carry out his economic agenda, if necessary.378 He 
denounced secession as “an ingenious sophism” and argued that secession would destroy 
the government and lead to anarchy; both claims were false.379 
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In his Gettysburg Address, he “claimed that the war was being fought in defense 
of government by consent, but in fact exactly the opposite was true: The Federal 
government under Lincoln sought to deny Southerners the right of government by 
consent, for they certainly did not consent to remaining in the Union.”380 Lincoln’s theory 
of consent did not include the right to use popular sovereignty in support of chattel 
slavery, and rightly so, but we have seen that he was not prepared to give blacks political 
equality and he was more than willing to deny non-slaveholding Northerners and 
Southerners their freedom.  
DiLorenzo raises a crucial question: why didn’t Lincoln, a man widely regarded 
as a master politician, apply his great skills to a serious effort at peaceful emancipation, 
such as had been done in nearly every other country in the world, instead of so readily 
going to war? The answer is that the issue of ending slavery was trotted out as a political 
and military propaganda tactic, even Lincoln admitted as much. In a letter to Horace 
Greeley he revealed his primary goal: 
My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either 
to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any 
slave I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving 
others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored 
race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union.381 
 
The Emancipation Proclamation, for example, purported to free all of the slaves in 
Confederate territory out of Lincoln’s control but did not free slaves in conquered 
Confederate territory.382  
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In the North, the American System was finally enacted in full during the war. The 
first-ever national income tax in America was introduced in 1861. The Internal Revenue 
Act of 1862 tried to tax nearly everything, requiring the creation of a large bureaucracy, 
and was unprecedented at the time. “At the war’s close the United States could boast 
higher taxation per capita than any other nation.”383 But taxes covered only one-fifth of 
the war’s monetary cost, so the North had to resort to steep protectionist tariffs, heavy 
borrowing, and monetary inflation. Internal improvement programs consisted of subsidies 
and grants for railroad construction, agriculture, education (agricultural, mechanical, and 
military related), and military related industries (the beginning of the military-industrial 
complex). “Because the tax structure and contract awards tended to favor economically 
integrated firms, the Civil War encouraged corporate concentration.”384 
Hummel argues convincingly that while the Republicans practiced neo-
mercantilism in the North, the Confederacy embraced full-blown war socialism. The 
Confederacy, too, increased taxation and borrowed heavily but relied far more on 
monetary inflation (to a point that dwarfed that of the North). The Commissary and 
Quartermaster Bureaus would also confiscate food and other supplies from the people, 
paying at officially fixed prices with depreciating paper money. The southern people 
experienced great hardship as a result and “state governments attempted to step in and aid 
suffering families” through social welfare policies.385 Unlike the North, the South lacked 
a developed industrial base and the Confederate government compensated by establishing 
government-owned military-industrial facilities. “When the authorities did purchase 
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supplies from private firms, they dictated prices and profits.”386 This system of war 
socialism necessitated the growth of a large central bureaucracy. “A North Carolinian 
serving in the Rebel Congress complained toward the war’s close that the land was 
‘alive’ with government officials, ‘thick as locusts in Egypt’.”387 
 Not only did the war’s economic policies on both sides violate the principles of 
limited government, Lincoln all but suspended the Constitution during the war. In 1861, 
he issued a decree suspending the writ of habeas corpus. He then proceeded to arrest 
thousands of political opponents without due process. One political opponent, 
Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham, was even deported. He suppressed free elections 
in Maryland and most other Northern states. He also suppressed the press that were not 
supportive of the war by shutting down papers, preventing circulation, arresting editors. 
Thomas DiLorenzo argues that Lincoln committed all, or nearly all, of the “train of 
abuses” the Declaration of Independence accused King George III of committing.388 And 
both the North and the South instituted conscription. 
 The war would have a lasting impact on American society and government. 
Lincoln fought a successful war to suppress the rights of secession and state’s rights, 
effectively destroying state sovereignty and making them mere subsidiaries of the federal 
government. It is instructive to note that the practice of referring to the United States as 
“it” rather than “them” began after the Civil War. The Union was “indissoluble”; not our 
rights or states’ rights but the federal government, the State, was “unalienable.” 
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Reconstruction also entailed severe costs for liberty. Not only had the Southern 
economy been almost completely destroyed by their war measures and the Federal 
military, Reconstruction imposed severe political and economic policies on the South. 
Among other things, the Southern states were blackmailed by Congress into ratifying the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which would have highly centralizing effects, “by prohibiting 
congressional representation by those states” until and unless they ratified it.389 When all 
initially refused, “Congress responded…by passing the Reconstruction Act of 1867, 
which established a comprehensive military dictatorship to run the governments of each 
of the ten states that were not yet restored to the Union” and made ratifying the 
amendment a requirement for lifting the military rule.390 The centralizing, mercantilist 
policies of the American System that were begun during the war were continued and 
expanded by the Republican Party during and after Reconstruction. 
The foregoing is the soil out of which grew both the welfare-warfare state and 
modern radical libertarianism. The War of Southern Secession, popularly known as the 
Civil War, is thought of by many libertarians and some conservatives as the turning point 
in American history when the principles of the Revolution and the ideals of limited 
government held by the Founders were discarded. However, even after the war, some 
scruples survived for a time and, though government continued to grow, big government 
as we have come to know it was decades off. 
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The early Progressive Era of the late 1800s and early 1900s brought some 
significant changes: namely, antitrust legislation (another term for corporate welfare), the 
Federal Reserve in 1913, the 16th Amendment (which constitutionalized the national 
income tax), and the 17th Amendment (which cut one of the last checks the states had on 
the federal government). This era also produced the only constitutional amendment to 
attempt social reform, the 19th Amendment. The Prohibition was unquestionably and 
predictably a monumental failure. 
Government growth can occur in both scale and scope.391 When the scale of 
government grows, the resources allocated to existing governmental functions are 
increased. Governments grow in scope when they take on new functions. The tendency of 
government growth does not proceed at a uniform rate. In the twentieth century, Western 
states have experienced an accelerated ratcheting up of the scale and scope of 
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VI. A Radical Libertarian Critique of the State 
Liberty: not the daughter but the mother of order.  
– Pierre-Joseph Proudhon 
 
Having given an overview of a radical libertarian natural law and natural rights 
theory, having examined La Boétie’s analysis of the nature of tyranny and subjection, and 
with the foregoing illustration of the conflict between liberty and power, I now turn on 
these grounds to sketching out a critique of the State. 
VI.1 Social Power vs. State Power 
 
One libertarian thinker who experienced World Wars I and II and the Great 
Depression (& New Deal) first-hand, at a time when most other defenders of classical 
liberal ideals were dead or retired, was Albert Jay Nock. Indeed, Nock was instrumental 
in spurring the development of modern libertarianism and conservatism. Nock saw the 
rise of statism in Europe and America as appalling, and he was in a perfect position to 
analyze the metamorphosis of Leviathan. Essentially, Nock, and subsequent libertarians 
like Murray Rothbard and Hans-Hermann Hoppe, came to see history as a race between 
social power – “the productive consequence of voluntary interactions”393 – and State 
power. 
Echoing La Boétie’s analysis of tyranny, Nock notes in Our Enemy, The State 
(1935): 
It is unfortunately none too well understood that, just as the State has no 
money of its own, so it has no power of its own. All the power it has is 
what society gives it, plus what it confiscates from time to time on one 
pretext or another; there is no other source from which State power can be 
drawn. Therefore every assumption of State power, whether by gift or 
seizure, leaves society with so much less power; there is never, nor can be, 
any strengthening of State power without a corresponding and roughly 
equivalent depletion of social power. 
                                                 
393 Rothbard, Conceived in Liberty Vol. I: The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, p. 10. 
 139
 
Moreover, it follows that with any exercise of State power, not only the 
exercise of social power in the same direction, but the disposition to 
exercise it in that direction, tends to dwindle.394 
 
Nock identifies three principal indices of the increase of State power. The first 
index is the degree of centralization of State power. The second is the degree to which the 
bureaucratic principle has been extended or expanded. The third is the degree to which 
poverty and mendicancy have been erected into a permanent political asset.395 The 
centralization of State power, not only into the federal government but also within it into 
the executive branch, has occurred through what Nock calls a curious 
American variant of the coup d’Etat. Our national legislature was not 
suppressed by force of arms…but was bought out of its functions with 
public money; and as appeared most conspicuously in the elections of 
November, 1934, the consolidation of the coup d’Etat was effected by the 
same means; the corresponding functions in the smaller units [the states] 
were reduced under the personal control of the Executive.396 
 
This centralization occurred concomitantly with a rapid expansion of the federal 
bureaucracy that set about to regulate, subsidize, or actually run all manner of economic 
and social functions, such as food production, communication, energy, charity, etc. The 
executive bureaucracies consolidated under their control legislative and decision-making 
powers formerly reserved to the national legislature, state and local governments, and 
voluntary social institutions, with the necessary consequence of crowding them out or 
making them subservient. 
The proliferation of bureaucrats, subsidized farmers and businesses, and social 
welfare recipients served to create a vast subsidized voting block that would have every 
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incentive to maintain and increase the power and benefits of their new positions. The 
inevitable result of this is that State power does not diminish. As the State consolidates its 
power, it often has to modify its practices, such as by shifting from direct subsidy to 
indirect control through legislation and regulations, and this often gives the appearance of 
diminishing State power. But State power is expressed through laws and regulations as 
much as it is through nationalized or subsidized industries and social welfare programs. 
How and why does this accumulation of State power occur? One of the 
mechanisms that Nock cites is that same danger Thomas Jefferson worried over: “the 
consolidation [i.e., centralization] of our government by the noiseless and therefore 
unalarming instrumentality of the Supreme Court.”397 Also, like La Boétie he recognizes 
that politicians and even the people themselves use various devices – “certain formulas, 
certain arrangements of words,…the rehearsal of poetic litanies” – to soften the image of 
policies or glorify the State; these “stand as an obstacle in the way of our perceiving how 
far the conversion of social power into State power has actually gone.”398 
It has already been noted that the exercise of State power not only diminishes or 
crowds out the exercise of social power but also the disposition to exercise it. Thus we 
see the people, who, growing ever more accustomed to the State taking responsibility for 
more and more functions formerly performed by society, increasingly look to the State to 
solve any and all problems that may arise, even the problems that the State inevitably 
causes due to its ineptitude in performing the functions properly left to society. Nock 
cites a perceptive observation from Herbert Spencer that “when State power is applied to 
social purposes, its action is invariably ‘slow, stupid, extravagant, unadaptive, corrupt 
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and obstructive.’”399 It will now be fruitful to turn to theoretical work of scholars of the 
Austrian school of economics to explain in part why this is so. 
VI.2 Profit Management vs. Bureaucratic Management 
 In order to understand why the State is so unsuited to social purposes it is 
important to distinguish between profit management and bureaucratic management. The 
eminent Austrian economist, Ludwig von Mises, teacher of Murray Rothbard and F. A. 
Hayek, in his book Bureaucracy (1944) and in other works, argues that bureaucratic 
management is the characteristic method of government and that it is appropriate only to 
government (not business, for example). Likewise, profit management is characteristic of 
the market and is not appropriate for necessary government functions (such as police or 
military). Unlike his student, Rothbard, Mises was not an anarcho-capitalist, though he 
came close with his arguments in favor of Jeffersonian local democracy and unlimited 
right to secession. 
 In a capitalist system of production, the capitalists, entrepreneurs, and farmers are 
beholden to the consumers. They must produce what the consumers want. “[I]f they fail 
to produce at the lowest possible cost what the consumers are asking for, they lose their 
office.”400 “Profit and loss are the instruments by means of which the consumers keep a 
tight reign on all business activities.”401 Profit and loss accounting is made possible by 
the system of market prices, which necessarily depends upon private ownership of the 
means of production; the market price is also necessary to guide economic planning. 
Without a common denominator to weigh the costs of pursuing one plan out of countless 
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others, of utilizing one factor of production among countless others, economic calculation 
would be impossible. 
By its nature, bureaucratic management is incapable of economic calculation. It 
“is the method applied in the conduct of administrative affairs the result of which has no 
cash value on the market.”402 There is no connection between revenue and expenditure in 
public administration; there is no market price for its achievements. The public services 
are concerned with spending money only. They are supported in whole or in part by taxes 
rather than sales. In the absence of the profit motive, it is necessary to impose thrift on 
the bureaucrat by regimentation. Consequently, 
bureaucratic management is management bound to comply with detailed 
rules and regulations fixed by the authority of a superior body. The task of 
the bureaucrat is to perform what these rules and regulations order him to 
do. His discretion to act according to his own best conviction is seriously 
restricted by them.403 
 
With profit management, on the other hand, “[t]here is no need to limit the discretion of 
subordinates by any rules or regulations other than that underlying all business activities, 
namely, to render their operations profitable.”404 
 For obvious reasons, then, a public enterprise in a market system, if it is to be 
operated without regard to profits, is also faced with the economic calculation problem. 
Since the behavior of the public is no longer a criterion of its usefulness, since every 
service can be improved by increasing expenditures, regimentation must be imposed 
upon the manager of a public enterprise. Extensive rules and regulations are required to 
guide the production of what, when, how much, and where. And unlike private 
enterprises, it is not a mark of failure to operate at a loss. 
                                                 
402 Ibid., p. 51. 
403 Ibid., p. 50. 
404 Ibid. 
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 If the lack of any means of economic calculation is damaging to public enterprises 
in a market system, so too is it to socialism. 
Socialism, that is, full government control of all economic activities, is 
impracticable because a socialist community would lack the indispensable 
intellectual instrument of economic planning and designing: economic 
calculation. The very idea of central planning is self-contradictory. A 
socialist central board of production will be helpless in the face of the 
problems to be solved. It will never know whether the projects considered 
are advantageous or whether their performance would not bring about a 
waste of the means available. Socialism must result in complete chaos.405 
  
It is only because public enterprises exist within a country, and socialist states exist 
within an international system, the greater part of which operates as a market economy, 
that they are able to perform any kind of economic calculation at all. Under these 
conditions they are able to use the prices established in the rest of the national or 
international economy for their own economic calculation. Though even this mimicry is 
no real substitute for genuine economic calculation. And if every state were to adopt 
socialism, “there would be no more prices for factors of production and economic 
calculation would be impossible.”406 
Government interference and impairment of the profit motive lead to the 
bureaucratization of private enterprise. There are a number of ways in which the 
government can interfere with business and impair the profit motive. The government 
may tax away all or most profits, fix prices, or limit profits in some other way. Such 
policies inhibit innovation as they limit the benefits to the entrepreneur while leaving him 
all the risks. The imposition of rules and regulations on private enterprise impose 
operating costs as efforts are made either to comply with them or evade them. To the 
                                                 
405 Ibid., p. 62. 
406 Ibid., p. 64; For a detailed treatment of the socialist-calculation problem, see Ludwig von Mises, 
Socialism (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969. Reprint. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, The Liberty Fund, 1982). 
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extent that private enterprise is driven to bureaucratization, it will become more 
dependent upon government bureaus; it will have to spend more time engaged in political 
competition, utilizing diplomacy or bribery, in order to gain an advantage over its rivals, 
while its economic competitiveness is eroded and its incentive to compete economically 
is decreased. 
VI.3 Privately-Owned vs. Publicly-Owned Government 
 In Democracy – The God That Failed (2002), Hans-Hermann Hoppe, a major 
Austrian economist and a colleague of Murray Rothbard, makes a distinction between 
private ownership of government and public ownership of government. The characteristic 
historical example of the former is hereditary monarchy, of the latter, democracy.407 A 
privately-owned government is one in which the government is considered to be the 
personal property of an individual(s). In contrast,  
[d]emocratic rule—in which the government apparatus is considered 
“public” property administered by regularly elected officials who do not 
personally own and are not viewed as owning the government but as its 
temporary caretakers or trustees—typically only follows personal rule and 
private government ownership [historically].408 
 
These two forms of government have systematically different effects on social time 
preference. 
 The Austrian theory of time preference holds that, ceteris paribus, people will 
prefer satisfaction of wants sooner rather than later. An individual with a higher degree of 
time preference will be more present-oriented, while a person with a low degree of time 
                                                 
407 It should be noted that dictatorships are an outgrowth of mass democracy. Despite any superficial 
resemblance to monarchy that it may have, in theory and practice a dictatorship tends to function like a 
publicly-owned government or a mass democracy. See Hoppe, The Myth of National Defense, pp. 6, 8, & 
13. 
408 Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Democracy – The God That Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, 
Democracy, and Natural Order (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002), p. 17 (emphasis in 
original). 
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preference will be more future-oriented or far-sighted. Under a privately-owned 
government, the ruler and the people will tend to have relatively lower degrees of time 
preference than they would under publicly-owned or democratic government. 
 Hoppe offers two interrelated structural/institutional factors that drive the 
tendency towards higher time preference in democracies: “public” ownership of the 
government and free entry into it. 
A democratic ruler can use the government apparatus to his personal 
advantage, but he does not own it. He cannot sell government resources 
and privately pocket the receipts from such sales, nor can he pass 
government possessions on to his personal heir. He owns the current use 
of government resources, but not their capital value. In distinct contrast to 
a king, a president will want to maximize not total government wealth 
(capital values and current income) but current income (regardless and at 
the expense of capital values). Indeed, even if he wished to act differently, 
he could not, for as public property, government resources are unsaleable, 
and without market prices economic calculation is impossible. 
Accordingly, it must be regarded as unavoidable that public-government 
ownership results in continual capital consumption. Instead of maintaining 
or even enhancing the value of the government estate, as a king would do, 
a president (as distinct from a king) has no interest in not ruining his 
country. For why would he not want to increase his confiscations if the 
advantage of a policy of moderation—the resulting higher capital value of 
the government estate—cannot be reaped privately, while the advantage of 
the opposite policy of higher taxes—can be so reaped? For a president, 
unlike for a king, moderation offers only disadvantages.409 
 
This, of course, applies not only to presidents or prime ministers in a democracy but also 
to members of congress or parliament as well as to bureaucrats. Obviously not all 
politicians act in the manner described above, or at least do not intentionally pursue 
policies with such effects, but public-government ownership has the effect of 
encouraging such tendencies. 
 Moreover, in a modern democracy, entry into government is in principle open to 
everyone. In contrast, entry into government in a monarchy is restricted to the ruler and 
                                                 
409 Ibid., p. 24 (emphasis in original). 
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his family and friends. This has the effect of stimulating “the development of a clear 
‘class consciousness’ on the part of the governed public and promotes opposition and 
resistance to any expansion of the government’s power to tax.”410 Also, “government 
attempts at territorial expansion tend to be viewed by the public as the ruler’s private 
business, to be financed and carried out with his own personal funds. The added territory 
is the king’s, and so he, not the public, should pay for it. Consequently, of the two 
possible methods of enlarging his realm, war and military conquest or contractual 
acquisition [e.g., marriage], a private ruler tends to prefer the latter.”411 
 Free entry into government blurs the distinction between the rulers and the ruled. 
Anyone, in theory, can become part of the ruling class. The “class-consciousness” of the 
ruled is blurred. Pressure groups will inevitably attempt to influence politicians and get 
representatives elected in order to use the coercive power of the government apparatus to 
satisfy their short-run interests at the expense of others. Consequently, “public resistance 
against government power is systematically weakened.”412 
The combined effect of these two factors – “public” ownership of government and 
free entry into it – is conducive to a state of affairs, commonly used to refer to 
environmental issues, that can best be characterized as a “tragedy of the commons.”413,414 
Of course, the tendency of a higher social time preference under publicly-owned 
governments relative to privately-owned governments should be understood in 
conjunction with the tendency of government growth. The Jacobin-style, statist 
                                                 
410 Ibid., p. 21. 
411 Ibid., p. 23. 
412 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
413 See, for example, Managing the Commons, Garret Hardin and John Baden, eds. (San Francisco: W.H. 
Freeman, 1977). 
414 It should be noted that neither Hoppe nor the present author advocate a return to monarchy or deny that 
monarchy suffers from serious flaws as well. 
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democracies have obviously won out over Jeffersonian-style democracy in the twentieth 
century. The transition from monarchy to democracy in the West has been characterized 
by rising public debt, high levels of taxation and inflation, increasing government 
intrusion into our every day lives, and the advent of total war. This is especially evident 
in the twentieth century. Consider, for example, the evidence presented by R.J. Rummel 
in his book, Death by Government, that governments have caused the deaths of an 
estimated 170 million civilians in the past century, not to speak of the number of soldiers 
killed in war.415 
VI.4 Government vs. the State 
 Most people use the terms ‘government’ and ‘the State’ interchangeably. I have 
been doing so thus far. Given Nock’s analysis of social power and State power, it may 
seem as if he makes a similar distinction between society and government as does 
Thomas Paine in Common Sense. In fact, Nock carries the analysis further in two novel 
ways. He distinguishes clearly between government and the State, and identifies the State 
as being a fundamentally anti-social institution. Government, Nock argues in Lockean 
fashion, “implements the common desire of society, first, for freedom, and second, for 
security. Beyond this it does not go; it contemplates no positive intervention upon the 
individual, but only a negative intervention.”416 He favorably cites, and notes that it 
seems favorable to Paine as well, “the legendary king Pausole, who prescribed but two 
laws for his subjects, the first being, Hurt no man, and the second, Then do as you please; 
                                                 
415 R.J. Rummel, Death by Government (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994). 
416 Nock, p. 45. 
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and the whole business of government should be the purely negative one of seeing that 
this code is carried out.”417 
 Government, then, is a natural part of society; the State, on the other hand, has an 
altogether different origin and function. The State “did not originate in the common 
understanding and agreement of society; it originated in conquest and confiscation. Its 
intention, far from contemplating ‘freedom and security’…contemplated primarily the 
continuous economic exploitation of one class by another.” The State’s primary function 
is not to protect the natural rights of individuals through purely negative interventions but 
to maintain the stratification of society into a plutocratic, exploiting class and an 
exploited class through “innumerable and most onerous positive interventions.” The 
order of interest it reflects is “not social, but purely anti-social; and those who 
[administer] it, judged by the common standard of ethics, or even the common standard 
of law as applied to private persons, [are] indistinguishable from a professional-criminal 
class.”418 
 Nock remarks that throughout history government has only existed where 
economic exploitation was either impractical or unprofitable. But where economic 
exploitation has been practical and profitable, the State has prevailed. A compelling 
reason for this is that economic theory tells us people will seek to satisfy their wants with 
as little exertion as possible. Only two means exist for man to satisfy his needs and 
desires.419 These are the economic means and the political means. The economic means 
consists of voluntary production and exchange of wealth and services. The political 
means, by contrast, consists of “the uncompensated appropriation of wealth produced by 
                                                 
417 Ibid., p. 46. 
418 Ibid. 
419 On the economic and political means, Nock has drawn from historian Franz Oppenheimer’s The State. 
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others[.]” As it is easier to take than to produce, men will, ceteris paribus, employ the 
political means whenever and as far as possible – exclusively, if possible, or in 
conjunction with the economic means. The State is the organization of the political 
means. In its primitive form we see that it is employed “by conquest, confiscation, 
expropriation, and the introduction of a slave economy.” In its modern form, the 
merchant-State employs “the apparatus of tariffs, concessions, rent-monopoly, and the 
like.” Thus corruption is unavoidable when the State apparatus is available.420 
 Nock notes that history shows that “the depletion of social power by the State can 
not be checked after a certain point of progress is passed.” Exactly when that point is 
reached in any given country or civilization it may be impossible to say until after the 
fact, but history furnishes no examples of reversals once State power has accumulated to 
a considerable degree. An excellent case study of this process is Rome. It became 
increasingly centralized and bureaucratized, strangling its own economy, as it slowly 
deteriorated. “Athens, on the other hand, collapse[d] quickly.”421 Nock is not sure, in the 
1930s, whether America had yet reached that point, but the prodigious acceleration of 
State power disturbed him greatly, particularly as there was no evidence then, nor is there 
now in the twenty-first century, of any inclination to retard or reverse it. This leaves us 
the question of how can the growth of State power be prevented in the first place? How 
can we prevent the State from transforming into Leviathan? Or government from 
transforming into the State? 
 
 
                                                 
420 Ibid., p. 59. 
421 Ibid., p. 61. 
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VI.5 The State as Territorial Monopolist 
It is not completely clear from Nock’s Our Enemy, The State what form his ideal 
government would take. All of the examples he offers are those of Native Americans and 
other ‘primitive’ peoples. Roy A. Childs, Jr., in a 1989 review of the book asserts that 
Nock was not an anarchist. One thing is clear, however; if Nock consistently believed in 
the principles expressed in the Declaration of Independence, and in his own criticisms of 
the State, then he would have to be classified as an anarchist. Any form of government 
perfectly consistent with natural rights must necessarily be completely voluntary and 
therefore anarchistic. This will become clearer if we establish an explicit definition of the 
State. 
 In The Ethics of Liberty, Rothbard defines the State, not inconsistently with 
standard definitions, as 
that organization which possesses either or both (in actual fact, almost 
always both) of the following characteristics: (a) it acquires its revenue by 
physical coercion (taxation); and (b) it achieves a compulsory monopoly 
of force and ultimate decision-making power over a given territorial area. 
Both of these essential activities of the State necessarily constitute 
criminal aggression and depredation of the just rights of private property 
of its subjects (including self-ownership). For the first constitutes and 
establishes theft on a grand scale; while the second prohibits the free 
competition of defense and decision-making agencies within a given 
territorial area -- prohibiting the voluntary purchase and sale of defense 
and judicial services.422 
 
Thus, if Nock was consistent, and I think he was, then he would not countenance any 
institution purporting to be a government that did either (a) or (b) or both. Anarchism is 
                                                 
422 Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (New York: New York University Press, 2002 [1982]), p. 
172. By “given territorial area” Rothbard means “beyond the area of each property owner’s just property” 
(n. 11). The passage quoted in the text is immediately followed by: “Hence the justice of the vivid critique 
of the State by libertarian theorist Albert Jay Nock: ‘The State claims and exercises the monopoly of crime’ 
in a given territorial area. ‘It forbids private murder, but itself organizes murder on a colossal scale. It 
punishes private theft, but itself lays unscrupulous hands on anything it wants, whether the property of 
citizen or alien.’” The quote from Nock is from On Doing the Right Thing, and Other Essays (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1928), p. 143. 
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not defined by a desire for no rules and no law. Rather, it opposes coercive monopolies 
like the State. Nock’s definition of government seems perfectly consistent with 
anarchism. 
 This anarchistic notion of government runs counter to mainstream theories of 
political philosophers and political economists, however. The standard definition of the 
State given above is what most theorists, and most people for that matter, think of as 
government. If nothing else, it is thought, the State must have a monopoly over 
legislation, internal and external defense, and the courts. It is argued that these are 
“public goods” that the State must control in order to maintain law and order. Yet even 
this “nightwatchman” or “limited government” version of the State possesses an inherent 
contradiction. 
As Hoppe, in The Myth of National Defense, cleverly puts it: It is widely accepted 
that every 
“monopoly” is “bad” from the point of view of consumers. Monopoly here 
is understood in its classical sense as an exclusive privilege granted to a 
single producer of a commodity or service; i.e., as the absence of “free 
entry” into a particular line of production. In other words, only one 
agency, A, may produce a given good, x. Any such monopolist is “bad” 
for consumers because, shielded from potential new entrants into his area 
of production, the price of his product x will be higher and the quality of x 
lower than otherwise.423 
 
This proposition is clearly incompatible with the one that the State must have a territorial 
monopoly. Ought the first proposition be rejected? Economic theory and history have 
shown the classical conception of monopoly to be correct. Is there something special 
about the production of security that exempts it from this principle? Certainly the burden 
of proof is on those who would answer yes. In the aforementioned book edited by Hoppe, 
                                                 
423 Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Myth of National Defense: Essays on the Theory and History of Security 
Production (Auburn: The Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2003), p. 5. 
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Austrian economists and historians offer a compelling case, indeed I would say a decisive 
case, that the answer is no. 
 If we cannot reject the proposition that every monopoly is bad, then we must 
reject as false the proposition that law and order require government (or rather, the State) 
to have a territorial monopoly. It is the very monopolistic nature of the State that enables 
it to grow beyond any constitutional limitations placed upon it and eventually transform 
into Leviathan before finally destroying itself. The first economist “to provide a 
systematic explanation for the failure of governments as security producers” was Gustave 
de Molinari (1818-1912), in his article “De la Production de la Securité (February 1849)” 
His argument, which follows along the same lines as those already made here, is worth 
quoting at length: 
If there is one well-established truth in political economy, it is this: 
 
That in all cases, for all commodities that serve to provide for the tangible 
or intangible needs of consumers, it is in the consumer’s best interest that 
labor and trade remain free, because the freedom of labor and trade have 
as their necessary and permanent result the maximum reduction of price. 
 
And this: That the interests of the consumer of any commodity whatsoever 
should always prevail over the interests of the producer. 
 
Now in pursuing these principles, one arrives at this rigorous conclusion: 
 
That the production of security should, in the interests of the consumers of 
this intangible commodity, remain subject to the law of free competition. 
 
Whence it follows: That no government should have the right to prevent 
another government from going into competition with it, or require 
consumers of security to come exclusively to it for this commodity… 
 
Either this is logically true, or else the principles on which economic 
science is based are invalid. (Gustave de Molinari, Production of Security 
[New York: Center for Libertarian Studies, 1977], pp. 3-4) 
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If, on the contrary, the consumer is not free to buy security wherever he 
pleases, you forthwith see open up a large profession dedicated to 
arbitrariness and bad management. Justice becomes slow and costly, the 
police vexatious, individual liberty is no longer respected, the price of 
security is abusively inflated and inequitably apportioned, according to the 
power and influence of this or that class of consumers. (Molinari, 
Production of Security, pp. 13-14)424 
 
VI.6 The Lockean Case Against Locke425 
 If the arguments given above are correct, then Locke’s argument for the State fails 
on its own merits. According to Locke, all men are created by God, born equally free in a 
state of nature. Man, born with a God-given 
title to perfect freedom and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and 
privileges of the Law of Nature, equally with any other man, or number of 
men in the world, hath by nature a power not only to preserve his property 
– that is, his life, liberty, and estate, against the injuries and attempts of 
other men, but to judge of and punish the breaches of that law in others, as 
he is persuaded the offence deserves…each being, where there is no other, 
judge for himself and executioner…426 
 
Locke argues that men will find it rational to voluntarily give up this equality of authority 
by setting up a government to protect their rights because these rights are imperfectly 
secure in a state of nature. Locke identifies “three principal defects of the state of natural 
anarchy” as the reasons for this insecurity.427 Philosopher Roderick Long has insightfully 
labeled them the legislative defect, judicial defect, and executive defect, respectively. 
Firstly, there wants an established, settled, known law, received and 
allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the 
common measure to decide all controversies between them. For though 
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the Law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures, yet 
men, being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of 
it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding them in the application of it to 
their particular cases. 
 
Secondly, in the State of Nature there wants a known and indifferent 
judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the 
established law. For every one in that state being both judge and 
executioner of the Law of Nature, men being partial to themselves, 
passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much 
heat in their own cases, as well as negligence and unconcernedness, make 
them too remiss in other men's.  
 
Thirdly, in the State of Nature there often wants power to back and 
support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who 
by any injustice offended will seldom fail where they are able by force to 
make good their injustice. Such resistance many times makes the 
punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive to those who attempt 
it.428 
 
“Locke concludes that these three defects may be remedied by centralizing the 
legislative, judicial, and executive functions in a constitutional government”429 that is 
restricted to protecting the rights of its citizens. 
Where Locke goes wrong is that he conflates the absence of the State with the 
absence of law. Let us consider first the judicial defect. Locke argues that the state of 
nature “wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences 
according to the established law.”430 In other words, a third party is wanted as an 
impartial arbiter as it is undesirable for men, being naturally partial to themselves, to act 
as judge in their own case. Yet as a territorial monopolist the State must necessarily judge 
in its own case when conflicts between itself and its citizens occur. It is no answer to this 
charge to reply that with the separation of powers under Constitutionalism the judicial 
branch can act as an impartial judge in conflicts between citizens and the other two 
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429 Long, “The Nature of Law: Part II.” 
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branches. It is still a part of the State, and its judges are nominated and appointed by the 
other two branches; as such it would be naïve to assume that its interests are entirely 
pure. And, as Roderick Long points out, “What if the citizen’s complaint is with the 
judicial branch itself?”431 The State, therefore, suffers from Locke’s judicial defect. 
 The State, too, suffers from the legislative defect. Locke argues that there “wants 
an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the 
standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies 
between them.”432 Certainly this is desirable. But consider the tens of thousands of pages 
of bureaucratic regulations and legislated laws that the United States government has 
produced and continues to produce at a prodigious rate. The bureaucratic regulations are 
not even subject to the electoral process as the bureaucrats are unelected officials within 
the executive branch. No one can possibly know all of these laws and regulations. 
Moreover, they tend to be vaguely worded so as to allow various arbitrary interpretations. 
Many of them contradict other regulations and laws. And it cannot honestly be said that 
the average citizen has consented to them. Virtually every modern democracy suffers 
from this defect. But autocratic States do as well. 
 Why is it assumed that impartial arbiters and a commonly agreed upon set of laws 
require a monocentric legal system? In the past century, historians have discovered that 
the majority of legal systems have been polycentric rather than monocentric, meaning 
that they had no central or monopolistic authority. Consider the case of early Anglo-
Saxon customary law: 
A system of surety, known as borh, provided the foundation of Anglo-
Saxon law. Under the borh system a set of ten to twelve individuals, 
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defined at first by kinship but later by contractual agreement, would form 
a group to pledge surety for the good behavior of its members. The group 
would back up this pledge by paying the fines of its members if they were 
found guilty of violating customary law. A surety group thus had strong 
financial incentives to police its members and exclude those who 
persistently engaged in criminal behavior. Exclusion served as a powerful 
sanction[.] 
 
The Anglo-Saxon courts, called moots, were public assemblies of 
common men and neighbors. The moots did not expend their efforts on 
creating or codifying law; they left that to custom and to essentially 
declaratory law codes of kings [declaratory because kings generally only 
codified customs already existing in society]. The outcome of a dispute 
turned entirely on the facts of the case, which were usually established 
through ritual oath-giving. […] 
 
Anglo-Saxon law had no category for crimes against the state or against 
society – it recognized only crimes against individuals. As in other 
customary legal systems, the moots typically demanded that criminals pay 
restitution or composition to their victims – or else face the hazards of 
outlawry and blood-feud. […]433 
 
Anglo-Saxon law also recognized and respected property rights, to the point that higher 
penalties were incurred for crimes in or about the home. The moot courts, like the borh, 
depended on voluntary cooperation. 
A favorite example of libertarians is the quasi-anarchistic legal system of 
Medieval Iceland. In “The Decline and Fall of Private Law in Iceland,” Roderick Long 
provides a good overview of the Icelandic Free Commonwealth: 
In outline, the system's main features were these: Legislative power was 
vested in the General Assembly (althingi); the legislators were Chieftains 
(godhar; singular, godhi) representing their Assemblymen (thingmenn; 
singular, thingmadhr). Every Icelander was attached to a Chieftain, either 
directly, by being an Assemblyman, or indirectly, by belonging to a 
household headed by an Assemblyman. A Chieftaincy (godhordh) was 
private property, which could be bought and sold. Representation was 
determined by choice rather than by place of residence; an Assemblyman 
could transfer his allegiance (and attendant fees) at will from one 
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Chieftain to another without moving to a new district. Hence competition 
among Chieftains served to keep them in line. 
 
The General Assembly passed laws, but had no executive authority; law 
enforcement was up to the individual, with the help of his friends, family, 
and Chieftain. Disputes were resolved either through private arbitration or 
through the court system administered by the General Assembly. 
Wrongdoers were required to pay financial restitution to their victims; 
those who refused were denied all legal protection in the future (and thus, 
e.g., could be killed with impunity). The claim to such compensation was 
itself a marketable commodity; a person too weak to enforce his claim 
could sell it to someone more powerful. This served to prevent the 
powerful from preying on the weak. Foreigners were scandalized by this 
"land without a king"; but Iceland's system appears to have kept the peace 
at least as well as those of its monarchical neighbors.434 
 
The primary reasons for its decline and fall were 1) the introduction of Christianity, and 
2) that it was not private enough, though the system flourished for nearly three hundred 
years. One of the principal flaws was that the number of chieftaincies were fixed by law 
and, over time, with the aid of Church tithes (especially the Churchstead fees paid to the 
private owner of the land each church was built on) as a guaranteed source of income, a 
relative handful of families were able to buy up a majority of them.  
Another prominent example of polycentric law is the Law Merchant, “a 
transnational system of customary law enforced by informal courts,”435 which 
spontaneously formed in late medieval Europe and “offered a more unified body of law 
than did the governmental systems with which it competed.”436 Modern credit bureaus, 
insurance companies, private arbitration firms, and the like serve similar functions of 
surety and assurance. Economic theory and the experience of history suggest that, far 
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from being chaotic, polycentric legal systems tended to be voluntary, to converge on a 
relatively uniform set of law, and were far more adaptable than monocentric systems. 
 Now consider the executive defect, which the State also suffers from. Locke 
argues that the state of nature “often wants power to back and support the sentence when 
right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offended will seldom fail 
where they are able by force to make good their injustice. Such resistance many times 
makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive to those who attempt it.”437 
Why is it supposed that in a state of anarchy, an individual will have no recourse to 
enforcing the law but himself? Consider such voluntary systems as the thief-takers’ 
associations of early nineteenth century England or the vigilance committees of the old 
American frontier or the bohrs of Anglo-Saxon law. Voluntary citizen militias existed in 
colonial America. The modern private security industry is currently a growth industry. In 
contrast, a standing police and military are fairly unusual in history; indeed, the former is 
a relatively modern invention. Whereas market competition will be able to better keep 
private security and law enforcement in check, a State monopoly on the legal use of force 
puts individual citizens at the mercy of an overwhelming force prone to corruption, 
arbitrariness, and general inefficiency. 
 Unfortunately, it has by now become clear that competition within a republican 
system of government, with the separation of powers and checks and balances of 
Constitutionalism, merely simulates market competition within a fundamentally 
monopolistic context and therefore does not provide an adequate check on ambition. 
“There has been a sufficient convergence of interests among the three branches of 
                                                 
437 Locke, IX.124-126, p. 325. 
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republican government that, despite occasional squabbles over details, each branch has 





















                                                 





History is philosophy teaching by examples.  
– Bolingbroke 
 
This essay has been far reaching and I have no doubt bit off more than I could 
chew for a Master’s thesis. I have attempted to sketch out to the best of my current 
understanding, and as far as possible with limited space and time, a radical libertarian 
theory of natural law and natural rights as well as a critique of the State in conjunction 
with La Boétie’s analysis of the nature of tyranny and the psychology of subjection. I see 
the history of mankind as a race and conflict between liberty and power, between social 
power and state power, and I have attempted to illustrate that as well as the fundamental 
role of ideology in revolutionary movements through a sketch of early American history. 
Many, if not most or all, of the ideas presented herein have no doubt evoked 
varying degrees of shock and skepticism. I myself would have reacted similarly a couple 
of years ago. It was partly out of a desire for logical consistency and partly over the 
puzzle of the seemingly never-ending cycle of nations and civilizations that led me to 
explore such radical notions as these. Why do all States and civilizations seem to follow 
the same cycle from liberty and prosperity to increasing centralization, tyranny, and 
decay? The answer, of course, lies in human nature. But I think it also lies in the nature of 
our institutions. Human beings possess the capacity for great good and great evil. The 
incentive and disincentive structures of our institutions play a key role in channeling that 
capacity. As Lord Acton once said, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely,” so why put into the hands of fallible and corruptible human beings the 
absolute power of a “compulsory monopoly of force and ultimate decision-making power 
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over a given territorial area”?439 It seems to be a recipe for disaster, if not in the short-run 
then at least in the long-run for our posterity. I am not naïve; I do not believe that 
mankind will ever live in perfect peace and harmony. However, I do think that it is 
possible to learn from our past mistakes and make improvements upon our institutions as 
our ancestors tried to do. In the nature of the State there is an inherent contradiction that 
cannot be reconciled. Radical libertarians like Rothbard et al. hold out an alternative. Is 
anarcho-capitalism, or as Hoppe calls it, the Natural Order, viable? At the very least, I 
think it is deserving of serious study. And even if it turns out not to be, and the State 
really is a necessary evil, the Austro-libertarian analysis of the State can point us in the 
right direction in our efforts to control its flaws. In the final analysis, it is ideas that drive 
history, that uphold our institutions and unmake or remake them, that maintain the status 
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